U.S. v. Peoples
| Decision Date | 16 November 2000 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 00-1618,00-1658,s. 00-1618 |
| Citation | 250 F.3d 630 |
| Parties | (8th Cir. 2001) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE, v. CORNELIUS PEOPLES, APPELLANT. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE, v. XAVIER LIGHTFOOT, APPELLANT. Submitted: |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Before Wollman, Chief Judge, McMILLIAN, and Richard S. Arnold, Circuit Judges.
Cornelius Peoples and Xavier Lightfoot were convicted of aiding and abetting the murder of a federal government witness in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1512(a)(1)(A), 1512(a)(1)(C), 1512(a)(2), and 1111. The district court sentenced each of them to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Both defendants appeal their convictions. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
In December of 1997, Lightfoot was arrested and charged with the robbery of a federally insured credit union in Omaha, Nebraska, based on information supplied by Jovan Ross, who shared a house with Lightfoot. Ross had met with state and federal law enforcement officers in early December of 1997. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents executed a search warrant for the Ross-Lightfoot house on December 11, 1997, and recovered items taken from the Omaha credit union. Lightfoot was held at a private pretrial detention facility operated by the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA facility), where he remained at all times relevant to this case. Through the discovery process in the robbery case, Lightfoot learned of Ross's cooperation with law enforcement. Shortly before Lightfoot's trial was scheduled to begin, Ross was murdered.
The government's theory at trial was that Lightfoot and Peoples entered into a contract to pay unknown persons to kill Ross because he was providing information about Lightfoot's criminal activity to law enforcement. Although Ross had no substantial information implicating Peoples in criminal activity, the government argued that Peoples believed that his involvement would be discovered if Ross continued to cooperate with law enforcement. The government further argued that Peoples and others had robbed a jewelry store in St. Joseph, Missouri, to obtain funds to pay the killers. At trial, the government offered into evidence recordings of conversations between Lightfoot and Peoples that occurred while Lightfoot was incarcerated at the CCA facility.
On appeal, the defendants contend that the district court erred in empaneling an anonymous jury, in denying their motions for mistrial following an allegedly prejudicial statement by the government prosecutor, and in admitting certain testimony.
The defendants contend that the district court erred by denying their motions for mistrial based on an improper statement made by the prosecutor. We review the denial of motions for mistrial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Wadlington, 233 F.3d 1067, 1077 (8th Cir. 2000). A mistrial is called for when the prosecutor's remark was both in fact improper and "'prejudicially affected the defendant['s] substantial rights so as to deprive [him] of a fair trial.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Figueroa, 900 F.2d 1211, 1215 (8th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted)).
During trial, a government witness testified about a statement that Ross had made to him. After defense counsel made a hearsay objection, the prosecutor asserted that the defendant had "murdered the witness" (referring to Ross), and that therefore the statements were admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), which allows the admission of hearsay evidence of the statements of an unavailable declarant against a party who caused the unavailability through wrongdoing. After overruling the hearsay objection, the district court instructed the jury that the statement had been admitted conditionally and that its ruling did not mean that the court believed that the defendants had caused Ross to be murdered.
We conclude that the prosecutor's remark was not improper, because it merely reiterated the government's theory of the case and provided legal support for the admissibility of the proffered statement. Even if the remark was improper, we are satisfied that the court's instruction was sufficient to cure any potential unfair prejudice. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions for mistrial.
The defendants contend that the district court erred in empaneling an anonymous jury. Upon request, a person charged with a capital offense must be provided with a list of the names and places of residence of each member of the venire panel at least three days prior to trial, unless the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that providing the list may jeopardize the life or safety of any person. 18 U.S.C. 3432 (1994). The district court has wide discretion to empanel an anonymous jury if it finds that a person's life or safety is in jeopardy, or to require the use of numbers for identification in any case. United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1532 (8th Cir. 1995).
All parties were provided a list of the names and places of residence of each member of the venire panel prior to trial. The court then ordered that the panel members be identified in court by numbers rather than by name. The court explained to the panel that this procedure was being employed to reduce the possibility that the media or others interested in the issues of this case might try to contact them.
We find the defendants' argument that the district court acted inappropriately to be without merit. The district court followed the procedures outlined in 18 U.S.C. 3432, and the defendants point to no legal authority requiring any further disclosure or prescribing any procedure for addressing members of the venire panel. The district court's explanation to the panel was reasonably calculated to ensure that the use of numbers did not cause undue prejudice. We approved a similar statement in Darden. 70 F.3d at 1533 ().
Both defendants also argue that the district court made a prejudicial statement concerning the need to conceal the identity of the members of the venire panel. The record reveals, however, that the statement complained of was made outside the presence of the jury, and thus it could not have prejudiced the jurors.
Citing the Fourth Amendment and Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. 2510 et seq. (1994)) ("federal wiretap law"), the defendants moved to suppress the recordings of their in-person visits at the CCA facility. Both defendants contend that these conversations were protected by the federal wiretap law as wire communications, oral communications, or both. They argue that because they had a reasonable expectation of privacy during the visits, the recordings constituted an unconstitutional search. Additionally, Peoples argues that the recordings were inadmissible against him because, as a visitor to the CCA facility, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy even if Lightfoot did not because of his inmate status. Following a hearing, the magistrate judge issued a detailed report recommending denial of the motions. The district court adopted the magistrate's report and recommendation and denied the motions.
On appeal of the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we review the court's factual findings for clear error and the court's application of the law to those facts de novo. United States v. Tavares, 223 F.3d 911, 914 (8th Cir. 2000). We will affirm a district court's denial of such a motion "'unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence, based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, or, based on the entire record, it is clear that a mistake was made.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Murphy, 69 F.3d 237, 240 (8th Cir. 1995)). The federal wiretap law protects only those statements that meet the statutory definition of wire or oral communications. 18 U.S.C. 2511(1)(c), 2515 (1994).
The defendants' argument that the CCA conversations were protected as wire communications is incorrect. In order to be a protected wire communication, a conversation must be transmitted via facilities "furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. 2510(1) (1994). During "no-contact" visits at the CCA facility, inmates and visitors sit in different rooms, separated from each other by clear glass. Each visiting station is separated from the adjacent ones by cement block partitions. Visitors communicate with prisoners through an internal communication device that physically resembles a telephone handset. The device, however, is an entirely internal system connecting only the two visiting rooms. It is not connected to any facility capable of transmitting interstate or foreign communications. Accordingly, the visitation conversations were not wire communications protected by the federal wiretap law.
The conversations were also not protected oral communications because the defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy. The federal wiretap law defines an "oral communication" as "any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation." 18 U.S.C. 2510(2). Before the interception of a conversation can be found to constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment or an "oral communication" under...
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