U.S. v. Philip Morris Inc.

• Decision Date: 28 September 2000
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A.99-2496 GK.,CIV.A.99-2496 GK.
• Citation: 116 F.Supp.2d 131
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. PHILIP MORRIS INCORPORATED, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Page 131

116 F.Supp.2d 131

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. PHILIP MORRIS INCORPORATED, et al., Defendants.

No. CIV.A.99-2496 GK.

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

September 28, 2000.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

J. Patrick Glynn, Sharon Y. Eubanks, Department of Justice Civil Division/Torts Branch, Washington, DC, David W. Ogden, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., William Schultz, Thomas J. Perrelli, Deputy Asst. Attys. Gen., Frank J. Marine, Sr. Litigation Counsel, Patrice M. Mulkern, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, Mark B. Stern, J.P. Ellison, Douglas Hallward-Driemeier, Robert Loeb, Dana J. Martin, Collette G. Matzzie, Mary Jo Moltzen, Peter J. Smith, Elizabeth A. Welsh, Attys., Civ. Div., Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Timothy M. Broas, Robert M. Rader, Winston & Strawn, Washington, DC, Dan K. Webb, Winston & Strawn, Chicago, IL, Herbert M. Wachtell, Ben M. Germana, Winston & Strawn, Washington, DC, Steven M. Barna, Jeffrey M. Wintner, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, New York City, Robert Francis McDermott, Jr., Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Washington, DC, Robert C. Weber, Paul Christ, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Cleveland, OH, Jonathan, M. Redgrave, Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty & Bennett, PA, Minneapolis, MN, David M. Bernick, Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, IL, Kenneth N. Bass, Kirkland & Ellis, Washington, DC, Stephen R. Patton, Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, IL, Michael B. Minton, Thompson Coburn, LLP, Washington, DC, J. William Newbold, Coburn & Croft, St. Louis, MO, Richard Paul Cassetta, Thompson & Coburn, LLP, St. Louis, MO, Warren Neil Eggleston, Michael P.A. Cohen, Howrey, Simon, Arnold & White, Washington, DC, Kenneth Anthony Gallo, Fred W. Reinke, Clifford, Chance, Rogers & Wells, LLP, Washington, DC, Aaron H. Marks, Marc E. Kasowitz, Daniel R. Benson, Kasowitz, Benson, Torres, Friedman L.L.P., New York City, Michael Asher Schlanger, Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal, Washington, DC, Mary Elizabeth

McGarry, Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett, New York City, Michael V. Corrigan, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, New York City, Demetra Frawley, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, New York City, William Salvatore D'Amico, Chadbourne & Parke, Washington, DC, Timothy M. Hughes, Garyowen P. Morrisroe, Chadbourne & Parke, New York City, Bruce G. Merrit, Steven S. Michaels, Debevoise & Plimpton, New York City, Judah Best, Debevoise & Plimpton, Washington, DC, John Vanderstar, Keith Allen Teel, Covington & Burling, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

KESSLER, District Judge.

I. Introduction

Plaintiff, the United States of America ("the Government"), brings suit against eleven tobacco-related entities ("Defendants")¹ to recover health care expenditures the Government has paid for or will pay for to treat tobacco-related illnesses allegedly caused by Defendants' tortious conduct. The Government also asks this Court to enjoin Defendants from engaging in fraudulent and other unlawful conduct and to order Defendants to disgorge the proceeds of their past unlawful activity.

The Government makes four claims against Defendants under three statutes. The first statute, the Medical Care Recovery Act ("MCRA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2651-2653, provides the Government with a cause of action to recover certain specified health care costs it pays to treat individuals injured by a third-party's tortious conduct (Count 1). The second statute is a series of amendments referred to as the Medicare Secondary Payer provisions ("MSP"), 42 U.S.C. § 1395y, which provides the Government with a cause of action to recover Medicare expenditures when a third-party caused an injury requiring treatment and a "primary payer" was obligated to pay for the treatment (Count 2). The third statute is the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (Counts 3 and 4), which provides parties with a cause of action to recover treble damages due to injuries they received from a defendant's unlawful racketeering activity, and to seek other equitable remedies to prevent future unlawful acts.

This matter is now before the Court on Defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.² Upon consideration of the motions, oppositions, replies, the applicable case law, the arguments presented at the motions hearing, and the entire record herein, for the reasons discussed below, the Non-Liggett Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim [# 72] is granted as to the MCRA claim (Count 1), granted as to the MSP claim (Count 2), and denied as to the RICO claims (Counts 3 and 4). Liggett's separate motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim [# 70] is denied.

Summary of Legal Conclusions

The United States Government has brought this massive civil action against the tobacco industry, seeking billions of dollars in damages for what it alleges to be a lengthy unlawful conspiracy to deceive the American public about the health effects of smoking and the addictiveness of nicotine. In order to prevail on these allegations, the Government has offered three distinct legal theories of liability. Two of these theories are being rejected, and therefore, Counts 1 and 2 of the Complaint will be dismissed. A significant portion of the Government's case, however, will go forward, namely its claims under RICO for disgorgement of all profits Defendants derived from activities, beginning in 1953 and continuing to the present, related to the alleged pattern of racketeering activity. Consequently, Counts 3 and 4 of the Complaint will proceed. In sum, while the Government's theories of liability have been limited, the extent of Defendants' potential liability remains, in the estimation of both parties, in the billions of dollars. The scope and complexity of this case will continue to pose significant challenges to the parties and to the Court.

1. The Government's Medical Care Recovery Act claim will be dismissed. The congressional intent in enacting MCRA in 1962—at which time Medicare did not exist and the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act ("FEHBA")³ was still in its infancy—was to provide a means for the Government to recover from third-party tortfeasors⁴ medical expenses it had furnished for (primarily military) employees. Applying the principles from a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000), this Court concludes that Congress did not intend that MCRA be used as a mechanism to recover Medicare or FEHBA costs. The Court reaches this conclusion after examining the broad context in which MCRA has existed for 38 years—including its legislative history, the construction given it by those agencies charged with its interpretation, a body of long-standing state and federal case law, and its total non-enforcement by the Department of Justice for thirty-seven of those thirty-eight years.

2. The Government's Medicare Secondary Payer claim will also be dismissed. MSP permits the Government to seek reimbursement from insurance entities, when Medicare has paid for health care expenses for which those entities should have paid. Although MSP also allows the Government to bring suit against non-insurance entities required to pay for health care costs under a "self-insured plan," the Government's Complaint contains no allegation that Defendants have at any time maintained a "self-insured plan," as that term is defined by MSP and the relevant regulations. Further, it is clear that Congress did not intend MSP to be used as an across-the-board procedural vehicle for suing tortfeasors, which is precisely how the Government attempts to use the statute in this case.

3. The Government's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act claims will be permitted to go forward. The Government has adequately alleged, which is all it must do at this early stage in the litigation, the necessary elements of a RICO claim: that Defendants formed an "enterprise" which engaged in the requisite "pattern of racketeering activity." In addition, given the nature and scope of Defendants' alleged prior misconduct, the Government has adequately pleaded its basis for requesting injunctive relief, including the specific remedy of disgorgement.⁵

II. Standard of Review

A "complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); see also Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 654, 119 S.Ct. 1661, 143 L.Ed.2d 839 (1999). At the motion to dismiss stage, "the only relevant factual allegations are the plaintiffs'," and they must be presumed to be true. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1506 (D.C.Cir.1984), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113, 105 S.Ct. 2353, 86 L.Ed.2d 255 (1985); Shear v. National Rifle Ass'n of Am., 606 F.2d 1251, 1253 (D.C.Cir.1979). Despite the sweeping breadth and seriousness of the Government's allegations, their validity is not for this Court to judge at this time.

III. Statement of Facts

The Government's Complaint describes in detail what it alleges to be a four-decade long conspiracy, dating from at least 1953, to intentionally and willfully deceive and mislead the American public about, among other things, the harmful nature of tobacco products, the addictive nature of nicotine, and the possibility of manufacturing safer and less addictive tobacco products. Complaint ("Compl.") at ¶ 3. Defendants' conspiratorial activity includes making numerous "false and deceptive" statements and concealing documents and research in an attempt to cover-up their deceit. Compl. at ¶ 5. According to the Government, Defendants continue to "prosper and profit" from their actions and will continue to do so into the future, unless restrained by this Court. Compl. at ¶ 6. The specifies of the alleged conspiracy are...