U.S. v. Pierce, 98-1082
Decision Date | 11 August 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 98-1082,98-1082 |
Citation | 1998 WL 462310,152 F.3d 808 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Kevin L. PIERCE, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Maria R. Moran, Assistant United States Attorney, Omaha, NE, argued (Thomas J. Monaghan, on the brief), for Appellant.
Jerold V. Fennell, Omaha, NE, argued, for Appellee.
Before BOWMAN, 1 Chief Judge, and McMILLIAN and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
The United States of America (the government) appeals from an order entered in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska denying in part and granting in part a motion to suppress filed by Kevin L. Pierce (defendant). United States v. Johnson, No. 8:97CR91 (D.Neb. Dec. 23, 1997) (hereinafter "District Court Order") ( ). For reversal, the government argues that the district court erred in holding that defendant's self-incriminating statements to an investigating police officer were made involuntarily because another officer had promised defendant leniency in exchange for cooperation. For the reasons stated below, we reverse that holding of the district court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Jurisdiction in the district court was proper pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. The government timely invoked the jurisdiction of this court pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731 ( ).
Defendant and Phelan Johnson were charged in a single indictment dated August 19, 1997, on one count of possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Following their indictment defendant and Johnson each filed a motion to suppress. 2 They each moved to suppress physical evidence taken from the vehicle in which they had been traveling at the time of their arrest, and defendant additionally moved to suppress statements he made to a law enforcement officer following his arrest. The motions to suppress initially came before a magistrate judge. The magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing on the motions. The following summary of the underlying facts is based upon the magistrate judge's findings of fact, Report and Recommendation at 2-10, and the exhibits introduced at the suppression hearing.
On August 8, 1997, at approximately 2:30 a.m., Nebraska State Patrol (NSP) Trooper Staskiewicz signaled to a van traveling on Interstate 80 near Omaha, Nebraska, to pull over. Trooper Staskiewicz did so after noticing that the van's bright lights were illuminated, observing it cross the white center line dividing the lanes of traffic, and clocking its speed at 56 miles per hour in a construction zone with a posted speed limit of 50 miles per hour. The van stopped on the right shoulder of the highway, and Trooper Staskiewicz stopped his patrol car behind it. Trooper Staskiewicz walked up to the driver's side of the van. The driver, Johnson, opened the window, and Staskiewicz smelled an odor of air freshener coming from inside. Trooper Staskiewicz obtained the vehicle registration and defendant's and Johnson's driver's license numbers. He radioed the numbers to NSP headquarters and received a "use caution" warning with respect to each individual, indicating possible arrests or convictions for assaulting a police officer or homicide. He was also informed that defendant had a prior drug trafficking conviction. Trooper Staskiewicz called for backup. While waiting for the backup car to arrive, Trooper Staskiewicz talked with each of Johnson and defendant separately about the origin, destination, and purpose of their trip. Defendant and Johnson gave conflicting statements about the purpose of their trip. After a backup officer arrived, Trooper Staskiewicz brought his drug dog, which had been in the back of his patrol car, over to the van. The dog responded positively for the presence of narcotics. Trooper Staskiewicz opened the door of the van and immediately smelled marijuana. Inside the van, he discovered a duffle bag filled with brick-shaped objects (which were later confirmed to be marijuana). Defendant and Johnson were immediately placed under arrest and handcuffed. The arrest took place at approximately 2:57 a.m.
Trooper Staskiewicz transported defendant to NSP headquarters while Johnson rode in the other officer's car. While en route in the patrol car, Trooper Staskiewicz commented to defendant about the benefits of cooperating. Trooper Staskiewicz told defendant that he could "get off pretty easy" if he cooperated with the police and completed the marijuana delivery. Trooper Staskiewicz told defendant that the prospects for cooperating would be discussed at the NSP station and that he should not say anything until his rights were read to him at the station. Trooper Staskiewicz also said "[i]t's a proven fact that cooperation helps in the long run ... especially if they go federal." The conversation between Trooper Staskiewicz and defendant was recorded by an audio/video camera mounted in the patrol car. (A copy of the audio/video taperecording was introduced into evidence at the suppression hearing as Government Exhibit 1.)
Once Trooper Staskiewicz and defendant arrived at the NSP station, defendant was left with another officer, Investigator Lutter, to be interviewed. Investigator Lutter testified that he was unaware of the prior conversation between Trooper Staskiewicz and defendant in the patrol car. Investigator Lutter read defendant his Miranda rights from a pre-printed "Advice of Rights" form. Investigator Lutter instructed defendant to answer "yes" or "no" each time he was read a right and asked if he understood it, and then to initial each right on the form if he understood it. Defendant verbally indicated that he understood each of his rights as read to him, and he wrote his initials, "K.P.," beside each right on the form. Defendant did not ask any questions about his rights, nor did he request an attorney. Investigator Lutter then read aloud to defendant the "waiver of rights" paragraph on the form, which states the following: Investigator Lutter asked defendant whether he understood that no promises were being made, nor was anything being offered, in exchange for his statement. Defendant indicated that he understood and signed his name directly below the waiver of rights paragraph. (A copy of the "Advice of Rights" form, bearing defendant's initials and signature, was introduced into evidence at the suppression hearing as Government Exhibit 2.)
Investigator Lutter then proceeded to question defendant. The interrogation lasted approximately half of an hour (from 4:26 a.m. to 4:55 a.m.). First, Investigator Lutter obtained biographical information from defendant. Then he asked defendant about the marijuana found in the van. Defendant admitted that he and Johnson were transporting the marijuana to Detroit, to a contact named Jim Bob for whom defendant had once previously made a delivery. According to defendant, he received $500 for the prior delivery, and this time he was to receive $2,000. Investigator Lutter suggested to defendant that he cooperate with law enforcement by attempting to complete the marijuana delivery. Defendant agreed. Afterward, defendant talked with Johnson and Johnson also agreed to cooperate in an attempted delivery.
Based upon these facts, the magistrate judge recommended that defendant's motion to suppress be denied. Report and Recommendation at 17-18. Defendant filed objections. Upon review, the district court agreed with the magistrate judge that the initial stop and search of the van were constitutionally permissible. However, the district court disagreed with the magistrate judge's conclusion that defendant's statements to Investigator Lutter were made voluntarily. The district court reasoned:
[Trooper Staskiewicz's] statements were plainly inducements that rendered [defendant's] subsequent statements to Investigator Lutter involuntary.... The trooper implied much more by his use of the words "proven fact" than merely suggesting that matters would go more smoothly for [defendant] if he cooperated. The trooper planted in [defendant's] mind a scenario that controlled everything else [defendant] did and said during the remainder of his stay at NSP headquarters, including his statements to Investigator Lutter. In fact, that promise of leniency was so real to [defendant] that he was able to convince the reluctant Johnson to join in the plan to deliver the marijuana to their Detroit contact. Lutter's subsequent reading and initialing of a Miranda form could not eradicate the efficacy of the earlier promise made by the friendly, respectful trooper in the cruiser.
District Court Order at 5. 3 The district court also reasoned "[t]o the extent that the trooper's statements promising leniency were 'unfulfillable,' they were false." Id. at 6 ( ). Consequently, the district court suppressed defendant's statements to Investigator Lutter. The government filed this timely interlocutory appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in granting defendant's motion to suppress his...
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