U.S. v. Pizzonia

• Decision Date: 19 August 2009
• Docket Number: Docket No. 07-4314-cr.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Dominick PIZZONIA, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

577 F.3d 455

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Dominick PIZZONIA, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 07-4314-cr.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued: September 25, 2008.

Decided: August 19, 2009.

Joey Lipton, Assistant United States Attorney (Peter A. Norling, Paige Petersen, Assistant United States Attorneys, of counsel), for Benton J. Campbell, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, for Appellee.

Diarmuid White (Brendan White, of counsel), White & White, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before: CALABRESI, STRAUB, and RAGGI, Circuit Judges.

REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Dominick Pizzonia appeals from a judgment of conviction for conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), which was entered on October 2, 2007, by Judge Jack B. Weinstein after a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)-(d). Presently incarcerated serving a 15-year prison term, Pizzonia invokes the statute of limitations to challenge his conviction. He contends that the indictment limited the scope of the charged conspiracy to seven predicate acts. Because the jury found only two of these acts proved, both of which fell outside the relevant limitations period, Pizzonia submits that the district court erred in denying his post-verdict motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Fed. R.Crim.P. 29.

The argument is unconvincing for several reasons: (1) the indictment alleged that it was the pattern of racketeering — not the conspiracy itself — that consisted of the charged predicate acts; (2) a racketeering conspiracy is a concept distinct from (a) the pattern of racketeering through which the conspirators agree to participate in the affairs of the charged enterprise, and (b) the predicate acts that may evidence the pattern; (3) while predicate acts within the limitations period can demonstrate the racketeering conspiracy's existence during that time, this temporal requirement can also be satisfied by other evidence; (4) a jury properly views predicate acts in light of the totality of the circumstances to determine whether they manifest the threat of continued criminal activity essential to prove a pattern of racketeering, and such circumstances, no less than the predicate acts themselves, can prove a conspiracy's existence beyond the conclusion of the last predicate act; and (5) in any event, a racketeering conspiracy, like any other conspiracy, is presumed to continue until it achieves its criminal object, and the object of a racketeering conspiracy is to conduct the affairs of a charged enterprise through a pattern of racketeering, not to commit discrete predicate acts.

As Judge Weinstein correctly observed, even though the predicate acts proved in this case were outside the statute of limitations, other trial evidence permitted the jury to conclude that both the charged racketeering conspiracy and Pizzonia's membership in it continued into the limitations period. See Sentencing Tr. at 12 (Sept. 5, 2007). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

I. Background

A. The Relevant Limitations Period

On May 26, 2005, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of New York returned an indictment against Pizzonia for the racketeering conspiracy at issue in this case. Thus, all parties agree that pursuant to the five-year statute of limitations established by 18 U.S.C. § 3282, the government was required to prove Pizzonia's participation in the conspiracy sometime after May 26, 2000.

B. The Fourth Superseding Indictment

Pizzonia ultimately stood trial on a fourth superseding indictment returned on December 7, 2006 ("the Indictment"). Thus, we focus on the language of that pleading on this appeal.

The Indictment charged that from approximately 1987 through September 2005, Pizzonia, co-defendant Alfred DiCongilio, and others employed by or associated with a specific enterprise, to wit, the "Gambino organized crime family of La Cosa Nostra," Indictment ¶ 1, "conspired to ... conduct and participate, directly and indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of that enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity," id. ¶ 15. The Indictment stated that the "principal purpose" of the Gambino crime family was "to generate money for its members and associates" through a wide range of criminal activities, "including extortion, illegal gambling, interstate transportation of stolen goods, loansharking, narcotics trafficking and robbery." Id. ¶ 10.¹ To further these criminal moneymaking activities, Gambino members and associates would engage in still other crimes, some involving the use and threatened use of "physical violence, including murder." Id. The Indictment identified a number of secondary enterprise objectives for which Gambino members and associates also employed criminal means, including violence and murder, i.e., to settle personal grievances and vendettas, to prevent detection by law enforcement, and to coordinate criminal activities with other organized crime families. See id. ¶¶ 11-13.

The Indictment alleged that the Gambino family operated through various "crews," which consisted of a number of "made" family members (sometimes referred to as "soldiers") as well as associates. Id. ¶ 2. Each crew was headed by a captain. Each captain reported to the family "boss," who was himself assisted by an "underboss" and a "consigliere" in supervising and protecting the family's overall activities. Id. ¶¶ 2-5. At various times, Pizzonia served as "a captain, acting captain, soldier or associate within the Gambino family." Id. ¶ 8.

The Indictment charged that the "pattern of racketeering activity through which the defendants ... agreed to conduct the affairs of the enterprise consisted of" seven numbered "racketeering acts," some of which were divided into lettered subparts. Id. ¶ 16 (emphasis added). These predicate acts were as follows:

• Act One, A: From 1987 through June 1988, Pizzonia, DiCongilio, and unnamed others conspired to murder Frank Boccia.

• Act One, B: In June 1988, Pizzonia, DiCongilio, and unnamed others murdered Frank Boccia.

• Act Two, A: From September 1992 through December 24, 1992, Pizzonia and unnamed others conspired to murder Rosemary and Thomas Uva.

• Act Two, B: On December 24, 1992, Pizzonia and unnamed others murdered Rosemary Uva.

• Act Three: On December 24, 1992, Pizzonia and unnamed others murdered Thomas Uva.

• Act Four: Between 1995 and 1996, Pizzonia and unnamed others conspired to use extortionate means to collect extensions of credit from John Doe # 1.

• Act Five: Between December 1999 and May 2000, Pizzonia and unnamed others conspired to use extortionate means to collect extensions of credit from John Doe # 2.

• Act Six, A: Between 2001 and June 2002, Pizzonia and unnamed others made extortionate extensions of credit to John Doe # 3.

• Act Six, B: Between 2001 and June 2002, Pizzonia and unnamed others used extortionate means to collect and attempt to collect an extension of credit from John Doe # 3.

• Act Seven, A: Between January 1994 and January 1996, Pizzonia, DiCongilio and unnamed others participated in an illegal gambling business.

• Act Seven, B: Between January 1994 and January 1996, Pizzonia, DiCongilio, and unnamed others profited from the same illegal gambling activity.

C. Trial

At trial, the prosecution offered extensive testimonial and physical evidence that convincingly established the existence of the charged enterprise; its moneymaking purpose; and its members' use of various criminal means to achieve that purpose and to protect the enterprise from internal disloyalty, outside rivalry, and law enforcement detection. Similarly, ample evidence was adduced demonstrating Pizzonia's association with the charged enterprise, including his induction as a "made" member of the Gambino family in 1988, and his eventual promotion to the role of "captain" in 2001. Because the sufficiency of this evidence is not challenged generally, but only as it pertains to the statute of limitations, we do not review it further except as necessary to address Pizzonia's timeliness challenge on appeal.

To establish Pizzonia's participation in a conspiracy to conduct the affairs of the Gambino family through a pattern of racketeering activity, the government sought to prove the charged predicate acts. The jury found proved Pizzonia's involvement in only two of the seven acts: the 1992 conspiracy to murder Rosemary and Thomas Uva (Act Two, A) and the 1994-1996 substantive gambling offense (Act Seven, A and B).² While these crimes, on their face, may appear distinct and complete, the jury concluded from the totality of the evidence that, in fact, they manifested the relationship and continuity essential to form a pattern of racketeering. See H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989).

Further, although the proved predicates ended well before May 26, 2000, the jury found that the charged racketeering conspiracy continued after that date and, specifically, into the limitations period. On this point, the district court instructed the jury that the government could not satisfy the statute of limitations simply by proving that the Gambino family continued to operate after May 26, 2000. The jury had to find that Pizzonia knowingly participated after that date in the charged conspiracy. Without objection, the court instructed the jury as follows:

The statute of limitations for the racketeering conspiracy charged in Count One is five years.... As to defendant Pizzonia, you must determine whether the RICO conspiracy charged in Count One, and Pizzonia's participation in the charged conspiracy, continued beyond May 26, 2000. Even if you find that the Gambino family existed beyond May 26, 2000, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant Pizzonia knowingly...