U.S. v. Prince, 75-3116

Decision Date09 June 1976
Docket NumberNo. 75-3116,75-3116
Citation533 F.2d 205
Parties1976-2 Trade Cases 61,038 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lawrence PRINCE, Screenco, Inc., Climatrol Corporation and Emery Findley, Jr., Defendants-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Lawrence E. Hoffman, Miami Beach, Fla., for Prince & Screenco.

Joel Hirschhorn, Miami, Fla., for Climatrol & Findley.

Robert W. Rust, U. S. Atty., Miami, Fla., Carl D. Lawson, Samuel R. Simon, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Thomas E. Kauper, Asst. Atty. Gen., John J. Powers, III, Atty., Barry Grossman, Robert B. Nicholson, Antitrust Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before GEWIN, COLEMAN and GOLDBERG, Circuit Judges.

GEWIN, Circuit Judge:

Appellants, two individuals and two corporations were indicted for violations of Section One of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. The indictment was based on an alleged agreement among the appellants to allocate accounts and fix prices in restraint of trade. The district judge sentenced the individuals to two months' imprisonment and one year of probation and fined them a total of $40,000 after adjudging them guilty following his acceptance of their pleas of nolo contendere. Following acceptance of their nolo pleas, and their subsequent convictions, the corporations, Screenco, Inc. and Climatrol Corp., 1 were fined a total of $48,000. Appellants seek relief in this court from the district court's denial of their motions to withdraw their nolo pleas or to mitigate their sentences and for a new trial. We affirm.

The appellants were indicted on May 21, 1974. They first entered pleas of not guilty and proceeded to trial; Prince and Findley each testified in his own behalf. Five witnesses testified for the government. Lee Latham, a former employee of Climatrol, apparently was one of the principal prosecution witnesses. 2

Upon completion of the trial, the jurors retired to deliberate and subsequently requested and received a transcript of Lee Latham's testimony. Thereafter, the foreman reported that they were deadlocked; the trial judge gave the "Allen charge" and directed them to continue to deliberate. Two hours later the jury announced that a verdict still had not been reached, and the trial judge declared a mistrial.

Appellant Findley's health was extremely poor and his physicians advised him against undergoing the rigors of a second trial. At a conference among the appellants and their attorneys, Findley informed the others of his intention to withdraw his not guilty plea and enter a plea of nolo contendere. Additionally, the appellants were advised of the government's position that, unless they all entered nolo pleas, the prosecution would require that all, including Findley, be retried. At this meeting the appellants also were informed of an article entitled "Tougher Antitrust Policy: Would It Curb Inflation?" 3 Their retained counsel informed them, by means of computations based on this article, that in 93% of the antitrust cases in which the defendants plead nolo, the resulting fines were minimal and no actual imprisonment resulted.

Accordingly, appellants filed motions to change their pleas from not guilty to nolo contendere. The alleged reasons for the decision were Findley's poor health and the "Tougher Antitrust Policy" article. 4 The pleas were accepted at a hearing on June 5, 1975, before the same judge who had presided at appellants' trial. At the hearing defense counsel explicitly stipulated that the transcript of the earlier trial was a "sufficient factual basis for acceptance of" the nolo pleas. The court informed appellants of the maximum sentence authorized by the statute 5 and carefully determined that the pleas were knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered with the advice of retained counsel and that no plea bargains had been made. He also advised appellants of the rights they were waiving by not proceeding to trial, including the rights of cross-examination and of utilizing compulsory process to obtain witnesses on their behalf.

Prior to their sentencing on July 10, 1975, appellants learned that Gene Latham, brother of Lee Latham, and one Robert Lipof were prepared to give sworn testimony that Lee Latham had perjured himself at the trial, and was not even present at the meeting where the alleged illegal agreement was reached. 6 At the time of sentencing, the trial judge was advised of this development, but neither of the appellants moved to withdraw his nolo plea.

Subsequent to the imposition of their sentences, however, appellants moved for a new trial, or for mitigation of their sentences, or to withdraw their nolo pleas. 7 The district court denied these motions, stating:

The court must observe that defendants' motions to withdraw their pleas (of) nolo contendere and for a new trial are a classic example of wanting to eat one's cake and have it too. The defendants are willing to plead and have sentence imposed by the court, but if it doesn't suit their fancy then they feel free to seek relief from the consequences of their plea. Defendants less privileged would not be so bold.

The court does not take pleas of guilty or nolo contendere lightly; neither should the defendants. They entered into them advisedly and there was a substantial basis on which the court would accept the pleas . . . (T)he sentences imposed and the term of incarceration is of a minimal nature, namely, only 60 days' confinement. This is hardly a disparate sentence even if most other antitrust violations are punished only by a fine.

I. Motions for a New Trial

Having plead nolo contendere, appellants waived their right to trial. Cf. United States v. Forrest, 356 F.Supp. 343 (W.D.Mich.1973). Just as the validity of a guilty plea is not properly tested by a motion for a new trial, Williams v. United States, 290 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1961), similarly a plea of nolo contendere is not properly challengable, at least as to non-jurisdictional and non-constitutional grounds, by such a motion. Cf. Dillon v. United States, 113 F.2d 334 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 689, 61 S.Ct. 71, 85 L.Ed. 445 (1940). See generally Lott v. United States, 367 U.S. 421, 426, 81 S.Ct. 1563, 1566, 6 L.Ed.2d 940, 944 (1961). Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying appellants' motions for a new trial.

II. Motions to Withdraw Pleas or for Mitigation of Sentences

Contrary to appellants' assertion, Rule 11 does not require that the district court find a factual basis for a plea of nolo contendere, as opposed to a plea of guilty. 8 United States v. Wolfson, 52 F.R.D. 170, 174-76 & nn. 9-10 (D.Del.1971), aff'd memo, 474 F.2d 1340 (3d Cir. 1973); 1 C. Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure, Criminal, § 177 at 390-91 (1969). In any event, the stipulation by defense counsel at the nolo hearing concerning the earlier trial adequately establishes that a factual basis for the appellants' nolo pleas existed.

Findley's contention that his punishment is cruel and unusual is without merit. The sentence is well below the statutory maximum; the district court took into account the state of Findley's health, and utilized a pre-sentence report. United States v. Brager, 474 F.2d 598 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 846, 94 S.Ct. 111, 38 L.Ed.2d 93 (1973); United States v. Rojas-Colombo, 462 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nom., Navarro v. United States, 410 U.S. 990, 93 S.Ct. 1507, 36 L.Ed.2d 188 (1973).

Accordingly, since appellants' 32(d) motions to withdraw their nolo pleas were made after sentencing, the only remaining question before this court is whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to permit appellants to withdraw their nolo pleas despite their assertion of manifest injustice. 9 See United States v. Shapiro, 222 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1955); United States v. Preston Trucking Co., 364 F.Supp. 515 (N.D.Ohio 1973). The mere fact that appellants' sentences were harsher than many of those brought to their attention by their attorneys does not evidence manifest injustice. See United States v. Cravatas, 330 F.Supp. 91, 100-01 (D.Conn.1971) (affirmed by Second Circuit from the bench). There has been no assertion that appellants' trial counsel were incompetent. Had the appellants moved to withdraw their pleas before sentencing, this case might stand on a different footing.

Here, however, appellants were aware of the potentially helpful witnesses and what they would testify to before the imposition of their sentences but they made no motion to withdraw their nolo pleas at that time. Neither manifest injustice nor an abuse of discretion is shown merely because appellants chose to test the water and found it too fervid. They made an intelligent and voluntary decision...

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28 cases
  • Doherty v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, I.N.S.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)
    • June 29, 1990
    ...because the sentence, or even prison itself, has proved harsher than expected. Such withdrawal is impermissible. See United States v. Prince, 533 F.2d 205 (5th Cir.1976) (defendant may not withdraw plea of nolo contendere, made after consulting counsel, when sentence proved harsher than exp......
  • United States v. Farrar
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
    • November 29, 2017
    ..., 367 U.S. 421, 426, 81 S.Ct. 1563, 6 L.Ed.2d 940 (1961) (internal quotations omitted).In addition, Rule 11, and our court's opinion in Prince , foreclose a factual basis' being required for a nolo contendere plea. United States v. Prince , 533 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1976). Rule 11 disting......
  • State v. Crowe
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Tennessee
    • August 16, 2005
    ...fact before they may be accepted and emphasizing that no similar requirement exists for pleas of nolo contendere); United States v. Prince, 533 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir.1976) ("Rule 11 does not require that the district court find a factual basis for a plea of nolo contendere, as opposed to a......
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    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. District of New Mexico
    • July 16, 2012
    ...“the validity of a guilty plea cannot be questioned by way of a motion for new trial.” Counsel's Brief at 5. See United States v. Prince, 533 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir.1976); Williams v. United States, 290 F.2d 217 (5th Cir.1961) (per curiam). It follows that it was not error to deny appellant......
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2 books & journal articles
  • Review Proceedings
    • United States
    • Georgetown Law Journal No. 110-Annual Review, August 2022
    • August 1, 2022
    ...trial under Rule 33 because defendant waived right to trial); U.S. v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 648 n.3 (3d Cir. 1999) (same); U.S. v. Prince, 533 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1976) (defendant who pleaded no contest could not seek new trial under Rule 33 because defendant waived right to trial); U.S......
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    • United States
    • American Criminal Law Review Vol. 42 No. 4, September 2005
    • September 22, 2005
    ...need not find a factual basis for a nolo plea. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 35 n.8 (1970); United States v. Prince, 533 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir. (169.) See United States v. Tunning, 69 F.3d 107, 111 (6th Cir. 1995). (170.) In discussing the history the amendments to Rule......

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