U.S. v. Prior

• Decision Date: 25 March 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-2110,96-2110
• Citation: 107 F.3d 654
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Reed Raymond PRIOR, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 654

107 F.3d 654

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Reed Raymond PRIOR, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 96-2110.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Oct. 23, 1996.

Decided Feb. 27, 1997.

Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing

En Banc Denied March 25, 1997.

Steven Paul DeVolder, Des Moines, IA, argued, for Defendant-Appellant.

Lester A. Paff, Des Moines, IA, argued (Don C. Nickerson, U.S. Attorney, on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before FAGG, BOWMAN, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

Reed Raymond Prior received a mandatory life sentence following his plea of guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1994). Prior appeals his sentence and the district court's ¹ denial of his motion to withdraw his plea. We affirm.

I.

Acting upon information that Prior was dealing in narcotics, police made numerous attempts to locate Prior. On May 2, 1995, police located Prior's vehicle at a Motel 6 in Des Moines, Iowa. They observed Prior carrying bags to his car as he prepared to leave his room. Police officers followed Prior to a mini storage unit where they saw him transferring items from his vehicle to the storage unit. Police officers then obtained a search warrant for the storage unit and Prior's vehicle. During the search, officers found a large quantity of methamphetamine in a duffle bag on the floor of the storage unit. In all, the police seized 869 grams of methamphetamine from the vehicle and storage unit. The police also seized a scale, other drug paraphernalia, and $17,690 in cash.

Prior was arrested and charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Given the amount of cash and actual methamphetamine found in the search, Prior could have been held responsible for a total of 1,147.6 grams of methamphetamine. The government provided notice that it would request the enhanced mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii), because Prior's offense involved over 100 grams of methamphetamine and he had three prior felony drug convictions.

Three days after his arrest, Prior signed a written waiver of indictment, a waiver of detention hearing, and a guilty plea agreement in which Prior agreed to fully cooperate with the government and provide complete and truthful information concerning any criminal matters of which he has knowledge. If the government determined Prior had provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person, the government had the sole discretion under the agreement to move for a departure below the mandatory minimum life sentence. Prior's attorney moved quickly with this agreement to preserve Prior's option of providing substantial assistance, which was the only way to avoid the mandatory life sentence. (Plea Tr. at 23.) After a hearing on May 31, 1995, the district court accepted Prior's plea of guilty and ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation report.

On November 30, 1995, before sentencing had taken place, Prior filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. During a hearing on the motion, Prior presented testimony that he had been incompetent to enter the plea agreement because he was going through withdrawal from addiction to controlled substances at the time he signed the agreement on May 5, 1995. Following a hearing, the district court filed a written order denying the motion. The court found that even if Prior had been incompetent at the time he signed the agreement, he undoubtedly was competent to make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights at the plea hearing when the district court accepted his plea of guilty.

On April 11, 1996, the district court entered judgment on Prior's guilty plea. The government presented certified copies of Prior's previous drug convictions and refused to make a substantial assistance motion, rendering the district court without authority to depart below the statutory minimum life sentence. Accordingly, the district court sentenced Prior to a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole. Prior appeals.

II.

Prior first contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. A guilty plea is a solemn act not to be set aside lightly. United States v. Morrison, 967 F.2d 264, 268 (8th Cir.1992). We review the district court's denial of a motion to withdraw a plea for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Newson, 46 F.3d 730, 732 (8th Cir.1995).

Rule 32(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a district court may permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing upon a showing of "any fair and just reason," and we have held that the defendant bears the burden of establishing such a justification. United States v. Yell, 18 F.3d 581, 582 (8th Cir.1994). While a defendant seeking to withdraw a plea before sentencing is given a more liberal consideration than someone seeking to withdraw a plea after sentencing, "a defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing," and the decision to allow or deny the motion remains within the sound discretion of the trial court. United States v. Boone, 869 F.2d 1089, 1091 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 822, 110 S.Ct. 81, 107 L.Ed.2d 47 (1989). Factors to consider in determining whether to set aside a plea of guilty include whether the defendant has demonstrated a fair and just reason, whether the defendant has asserted his innocence, the length of time between the guilty plea and the motion to withdraw, and whether the government will be prejudiced. Id. at 1091-92.

The reasons offered by Prior for withdrawing his plea were that he was mentally incompetent due to substance abuse at the time he signed the plea agreement and that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional rights. At the December 22, 1995, hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Prior presented the testimony of a psychiatrist, Dr. Mark Souza, who concluded that because Prior was undergoing withdrawal from several controlled substances, he was unable to fully comprehend the agreement or appreciate its implications at the time he signed it on May 5, 1995. Dr. Souza further testified that Prior would have been competent by the time of the plea hearing on May 31, 1995, when the court accepted Prior's guilty plea. Prior asserts that because he had been incompetent when he signed the plea agreement and when it was explained to him, his plea was not knowing and voluntary at the May 31, 1995, plea hearing.

Prior was competent at the time of the plea hearing, and he cannot seriously argue otherwise. Furthermore, the transcript of the plea hearing indicates that Prior understood his rights. The Assistant United States Attorney summarized the plea agreement in court, explaining that under the agreement Prior is subject to a mandatory minimum term of life imprisonment, he has agreed to cooperate with the government, and upon a government motion, there may be a possibility of reducing his sentence below the mandatory minimum if he provides substantial assistance. (Plea Tr. at 11-12.) The district court asked Prior if he was able to follow the government's summary description of the plea agreement. Prior replied, "Yeah, I was, because I've read it a couple of times myself." (Id. at 13.) Prior also stated that he had understood its terms at the time he signed the agreement and that he had been given a full opportunity to confer with counsel about this matter. The district court carefully explained to Prior his constitutional rights, including the right to trial by a jury, to confront the witnesses against him, and to put the government to its proof. Prior indicated that he understood that he had the right to go to trial and have his case decided by a jury if he so chose. (Id. at 25.) Prior indicated that he understood and voluntarily waived all his trial-related constitutional rights. Prior provided an adequate factual basis for the plea, admitting to possessing 3 1/2 pounds of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. Additionally, at the hearing on his motion to withdraw the plea, Prior testified that he had told the truth at the May 31, 1995, plea hearing.

We agree with the district court's conclusion that Prior, who at all times was represented by counsel, knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights and pled guilty to the charge at the plea hearing on May 31, 1995. Thus, Prior's asserted fair and just reason to withdraw his plea cannot carry the day. Additionally, he did not assert his innocence of the charges and he waited approximately five months before seeking to withdraw his plea. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Prior's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

III.

Prior raises several constitutional challenges to his sentence. Specifically, he contends that the mandatory life sentence, imposed pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii), violates his rights to due process and equal protection under the Fifth Amendment, his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, and the doctrine of separation of powers. "The question of whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law and must be reviewed de novo." United States v. Wesley, 990 F.2d 360, 363 (8th Cir.1993).

First, Prior contends that the mandatory life sentence violates his due process rights, arguing that the statute deprives the district court of discretion to impose an individualized sentence. Where capital punishment is not involved, however, an individualized sentencing determination is not a constitutional imperative. United States v. Goodface, 835 F.2d 1233, 1236, 1237 n. 4 (8th Cir.1987). See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2701-02, 115 L.Ed.2d...