U.S. v. Pruitt

• Decision Date: 10 May 1999
• Docket Number: No. 97-6217,97-6217
• Citation: 174 F.3d 1215
• Parties: 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 805 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Tony Laverne PRUITT, Oscar Hernan Pena, Miguel A. Garrido, Daaiyah Jameelah Mustafa, Douglas Gene Mayberry and Marlan Everette Engle, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1215

174 F.3d 1215

12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 805

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Tony Laverne PRUITT, Oscar Hernan Pena, Miguel A. Garrido Daaiyah Jameelah Mustafa, Douglas Gene Mayberry and Marlan Everette Engle, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 97-6217.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

May 10, 1999.

John I. Gottle, III, Tallahassee, AL, for Pruitt.

Allen Stoner, Summerford & Stoner, Decatur, AL, for Mayberry.

James Eugene Williams, Melton, Espy, Montgomery, AL, for Engle.

David Byrne, Jr., Robison & Belser, Montgomery, Al, for Pena.

Douglas C. Freeman, Montgomery, AL, for Garrido.

Christine A. Freeman, Asst. Fed. Pub. Defender, Montgomery, AL, for Mustafa.

R. Randolph Neeley, Terry F. Moorer, Asst. U.S. Attys., C. Redding Pitt, U.S. Atty., Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama.

Before DUBINA and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and JONES ^*, Senior Circuit Judge.

JONES, Senior Circuit Judge:

This is a direct criminal appeal brought by six defendants found guilty of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; and laundering their drug proceeds thereafter, in violation of 18 U.S.C § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). The six defendants-appellants are Tony Pruitt, Oscar Pena, Miguel Garrido, Daaiyah Mustafa, Douglas Mayberry, and Marlan Engle. At issue, with respect to Pena and Garrido, is the constitutionality of a motor vehicle search conducted on July 29, 1995. Pursuant to Knowles v. Iowa, --- U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998)--a Supreme Court decision issued subsequent to the trial of this matter--and earlier Eleventh Circuit precedent, we find the search of defendants' vehicle violative of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore reverse. In all other respects, we affirm the convictions and sentences of the remaining co-defendants.

I.

The drug conspiracy at issue in this case transported marijuana from California, and other western locales, to Alabama, where the drugs were distributed and sold. Pena and Garrido, located in Los Angeles, supplied the marijuana. The Alabama-based Engle and Mayberry purchased the drugs with funds wired to Los Angeles Thereafter, couriers, working on behalf of the conspiracy, traveled to California and other destinations, and returned to Alabama with the purchased marijuana. The drugs were distributed in Alabama via two networks: one operated by Engle (based in Birmingham); the other, by Mayberry (based in Tuskegee).

The six defendants were indicted in the Middle District of Alabama in March 1996. Each was charged with having violated 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count I, the conspiracy count) and 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) (Count II, the money laundering count). Following the taking of individual not-guilty pleas, all six proceeded to trial, with the assistance of counsel, in December 1996. The jury found Pruitt guilty of Count I only, and the remaining five co-defendants guilty of both Counts I and II. Thereafter, the co-defendants were sentenced to incarceration terms as follows: Pruitt, Pena and Garrido: 80 months; Mustafa: 96 months; Engle: 240 months; and Mayberry: 292 months. All six co-defendants now timely appeal.

II.

The subject stop and search occurred near an Interstate 40 exit ramp in Memphis, Tennessee. ¹ (Pena was apparently transporting marijuana from California to Alabama, by way of Tennessee.) Just after midnight on July 29, 1995, Pena was pulled over for speeding by Officer Joseph Moore of the Shelby County, Tennessee Sheriff's Department. ² Garrido was then a passenger in the vehicle, along with two others not parties to this appeal.

The stop was automatically recorded on Moore's police videocamera. The resulting videotape (Gov't Ex. 344(c)) shows the following sequence of events:

1. Moore asked Pena to step out of the van, and Pena did so. Pena accompanied Moore to the rear of the van;

2. Moore advised Pena that he was speeding--traveling 65 miles per hour in a 55 m.p.h. zone. In broken but understandable English, Pena apologized to Moore. Moore responded by asking Pena his age, and whether he owned the van;

3. Moore directed Pena to accompany him to his police car, so he could check on the status of Pena's driver's license and issue him a speeding ticket;

4. Once in the police car, Moore began asking Pena questions unrelated to the stop, e.g., where Pena's family resides in Memphis. Moore then asked Pena if his registration and insurance papers were in the van. Pena responded affirmatively, and Moore left to retrieve them;

5. Standing outside the van, Moore asked Garrido (in the front passenger seat) for the registration and insurance papers. He also asked the two other passengers who they were going to visit in Memphis, and that person's street address;

6. Moore returned to his police car where, instead of completing Pena's ticket, he proceeded to ask Pena: (a) to identify the three other van passengers; (b) how much he paid for the van; (c) what kind of work he does for a living; (d) whether Garrido is his brother; and (f) why they have different last names;

7. Again postponing the writing of Pena's ticket, Moore asked Pena if he had anything illegal in the van; Pena said "no." Moore followed up by asking Pena if he had pistols or weapons in the van; Pena again said "no." Moore then asked Pena if he had drugs in the van; Pena said "no" a third time;

8. Moore, having no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity by Pena, nonetheless asked him if he could search the van. To that end, he handed Pena a written consent form--in Spanish--to be signed. Pena declined to sign the form, see J.A. vol. 1, doc. 549, ex. B, whereupon Moore told him that he needed yet additional time to complete the writing of the speeding ticket. Instead of completing the ticket, however, Moore picked up his police radio to declare that, "I have a refusal"--a code phrase indicating to the other officers that they should bring a drug-sniffing dog to the scene;

9. While awaiting the dog's arrival, which took more than fifteen minutes, Moore detained in his police car--again without a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity--Pena, Garrido, and the other two van passengers as well. While waiting, Moore finally issued a "courtesy warning" to Pena instead of a traffic ticket. See id., ex. A; and

10. Nearly one-half hour after Pena's initial stop, the drug dog arrived. The dog sniffed the outside of the van, and indicated the presence of drugs. The van was then searched by Moore and other officers acting without a warrant. The search revealed significant amounts of marijuana (approximately 81 pounds). Pena and Garrido were arrested and read their Miranda rights (in English and in Spanish).

Following his guilty finding, Pena challenged the constitutionality of Moore's search in a Fed.R.Crim.P. 33 motion for a new trial. ³ See J.A. vol. 1, doc. 549. The district court denied the motion, finding that Moore's conduct leading up to his search was supported by the required reasonable suspicion of Pena's guilt. Id., doc. 561 at 5-7. We review that decision for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Pope, 132 F.3d 684, 687-88 (11th Cir.1998). This standard includes review to determine whether the district court was guided by an erroneous legal conclusion. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996). "A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law." Id.

III.

We addressed the constitutionality of detentions following a routine traffic stop in United States v. Tapia, 912 F.2d 1367 (11th Cir.1990), where we held:

In the absence of consent, the reasonableness of [police officer] Guthrie's decision to detain and search the vehicle in which appellant Bernardino Tapia was a passenger is governed by the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). According to Terry, even in the absence of probable cause, police may stop persons and detain them briefly in order to investigate a reasonable suspicion that such persons are involved in criminal activity. In justifying such an intrusion, the "reasonableness" standard requires that a police officer "be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Id. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1879 (footnote omitted). In this regard, "reasonable suspicion" is determined from the totality of the circumstances, United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989), and from the collective knowledge of the officers involved in the stop. United States v. Williams, 876 F.2d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir.1989); United States v. Cotton, 721 F.2d 350, 352 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1108, 104 S.Ct. 1614, 80 L.Ed.2d 143 (1984). Such a level of suspicion is obviously considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 1763, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984), or even the implicit requirement of probable cause that a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found. Sokolow, 109 S.Ct. at 1585. Nevertheless, "reasonable suspicion" must be more than an inchoate "hunch," and the [F]ourth [A]mendment accordingly requires that police articulate some minimal, objective justification for an investigatory stop. Id.; Williams, 876 F.2d at 1524.

Id. at 1370 (brackets added; footnote deleted). Since the issuance of Tapia, we have consistently held that once an officer has briefly stopped a motor vehicle operator for the purpose of issuing a traffic violation (i.e., a ticket), the officer's continuing detention of the vehicle's occupants is authorized under the Fourth Amendment only if the officer can point to "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant...