U.S. v. Quinn

Decision Date04 March 2004
Docket NumberNo. 02-4762.,No. 02-4753.,02-4753.,02-4762.
Citation359 F.3d 666
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clifford J. QUINN, Defendant-Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jan P. Blanton, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Robert Charles Bonsib, Marcus & Bonsib, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant Quinn; Michael Joseph, Blank Rome, L.L.P., Washington, DC, for Appellant Blanton. Bonnie S. Greenberg, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

ON BRIEF:

Alex Blanton, Blank Rome, L.L.P., Washington, DC, for Appellant Blanton. Thomas M. DiBiagio, United States Attorney, Sandra Wilkinson, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Before MICHAEL, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge SHEDD wrote the opinion in which Judge MICHAEL and Judge TRAXLER joined.

OPINION

SHEDD, Circuit Judge:

A grand jury indicted Clifford Quinn, Jan Blanton, and Christopher Beisler on two counts of soliciting a bribe, three counts of conflict of interest, two counts of "honest services" wire fraud, and one count of conspiracy to defraud the government. Beisler pled guilty and agreed to testify against Quinn and Blanton. After a three-week trial, the jury found Quinn guilty on all counts and Blanton guilty on all counts but one. The district court sentenced Quinn and Blanton each to 87 months' imprisonment and a $15,000 fine. Quinn and Blanton timely appealed, challenging their convictions on the two bribery counts and their sentences. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the convictions but vacate the sentences and remand the case for resentencing.

I.

From 1994 to 1998, Blanton served as Director of the Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture ("EOAF"), the agency within the Department of the Treasury responsible for administration of the Treasury Forfeiture Fund.1 Various law enforcement agencies within the Treasury Department deposit non-tax forfeited assets into this fund. Among other things, the monies deposited in the Treasury Forfeiture Fund may be used to finance internal EOAF projects. In the spring of 1997, Blanton hired her paramour, Quinn, to oversee the operation of EOAF's asset forfeiture tracking systems. Shortly after assuming his duties at EOAF, Quinn requested and Blanton approved a no-bid contract for Quinn's friend Beisler to repair a computer system that had been installed only a month earlier. Quinn set the price of this contract at $50,000; Beisler completed the work in two nights.

At about the same time, Quinn began discussing with Beisler a business venture, later known as Equus, to develop asset tracking software for use by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. State and local law enforcement agencies may make claims against the Treasury Forfeiture Fund for shares of certain forfeited assets held in the fund, and Quinn asked Beisler to write software for Equus that would allow state and local officials to manage their asset tracking information requests to the federal government. Quinn suggested that the new business be funded by monies that Beisler would receive from EOAF contracts. While Quinn and Beisler maintained this prospective business arrangement, Quinn and Blanton approved two more no-bid contracts for Beisler, one for $50,000 and another for $24,500.

Shortly after Beisler began his work at EOAF, Quinn began discussing his goal of fully automating the office. Quinn's experience in government offices convinced him that the existing programs were wasteful and inadequate. At the same time, Quinn saw an opportunity to profit from his Equus applications. According to Beisler, Quinn estimated that they could make between $30 million and $60 million from Equus once the EOAF office was fully automated. Quinn could "wire up these contracts" so Beisler would do the work; Quinn would then quit his government job and go to work for Beisler.

In July and August 1997, Quinn and Blanton approached Counter Technology, Inc. ("CTI") to discuss a contract for the full automation of the EOAF system. At a July 24 meeting, Quinn presented a business plan for a joint venture between CTI and Equus. This presentation included slides describing potential applications of Equus software to EOAF functions and prices for Equus products. The pricing schedule made reference to fully automated versions of Equus products designed to interact with "mirror capabilit[ies]" at EOAF and other government agencies. Quinn's presentation also covered the estimated costs of the EOAF automation project. A week after this initial meeting, Quinn faxed CTI a letter proposing a "joint venture between Equus and CTI" to market the new software. Equus would produce the software and provide technical expertise, while CTI would handle marketing. Quinn stated that EOAF intended to award a contract for development of an automated system in October 1997; he further proposed that he "manage this effort from the private sector."

Quinn and Blanton subsequently had dinner at the home of CTI's principals. At this meeting, Quinn again promoted his Equus software and Blanton indicated that she wanted to award a no-bid contract to CTI for the automation of the EOAF system. Blanton told CTI that this contract would be worth more than $4 million and that she would structure the deal in a manner that would satisfy applicable contracting rules.

A few days after this dinner meeting, Quinn faxed CTI another document indicating specific terms for the proposed joint venture. Quinn proposed that he "come to work as an employee of CTI with a base salary of $125,000; management of any federal procurement utilizing the design of any of the Equus packages; ... 40% of the net revenues of any procurement utilizing the Equus applications; personnel authority over any application managed; [and] management of any application as a profit center with performance bonuses tied to profitability." In a subsequent telephone conversation with one of CTI's principals, Blanton stated that she wanted Quinn to be the project manager for the automation project once CTI was awarded the contract. Blanton told one CTI official that CTI needed to hire Quinn so she could "sustain her lifestyle."

Hoping to avoid a conflict with Blanton, CTI made no response concerning the automation contract. CTI soon learned that Blanton was removing CTI employees from work details at EOAF and complaining to other government officials about CTI's work. When another government official asked CTI what was causing these new complaints, a CTI representative suggested that Blanton was upset because CTI was dragging its feet on the automation contract proposal. Blanton did not award the automation contract to CTI.

Blanton continued her search for a contractor to automate the EOAF office. In September 1997, she approved a procurement request for the automation project, then valued at $10 million. Quinn and Blanton specifically requested that Beisler perform the automation work. In response to this request, Treasury Department procurement officers advised Quinn and Blanton that once a contractor was selected, they could only suggest that Beisler be hired as a subcontractor on the project; it would be left to the discretion of the contractor to determine whether Beisler would be involved. With Blanton's approval, West Electronics ("West") was selected to be the prime contractor. Quinn and Blanton continued to press for Beisler's participation in the project, urging procurement officers to make certain that Beisler was made the project manager on West's project.

West entertained a bid from Beisler for a subcontract. Beisler initially submitted a bid proposing that he receive about 80% of the $10 million contract. West rejected this bid, noting that applicable contracting rules capped any subcontractor's share at 49% of the contract price. Beisler complained to Quinn that West was not likely to pay him more than about $2 million for his work on the project. Quinn responded, "I'm not doing this contract for no $2 million." Beisler revised his bid to reflect the 49% cap, but West still refused to do business with him. West went to the Treasury Department procurement officers handling the project to find out whether West had any obligation to use Beisler. Shortly after West indicated that it was not likely to engage Beisler, Blanton announced that she no longer wanted West to handle the project. One of the procurement officers in charge of the project attempted to persuade Blanton that West was capable of performing the contract, but Blanton was unmoved. The offer to West was withdrawn.

II.

Quinn and Blanton were convicted on two counts of soliciting a bribe, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2), which states that "[w]hoever ... being a public official or person selected to be a public official, directly or indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts or agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally or for any other person or entity, in return for: (A) being influenced in the performance of any official act; (B) being influenced to commit or aid in committing, or to collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the commission of any fraud, on the United States; or (C) being induced to do or omit to do any act in violation of the official duty of such official or person" shall be fined or imprisoned, or both, and disqualified from holding federal office.

Quinn and Blanton seek to set aside their bribery convictions on the grounds that (1) the indictment failed to allege with sufficient particularity the facts underlying the bribery counts, (2) the district court improperly instructed the jury on the elements necessary for conviction on the bribery counts, (3) the evidence was not...

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