U.S. v. Quinteros, 84-5219

Decision Date07 August 1985
Docket NumberNo. 84-5219,84-5219
Citation769 F.2d 968
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jesus Amaya QUINTEROS, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Gracelia R. Helring, Arlington, Va. (Gracelia R. Helring, P.C., Arlington, Va., on brief), for appellant.

Theodore R. Carron, Sp. Asst. U.S. Atty., Alexandria, Va. (Elsie L. Munsell, U.S. Atty., Alexandria, Va., Janet K. DeCosta, Sp. Asst. U.S. Atty., on brief), for appellee.

Before SPROUSE and WILKINSON, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

SPROUSE, Circuit Judge:

Jesus Amaya Quinteros appeals his conviction for the knowing transfer of false identification documents (Social Security cards) in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1028(a)(2) (1982) and possession of false U.S. identification documents (Alien Registration Receipt cards) in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1028(a)(6) (1982). Quinteros first contends that Social Security cards are not identification documents within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1028(a)(2), (d)(1) (1982). Secondly, he contends that he was denied a speedy trial in violation of the Speedy Trial Act 1 and the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. We affirm.

I.

In January 1984 the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) conducted an undercover investigation of the production and sale of Social Security cards and Alien Registration Receipt cards in the Washington, D.C., area. About that time, Quinteros sold counterfeit Social Security cards to an undercover INS officer on two separate occasions. On April 4, 1984, Quinteros was arrested and incarcerated at the D.C. Detention Facility on a warrant charging him with the knowing transfer of false Social Security cards in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1028(a)(2) (1982).

On May 3, 1984, a U.S. magistrate granted the Government's ex parte motion to dismiss the complaint against Quinteros. The U.S. Marshal then released Quinteros from custody. INS officers, however, immediately exercised an unrelated detainer which they had previously filed on the basis that Quinteros was an illegal alien. Quinteros thus remained incarcerated at the D.C. Detention Facility.

On May 7, 1984, a federal grand jury returned a four-count indictment charging Quinteros with violations of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1028(a)(2), (a)(6) (1982). Counts I and II charged Quinteros with the knowing transfer of false Social Security cards, the same offense for which he was originally arrested. Count III charged Quinteros with a new offense--the possession of two false Alien Registration Receipt cards, and Count IV charged him with the knowing attempt to transfer the Alien cards. Quinteros moved twice to dismiss the indictment, first contending that Social Security cards are not identification cards within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1028(a)(2), (d)(1) (1982), and later, that his statutory right to a speedy trial had been violated. The district court denied both motions. On June 18, 1984, Quinteros was convicted after a bench trial on Counts I, II, and III.

II.

Quinteros' conviction under counts I and II involved the knowing transfer of false Social Security cards in violation of section 1028(a)(2), which declares it unlawful for an individual to "knowingly transfer[ ] an identification document or a false identification document knowing that such document was stolen or produced without lawful authority." 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1028(a)(2) (1982). Quinteros contends that Social Security cards are not identification documents as defined in section 1028(d)(1), which provides in pertinent part:

[T]he term "identification document" means a document made or issued by or under the authority of the United States Government ... which, when completed with information concerning a particular individual, is of a type intended or commonly accepted for the purpose of identification of individuals....

18 U.S.C. Sec. 1028(d)(1) (1982). It is true, of course, that providing identification to the holder is not one of the primary purposes of Social Security cards. In fact, the Operation Procedure Manual of the Social Security Administration states that the Social Security card is not to be used for the purpose of identification. Nevertheless, the Social Security card is commonly accepted as an identification card. An expert for the Social Security Administration testified that the Administration frequently issues Social Security cards to elderly people for the purpose of providing identification for cashing checks. She further testified that the legend "Not for Identification Purposes" was dropped from the card in 1972 because individuals nevertheless were using the cards for identification purposes. We think this reflects the common understanding that Social Security cards are identification documents. The fact that an illegal market valued false Social Security cards for identification purposes further supports our conclusion that such cards are commonly accepted for identification within the meaning of section 1028(d)(1).

Moreover, the legislative history of the False Identification Crime Control Act of 1982, of which section 1028 is a part, leads us to conclude that Congress intended Social Security cards to be within the section 1028(d)(1) definition of an identification document. Specifically addressing section 1028(d)(1), the House Judiciary Committee reported:

The Committee intends that a "type" of identification document "commonly accepted for the purpose of identification of individuals" not be restricted to identification documents, such as driver's licenses, which are widely accepted for a variety of identification purposes. The Committee intends that "identification document" also include those which are "commonly accepted" in certain circles for identification purposes, such as identification cards issued by state universities and Federal government identification cards.... Finally, an identification card normally will include such identifying elements as an individual's name, address, date or place of birth, physical characteristics, photograph, fingerprints, employer, or any unique number assigned to an individual by any Federal or State government entity.

H.R.Rep. No. 802, 97th Cong., 2d. Sess. 9, reprinted in 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 3519, 3527 (emphasis added). It is true that the Committee report did not specifically list Social Security cards, but it is also true that the report did not list any specific document as the object of the Act's intended protection, including instead a general description embracing a generic group of government documents commonly accepted for identification purposes. A fair reading of this legislative history reveals a congressional intent to include Social Security documents in that group. Finally, in this connection, we find no merit in Quinteros' contention that section 1028(d)(1)'s definition of identification document is constitutionally over-broad or vague.

III.

Quinteros next contends that he was denied his right to a speedy trial. He claims that the thirty-three day delay between April 4, when he was arrested and charged, and May 7, when he was finally indicted, violated his rights under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3161(b) (1982), and under the sixth amendment to the Constitution. As Quinteros' arrest involved only the Social Security cards, and not the Alien Registration Receipt cards, we consider the timeliness of his indictment only as it relates to the Social Security cards. We reject Quinteros' contention, concluding that the indictment was timely under the circumstances of this case. Our conclusion is based on the language of the Speedy Trial Act, its legislative history, and the Speedy Trial Act Guidelines, 2 which together indicate that after a Government-initiated dismissal of a complaint within thirty days of arrest, a subsequent indictment for the same offense filed within the time frame involved here does not violate a defendant's speedy trial rights.

It is true that section 3161(b) provides:

Any information or indictment charging an individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges.

18 U.S.C. Sec. 3161(b) (1982). It is also true that after the Government-initiated dismissal of the original complaint, Quinteros was indicted for the same offense thirty-three days after arrest. Quinteros' contention that the indictment violated the thirty-day provision of section 3161(b), however, overlooks the language of another provision of the Act, namely section 3161(d)(1). This provision outlines the consequences of filing a subsequent complaint or indictment after the timely dismissal of the original charge. Section 3161(d)(1) provides in pertinent part:

If any indictment or information is dismissed upon motion of the defendant, or any charge contained in a complaint ... is dismissed or otherwise dropped, and thereafter a complaint is filed against such defendant ... or an information or indictment is filed charging such defendant with the same offense ... the provisions of subsections [3161(b) and 3161(c) ] shall be applicable to such subsequent complaint, indictment, or information, as the case may be.

18 U.S.C. Sec. 3161(d)(1) (1982).

In focusing on the effects of a dismissed complaint, Congress directed that after dismissal, the thirty-day provision of section 3161(b) "shall be applicable." 3 Although the bare language of section 3161(d)(1) does not specify whether the thirty-day requirement of section 3161(b) is to run from the original arrest or is to run anew from the date of the second complaint, we conclude that it runs anew from the date of the second complaint. Our study of the legislative history of section 3161(d)(1) and the Speedy Trial Act Guidelines compels this result.

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