U.S. v. A.R.

Decision Date29 October 1999
Docket NumberNo. 99-5484,99-5484
Citation203 F.3d 955
Parties(6th Cir. 2000) United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. A.R., Defendant-Appellant. Argued:
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee at Jackson; No. 99-10011--James D. Todd, District Judge. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] David W. Camp, DOWDEN, ZDANCEWICZ & CAMP, Jackson, Tennessee, for Appellant.

John T. Fowlkes, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellee.

Before: JONES, BOGGS, and COLE, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge.

Defendant-Appellant A.R. appeals the district court's order for transfer to adult criminal prosecution for crimes A.R. committed when he was 17 and 18 years old. A.R. also challenges the court's dismissal of his motion to set aside the order of transfer on speedy trial grounds. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering A.R.'s transfer, we AFFIRM.

I.
A. Procedural History

On February 2, 1999, the United States filed an Information against A.R. which charged him with a number of criminal actions: conspiracy; armed robberies of a Little Caesar's Pizza Parlor and Po Folks Restaurant on October 18, 1997 and in November 1997, respectively; and two drug offenses in November 1997 and in March 1998, the latter occurring after A.R.'s 18th birthday. The Government also filed motions to detain A.R. pending trial and to transfer his proceedings to adult criminal prosecution. A.R. was arrested and taken into custody on February 3, 1999. On February 18, the district court issued an order to detain A.R. without bond. Fifty-five days after his initial detention, on March 30, the district court held a transfer hearing. There, the court found for the Government, ordering A.R.'s transfer to adult criminal prosecution on April 2. On April 5, the court denied A.R.'s motion to set aside the order of transfer. A.R. filed a notice of appeal on April 7, 1999.

B. The Transfer Hearing

At A.R.'s transfer hearing, several witnesses testified on behalf of the Government and A.R. This testimony provided information relevant to the list of factors that the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act ("FJDA"), 18 U.S.C. § 5032, requires judges to consider in determining whether to transfer a juvenile delinquent to adult criminal proceedings. Information was provided on the following enumerated factors:

1. A.R.'s Age and Social Background

A.R. was 18 years old at the time of the transfer hearing, and was 17 and 18 years of age at the time of the alleged offenses. It is undisputed that A.R. has been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and a learning disability. As the district court stated, there is little additional information on A.R.'s social background. The record indicates that he lives in a "low to middle class" income home. Although his parents never married, they have always been amicable, and, according to A.R., have both provided for his basic needs. Mr. Veldon Reedy, a clinical social worker who examined A.R., noted in his evaluation that A.R. has a stable home environment. Mary Jo Bell, the Intake Counselor for the Madison County Juvenile Court Services, testified that although A.R.'s mother was supportive, she was not in control of her son's behavior. Bell also testified that A.R. was at one time removed from the custody of his mother to be with his aunt, and spent considerable amounts of time with his aunt.

2. The Extent and Nature of A.R.'s Prior Delinquency Record

Beginning in 1992, A.R. was charged with unruly conduct and placed in a Teacher, Parent, Probation Officer program and ordered to attend counseling at a behavioral center. His problems continued, however. In 1995, A.R. was charged with vehicular burglary, theft, and vandalism (under five hundred dollars). In the same year, he was arrested for criminal trespassing, assault, and evading arrest. In March of 1996, A.R. was again charged with theft (of a Sears store) and disruption of a school assembly by fighting. In January 1997, A.R. was charged with disorderly conduct for fighting.

Despite these numerous arrests, A.R. has only been found guilty of two minor offenses. Some of the charges were dropped, and in other cases A.R. was ordered to stay away from the premises where the alleged incident occurred or to pay restitution to the victim. He has also been assigned to a number of specialty programs designed to address his disabilities.

3. A.R.'s Intellectual Development and Psychological Maturity

Testing of A.R. has revealed low levels of academic achievement and intelligence. A.R. was initially tested and placed in special education classes when he was in middle school. He has long been diagnosed with ADHD and with a learning disability. The defense's expert, Mr. Reedy, testified that although A.R. is eighteen years old, those diagnoses generally cause a thirty percent "drop in expectations" for cognitive and emotional levels, meaning that a person of A.R.'s age and conditions functions at the level of a ten- to eleven-year-old. Ms. Estell Staten, the probation officer and community service caseworker for the Madison County Juvenile Court Services, testified that A.R. was able to communicate with her adequately and seemed of average intelligence.

4. The Nature of Past Treatment Efforts and A.R.'s Response to Such Efforts

A.R. has been placed in special education classes since middle school. He has also undergone special investigation and behavioral treatment in a school program called the "M team," which designs individual educational and behavioral plans for youths with conditions such as A.R.'s. A.R.'s teacher, Ms. Arnold, testified that the M-team approach had achieved some success in A.R.'s treatment and educational progress. She stated that A.R. had the intelligence to be taught, demonstrated the ability to learn, and further "demonstrated that with the right structure he could function well with others." J.A. at 141. The defense claims that the attempts to treat A.R. and accommodate the ADHD and learning disability from which he suffers were not supported by the school system. Ms. Marcella Fletcher, a Tennessee Legal Services attorney who represented A.R. concerning special education issues, testified that she had to file a due process notice against the school in order to assure that A.R. would be treated properly for his ADHD.

Reedy testified that A.R. received Ritalin for about three years, but that the treatment had been discontinued. He further testified that with the medication, A.R. had "tended to do better"--without the medication, he was "going to be pretty much doomed to not being successful academically and [] behaviorally." J.A. at 170. Reedy further testified that the "M team" response was not adequate to treat A.R.'s problems--"I would like to have seen a more intensive type of work done . . . . [H]e should have had [] some intensive counseling since his early childhood." J.A. at 132.

5. The Availability of Programs Designed to Treat A.R.'s Behavioral Problems

Brenda Roden, the Madison County Juvenile Court Clerk, testified that the county's juvenile system had an age limit of 19. Christopher Bryant Worrell, an employee of the Correction Corporation of America at the Shelby Training Center in Memphis, Tennessee, testified as to the availability of that private facility for A.R. Worrell testified that the Center provides numerous programs offering education and guidance for incarcerated juveniles. Worrell explained that "there is further provided to an individual incarcerated over the age of eighteen educational opportunities based upon what needs and desires are necessary as determined by the guidance counselor. He (A.R.) would be placed into a structured environment . . . The facility is described as secured" and "rehabilitative in nature." J.A. at 221. Reedy testified that the Shelby Center's "highly structured" environment, with both educational training and counseling components, would be helpful to A.R. J.A. at 171-72.

On these facts, the district court ordered A.R. transferred to adult proceedings.

II.

We review a district court's order of transfer for abuse of discretion. See United States v. T.F.F., 55 F.3d 1118, 1120 (6th Cir. 1995). Such an abuse of discretion occurs "if the district court fails to make the required factual findings, or if those findings are clearly erroneous." Id.

III.
A.

The purpose of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act is to "remove juveniles from the ordinary criminal process in order to avoid the stigma of a prior criminal conviction and to encourage treatment and rehabilitation." United States v. One Juvenile Male, 40 F.3d 841, 844 (6th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). This aim, however, is counter-balanced by the need to protect the public from violent and dangerous offenders and their criminal acts. See id. Thus, a juvenile who commits a felony when he or she is fifteen or older may be subject to adult criminal procedures if a district court deems it to be "in the interests of justice." T.F.F., 55 F.3d at 1119 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 5032). Specifically, a district court must "determine[] whether the risk of harm to society posed by affording the defendant more lenient treatment within the juvenile justice system [is] outweigh[ed by] the defendant's chance for rehabilitation." One Juvenile Male, 40 F.3d at 844. The statute requires that in making this determination, the district court must make record findings as to the following factors:

1)the age and social background of the juvenile;

2)the nature of the alleged offense (which, for the purposes of this inquiry, a court may assume to have been committed, see One Juvenile Male, 40 F.3d at 845), including the defendant's role in the offense;

3)the extent and nature of the juvenile's prior delinquency record;

4)the juvenile's present...

To continue reading

Request your trial
25 cases
  • United States v. Under Seal
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • April 5, 2017
    ...We therefore decline to rule on this question, which we acknowledge has divided our sister circuits. Compare United States v. A.R., 203 F.3d 955, 962–63 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that the denial of a § 5036 motion is immediately appealable if the juvenile defendant makes the appeal after bei......
  • U.S. v. L.M.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa
    • April 12, 2006
    ...provision and remarking that "[e]very circuit that has addressed the issue has reached the same conclusion") (citing United States v. A.R., 203 F.3d 955, 964 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Sealed Juvenile 1, 192 F.3d 488, 490-91 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Wong, 40 F.3d 1347, 1371 ......
  • U.S. v. David A.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • February 3, 2006
    ...jurisdiction to consider an interlocutory appeal involving a juvenile's speedy trial rights under § 5036. See United States v. A.R., 203 F.3d 955, 962-63 & 963 n. 6 (6th Cir.2000) (limiting its holding "to speedy trial claims filed after the district court has issued a transfer A speedy tri......
  • U.S. v. C.P.A.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of North Dakota
    • May 29, 2008
    ...Courts have given considerable weight, and at times predominant weight, to an offense of a serious nature. See United States v. A.R., 203 F.3d 955, 963-64 (6th Cir.2000). The Eighth Circuit has recognized that when a crime is particularly serious, the district court is justified in weighing......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT