U.S. v. Ramey, 82-2388

Decision Date07 July 1983
Docket NumberNo. 82-2388,82-2388
Citation711 F.2d 104
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Donald Edward RAMEY, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Rodney S. Webb, U.S. Atty., Charles S. Miller, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., Bismarck, N.D., for appellee.

Russell J. Myhre, Bismarck, N.D., for appellant.

Before LAY, Chief Judge, and HEANEY and FAGG, Circuit Judges.

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

Donald Edward Ramey appeals from his conviction for involuntary manslaughter in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1112(b) and 1153 (1976). Defendant was the driver of a car that struck the rear of a payloader on a Bureau of Indian Affairs road leading into Fort Yates, North Dakota. A passenger in the car, George Kevin Keeps Eagle, Jr., died as a result of injuries he sustained in the accident. The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the results of a blood alcohol test administered shortly after the accident, while the defendant was being treated at the Public Health Service Hospital in Fort Yates. Because the district court's finding that the defendant consented to the taking of the blood sample is not clearly erroneous, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On February 8, 1982, at approximately 6:40 p.m., Ramey and Keeps Eagle were traveling east on a road leading into Fort Yates when their vehicle crashed into a slower moving front end payloader, which also was traveling eastbound into Fort Yates. Officer Little Dog of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) Police was traveling in the westbound lane of the road, and had just begun to turn around in an attempt to stop the defendant's vehicle for speeding when the accident occurred. It was dusk at the time, and there was some evidence that the payloader's taillights had not been on prior to the collision.

Immediately after the accident, Officer Little Dog's first concern was to get Ramey and his passenger Keeps Eagle to the hospital for treatment. Little Dog knew both men because they were fellow BIA employees: the defendant was a BIA police officer and Keeps Eagle was a BIA dispatcher and jailer. When Little Dog was unable to open the doors on the defendant's car, he called for assistance and an ambulance. Police began an investigation of the accident after the defendant and Keeps Eagle were taken to the hospital. They found empty beer bottles on the front floorboards of the defendant's vehicle and Officer James Molash, who had been called to the scene, smelled the odor of alcohol in the car.

At the hospital, Ramey was placed in the emergency room on a stretcher while doctors tried to resuscitate Keeps Eagle. When these attempts proved unsuccessful, their attention turned to the defendant, who was less seriously injured. The defendant was first taken to the x-ray room for x-rays by laboratory technician Gertrude Alice Nale. Nale testified that, in her opinion, the defendant was drunk and uncooperative, and she stated that she detected a strong smell of alcohol on his breath. BIA Officer Fool Bear also observed the defendant in the x-ray room and testified that he too smelled the odor of alcohol on the defendant.

After the x-rays were taken, Nale moved Ramey to another room to be examined by Dr. Lynn Standsbury. Prior to the examination, Standsbury had received a call from Officer Molash, who requested that the hospital take a blood sample from Ramey for police purposes. Molash testified that he wanted the blood sample once he learned that a death had occurred as a result of the accident. Molash knew that the Public Health Service Hospital had a policy of refusing to draw blood from an Indian without his or her consent if the blood was to be used against the Indian, so he also called FBI Agent Bill Willis to inform him that a warrant might be required to obtain a blood sample. Officer Fool Bear talked with Dr. Standsbury at the hospital about obtaining a blood sample as well. When Standsbury stated that the defendant might not want to give one, Fool Bear indicated that he would attempt to obtain a warrant if Ramey did not consent to the taking of the sample.

Dr. Standsbury's first attempts to examine Ramey were not successful. Ramey refused to cooperate and pulled out an IV that had been partially started. After the doctor and members of Ramey's family urged him to cooperate, however, Ramey did permit the doctor to examine him. Following the examination, the doctor asked Nale, the lab technician, to draw some blood for medical purposes. Dr. Standsbury also indicated that the BIA Police had requested an extra vial of blood. Nale left the examining room to get the necessary equipment; and when she returned, she heard the defendant say, "I suppose the so-and-so's want to know how drunk I am." Nale did not respond to this comment, but she took the defendant's arm, washed it with iodine, and took the blood needed for both the police and the medical tests which the doctor had requested. A vial was given to the BIA Police, who subsequently had the blood analyzed by the North Dakota State Toxicologist's office. The sample disclosed a serum-alcohol concentration of .26 percent, which is the equivalent of a blood alcohol concentration of .22 percent.

II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS

The defendant was indicted by a grand jury for manslaughter on April 21, 1982. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the results of the blood alcohol test that had been performed by the state toxicologist's office. A hearing was held on July 8, 1982. The five witnesses who testified were Officer Little Dog, Officer Fool Bear, Officer Molash, Gertrude Nale, and Rose Ramey, the defendant's wife. A number of facts were stipulated. Both parties agreed that the blood sample was taken without a warrant when the defendant was not under arrest. In addition, both parties agreed that the defendant was hospitalized and under treatment at the time the sample was taken and that there were exigent circumstances involved because the alcohol content of the blood was dissipating over time.

At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court issued an oral ruling denying the defendant's motion to suppress the results of the blood test. On July 9, 1982, the court issued an order confirming this denial. The court held that the taking of the blood did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights because there was probable cause, the blood sample was a very limited intrusion incident to Ramey's hospitalization for medical treatment, and the blood alcohol evidence was in danger of immediate destruction. Thus the court determined that under the Supreme Court's decision in Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296, 93 S.Ct. 2000, 2004, 36 L.Ed.2d 900 (1973), the evidence was obtained in a constitutional...

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