U.S. v. Ramnath

• Citation: 533 F.Supp.2d 662
• Decision Date: 11 January 2008
• Docket Number: No. 9:07-MJ-28.,9:07-MJ-28.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Priya RAMNATH.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

533 F.Supp.2d 662

UNITED STATES of America v. Priya RAMNATH.

No. 9:07-MJ-28.

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Lufkin Division.

January 11, 2008.

Albert John Charanza, Jr., Charanza Law Office, Lufkin, TX, Sanjay S. Mathur, Mathur Law Offices, Dallas, TX, for Priya Ramnath.

Reynaldo Padilla Morin, U.S. Attorney's Office, Lufkin, TX, for United States of America.

MEMORANDUM RE BOND PENDING EXTRADITION HEARING

EARL S. HINES, United States Magistrate Judge.

By separate order, the court granted Priya Ramnath's "Motion to Release from Detention on Conditions." This memorandum opinion states the court's reasons underlying that decision.

I. NATURE OF CASE; PARTIES

This action involves a request for extradition pursuant to an Extradition Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (hereinafter "Treaty").¹ The United States attorney for the eastern district of Texas (hereinafter "government") acts on behalf of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (hereinafter "United Kingdom").

The government; petitions the court to arrest a person accused of committing a crime in the United Kingdom, and to surrender that individual to the United Kingdom for prosecution. The subject of the United Kingdom's request is Priya Ramnath, M.D. For convenience, Dr. Ramnath is referred to sometimes as "respondent."²

Dr. Ramnath, age 39, is a citizen of India who is fully credentialed, certified and licensed to practice medicine — more particularly the specialty of anesthesiology — in the United States. She has resided lawfully in the United States since 1996, and most recently, on a temporary nonimmigrant specialty occupation visa. Her application for permanent residency is pending before the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement service within the Department of Homeland Security. Dr. Ramnath resides with her husband and two minor children, all of whom are United States citizens, in, Lufkin, Texas, within the territorial jurisdiction of this court.

II. PROCEEDINGS

In November, 2007, the government filed a complaint requesting respditdent's arrest pursuant to the Treaty and the United States extradition statute codified in Section 3184 of Title 18, United States Code. That complaint alleged that, respondent is charged in the United Kingdom with an offense described as "manslaughter contrary to Common Law on a patient." According to the complaint, Dr. Ramnath temporarily worked as a junior resident in training at the Staffordshire General Hospital in England. Early in the morning on July 22, 1998, Dr. Ramnath allegedly injected Patricia Leighton, a patient in the intensive therapy unit, with a bolus of adrenaline over the objection of two more senior physicians and a senior, experienced nurse on the critical care team, without obtaining prior permission from the attending physician with ultimate medical authority in the case, and in disregard of established hospital protocol for administering adrenaline. Mrs. Leighton immediately reacted, went into cardiac arrest, and died.

A manslaughter charge was filed by the Crown Prosecution Service in Staffordshire, England on July 31, 2003 — five years after the alleged offense — and an arrest warrant was issued. An extradition request was made to the United States Department of State in September, 2007, over nine years after the alleged offense.

The, government filed its complaint in extradition in this court on November 29, 2007. Respondent was arrested the next day on November 30, 2007, in Lufkin, Texas. She initially appeared before this court the same day, whereupon the court advised her of the reason for her arrest and the nature of proceedings that would ensure pursuant to law. Respondent then was remanded to the custody of the United States marshal.

Thereafter, she retained counsel, and reappeared before the court at a status hearing on December 4, 2007. Through counsel respondent moved for bail pending her formal extradition hearing. That motion was heard in two phases on December 18, 2007, and January 4, 2008. Counsel for the respondent and government also submitted further argument through written briefs.

III. PRINCIPLES OF ANALYSIS

Individual liberties, so carefully protected in domestic criminal proceedings, sometimes must yield to paramount national interests in preserving harmonious working relations with foreign sovereigns. The federal extradition statute, Title 18, United States Code, Sections 3181 et seq., provides no explicit authority for a district court, to admit a respondent to bail. Thus, bail generally is not available in extradition cases. See Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 63, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903); see also In re Extradition of Russell, 805 F.2d 1215, 1216 (5th Cir,1986). The rationale for the presumption against bail is to ensure that the United States fulfills its obligation to the requesting country to deliver the suspect. Wright, 190 U.S. at 62, 23 S.Ct. 781. Releasing a respondent on bond provides an opportunity to abscond, which would result in "serious embarrassment" to the country and create potential reciprocal noncompliance by other countries. Wright, 190 U.S. at 62, 23 S.Ct. 781; see also United States v. Hills, 765 F.Supp. 381, 385 (E.D.Mich.1991) (citing United States v. Taitz, 130 F.R.D. 442, 444 (S.D.Cal.1990)). As a result, national foreign policy interests often outweigh a respondent's individual liberty interests. See In re Extradition of Orozco, 268 F.Supp.2d 1115, 1116-17 (D.Ariz.2003); In re Extradition of Molnar, 182 F.Supp.2d 684, 687 (N.D.Ill.2002).

Governing circuit law nevertheless recognizes that federal trial courts have authority to set, bail for extradition respondents when appropriate. See In re Extradition of Russell, 805 F.2d at 1217. Generally, there are two prerequisites for setting bail. The court must find that the respondent is neither a flight risk nor danger to any person or the community. In re Extradition of Molnar, 182 F.Supp.2d at 687; In re Extradition of Nacif-Borge, 829 F.Supp. 1210, 1215 (D.Nev.1993). The court also must conclude that "special circumstances" warranting pre-hearing release exist. In re Extradition of Russell, 805 F.2d at 1216.³

The burden rests with extradition respondents to show by clear and convincing evidence that they are neither a risk of flight nor a danger to any person or the community.⁴ In re Extradition of Gonzalez, 52 F.Supp.2d 725, 735 (W.D.La.1999); In re Extradition of Nacif-Borge, 829 F.Supp. at 1215. In that respect, extradition respondents are situated similarly to domestic criminal defendants who are convicted and awaiting sentence or the outcome of an appeal. See 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a) & (b); In re Extradition of Nacif-Borge, 829 F.Supp. at 1215 (identifying similarities between Bail Reform Act and bail in extradition proceeding).

Proof that an extradition respondent is neither a flight risk nor a danger is, without more, an insufficient ground for admission to bail pending an extradition hearing. In re Extradition of Gonzalez, 52 F.Supp.2d at 735. An additional requirement is to establish — also by clear and convincing evidence — a special circumstance or a combination of factors that, in the aggregate, constitute a special circumstance that creates a compelling case for release on bail. Wright, 190 U.S. at 63, 23 S.Ct. 781; In re Extradition of Russell, 805 F.2d at 1216; In re Extradition of Gonzalez, 52 F.Supp.2d at 735 (citing In re Extradition of Nacif-Borge, 829 F.Supp. at 1215); In re Extradition of Valles, No. M-02-008, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26710, at *4 (S.D.Tex. May 13, 2002) ("cumulation of several factors can constitute special circumstances that justify bail in extradition proceedings" (citation omitted)), extradition denied, 268 F.Supp.2d 758, 770 (S.D.Tex.2003); In re Extradition of Nacif-Borge, 829 F.Supp. at 1216. Special circumstances can arise under various conditions, and the determination of when such conditions exist is left to the sound discretion of federal trial judges. In re Extradition of Gonzalez, 52 F.Supp.2d at 736 (citing Beaulieu v. Hartigan, 554 F.2d 1, 1 (1st Cir.1977)).

By definition, special circumstances are rare. While the term is semantically imprecise, a reasonably clear explication was penned by Judge Learned Hand almost a century ago. He opined that the court's limited power to grant bail in cases involving foreign extradition "should be exercised only in the most pressing circumstances, and when the requirements of justice are absolutely peremptory." In re Mitchell, 171 F. 289, 289 (S.D.N.Y.1909) (emphasis added). Thus, an extradition respondent's burden is heavy, almost to the point of being unrealistic.

Nonetheless, subsequent jurisprudence suggests that certain conditions or an individual's status may meet this rigorous test. They include:

1) Length of proceedings and detention;

2) Need to consult with counsel;

3) Health of respondent;

4) Age of respondent;

5) Availability of bail to respondent in requesting state or state of arrest;

6) Likelihood of respondent being found non-extraditable;

7) Likelihood of success in action in the requesting state; and

8) Deprivation of religious practices while incarcerated.

Bassiouni, supra, at 802-08; Roberto Iraola, The Federal Common Law of Bail in International Extradition Proceedings, 17 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L.Rev. 29 (2007); see also In re Extradition of Gonzalez, 52 F.Supp.2d at 735-36.

The United States Bail Reform Act of 1984⁵ establishes substantive law and procedures regarding bail for defendants accused of committing crimes within the United States. This statute does not govern international extradition actions because they are not domestic criminal cases. In re Extradition of Russell, 805 F.2d a 1217; In re Extradition of Mainero, 950 F.Supp. 290, 293 (S.D.Cal.1996). However the Bail Reform Act uses terminology similar to ...