U.S. v. Ramstad

Decision Date24 October 2002
Docket NumberNo. 00-3407.,00-3407.
Citation308 F.3d 1139
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Howard Lee RAMSTAD, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Joseph D. Johnson, Law Office of Joseph D. Johnson, Chtd., Topeka, KS, for Defendant-Appellant.

Robin D. Fowler, Assistant United States Attorney (Gregory G. Hough, Assistant United States Attorney, and Jackie N. Williams, United States Attorney, Topeka, KS, on the brief), Topeka, KS, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before EBEL, BALDOCK, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

EBEL, Circuit Judge.

On March 2, 1999, Defendant-Appellant Howard Lee Ramstad conditionally pled guilty to knowingly and intentionally possessing with the intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of a substance or mixture containing a detectable amount of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). As part of his conditional guilty plea, which was entered pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Mr. Ramstad reserved the right to appeal the district court's denial of a pretrial motion to suppress the marijuana, which Mr. Ramstad argued was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court subsequently sentenced Mr. Ramstad to fifty-one months in prison, four years of post-release supervision, and a $100.00 assessment, and Mr. Ramstad appealed the district court's denial of his suppression motion. Finding that "the district court did not make any findings or otherwise explain the basis for its decision [denying Mr. Ramstad's motion to suppress the marijuana]," we remanded Mr. Ramstad's appeal to the district court "for further fact-finding." United States v. Ramstad, 219 F.3d 1263, 1265 (10th Cir. 2000). On remand, the district court again denied Mr. Ramstad's suppression motion, and this appeal followed. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we now affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The events surrounding Mr. Ramstad's arrest and guilty plea were discussed in detail in our prior decision, see Ramstad, 219 F.3d at 1264-65, as well as in the district court's opinion on remand. See United States v. Ramstad, 120 F.Supp.2d 973, 975-77 (D.Kan.2000). Accordingly, we limit our discussion here to those facts most relevant to the present appeal.

On Sunday, July 19, 1998, Trooper Brian K. Smith of the Kansas Highway Patrol (KHP) observed Mr. Ramstad's motor home traveling on Interstate 70, near Topeka, Kansas. Trooper Smith noticed a California license plate on the rear of the vehicle, but he did not observe a front license plate. Although Kansas law generally only requires vehicles to display a rear license plate, see Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-133, Trooper Smith believed that, under California law, California vehicles must display both a front and a rear license plate. Trooper Smith further believed that an interstate compact between California and Kansas authorized Kansas patrol officers to stop out-of-state vehicles that were not in compliance with their home state's motor vehicle laws, even if the out-of-state vehicle was not violating any Kansas laws governing Kansas vehicles. Consequently, Trooper Smith began following Mr. Ramstad's vehicle and "ran the registration plate [he had seen] through the Topeka dispatch," which informed him that the plate belonged to a 1964 GMC vehicle. Unable to determine the vehicle's make and model, Trooper Smith activated his emergency lights and pulled over Mr. Ramstad's motor home. At the time he initiated the stop, Trooper Smith intended (1) to warn the driver that California vehicles must display a front license plate and (2) to ascertain whether, in fact, the vehicle was a 1964 GMC.

After the vehicle pulled over, Trooper Smith approached Mr. Ramstad, who produced a valid California driver's license, as well as the vehicle's proof of insurance. See Ramstad, 219 F.3d at 1264; Ramstad, 120 F.Supp.2d at 975. Mr. Ramstad appeared "extremely nervous" to Trooper Smith. Ramstad, 219 F.3d at 1264. He noticed that Mr. Ramstad's hands shook as he presented his driver's license, observed that "the veins in his neck were distended," and, given his distended veins, thought that his heart rate "was very rapid." Mr. Ramstad also paced back and forth as he spoke with Trooper Smith.

Trooper Smith later asked Mr. Ramstad about his travel plans, and Mr. Ramstad indicated that he was driving from San Diego, California, to Indianapolis, Indiana. He also explained that during the journey, he had stopped in Durango, Colorado. At some point, Mr. Ramstad and Trooper Smith left the roadside and went to Trooper Smith's patrol car, where Mr. Ramstad's nervous behavior continued. While in the patrol car, Mr. Ramstad indicated that he was traveling to Indianapolis because his girlfriend, Ryn Reavis, who was a passenger in the motor home, was going "to be on a Talk Show of some sorts." He also informed Trooper Smith that he had purchased the motor home recently, but that he was currently unemployed.

Trooper Smith then left Mr. Ramstad in the patrol car and returned to the motor home to verify its vehicle identification number (VIN). While in the vehicle, Trooper Smith encountered Ms. Reavis, who told him that she and Mr. Ramstad were traveling to Indianapolis "to see a friend who had a skin condition." Ramstad, 120 F.Supp.2d at 976. During his conversation with Ms. Reavis, Trooper Smith noticed that the wallpaper in the bedroom area of the motor home differed from the other living areas of the vehicle, which, based on his experience, Trooper Smith found unusual.

Trooper Smith subsequently returned to his patrol car and explained to Mr. Ramstad that he would receive a warning citation for not displaying a front California license plate. Trooper Smith then returned Mr. Ramstad's proof of insurance and driver's license, gave him the citation, and told him "[T]hat's all I got. Have a safe trip okay." Ramstad, 120 F.Supp.2d at 976. During the next eight seconds, Mr. Ramstad asked Trooper Smith if the Kansas Highway Patrol monitored "CB" traffic, explaining that a driver up the road had radioed for assistance. Ramstad, 120 F.Supp.2d at 976. Literally one second after Mr. Ramstad finished his statement, and before Mr. Ramstad exited the patrol car, Trooper Smith asked Mr. Ramstad, "Can I ask you a couple of questions real quick? We're all done with everything." Mr. Ramstad quickly consented to the additional questioning, and Trooper Smith asked, "You guys aren't hauling anything illegal with you are you: no guns, drugs, weapons, contraband, large sums of money?" Mr. Ramstad denied hauling anything illegal. Trooper Smith immediately responded by asking for permission to take "a quick look around" the motor home. Mr. Ramstad consented to the search, provided that Trooper Smith would not "tear anything up." Trooper Smith agreed that he would not tear anything up.

Once inside the motor home, Trooper Smith noticed discrepancies in the wall near the bedroom area, including a recessed area, recent scrapes and scratches on the wall, and fresh caulking, screws, and trim. He also noted "that the speaker grill covers [in the wall] did not cover speakers, but just covered a small hole with a wire." Ramstad, 219 F.3d at 1264. In the course of this search, Trooper Smith unscrewed and removed the speaker covers. Ramstad, 120 F.Supp.2d at 976.

Trooper Smith then exited the motor home and walked to the rear of the vehicle, where he observed a depth discrepancy of approximately twenty-eight inches between the interior and exterior walls of the motor home. Based on his prior experience, Trooper Smith suspected that the motor home contained a false wall. At that point, Trooper Smith radioed his Topeka dispatcher and requested that a K-9 narcotics dog be sent to inspect the vehicle. The drug sniffing dog arrived ten to fifteen minutes later. Inside the vehicle, the dog alerted at the rear wall, near the same area where Trooper Smith had noticed "fresh scratches and marks." Ramstad, 219 F.3d at 1264.

After the dog alerted, Trooper Smith asked Mr. Ramstad to drive the motor home to a nearby KHP facility, where Trooper Smith removed a mirror and plywood panel from the rear of the motor home. Behind the panel, Trooper Smith discovered thirty-eight plastic-wrapped bundles containing 567.3 pounds of marijuana.

Prior to trial, Mr. Ramstad filed a motion to suppress the marijuana. Among other things, Mr. Ramstad argued that the stop preceding the discovery of the marijuana was illegal because the failure to display a front license plate in accordance with California law did not violate Kansas law. Second, assuming the stop's illegality, Mr. Ramstad contended that his consent to Trooper Smith's search did not purge the illegality of the stop. Third, even if the stop was legal, or his subsequent consent to the search purged any illegality, Mr. Ramstad asserted that Trooper Smith exceeded the scope of his consent by unscrewing and removing the speaker covers. Ramstad, 219 F.3d at 1265.

In response, the government argued several provisions of Kansas law justified the stop. First, the government cited two interstate compacts joined by Kansas, the "Driver License Compact," Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1212, and the "Nonresident Violator Compact," Id. § 8-1219, which, argued the government, "provide that Kansas shall give full faith and credit to the traffic laws of its sister states and the District of Columbia, and report traffic offenses to sister jurisdictions." Aplt.App., Vol. I at 29. Second, the government invoked § 8-142 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated, which makes it illegal to operate a vehicle that "does not have attached thereto and displayed thereon the license plate or plates assigned thereto by [the Kansas] [D]ivision [of Vehicles of the Department of Revenue] for the current registration year." Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-142.

After holding a suppression hearing, the district court denied Mr. Ramstad's motion. The district court made no...

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