U.S. v. Reid

Decision Date17 July 2002
Docket NumberNo. CR.A. 02-10013-WGY.,CR.A. 02-10013-WGY.
Citation211 F.Supp.2d 366
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, v. Richard C. REID, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

Owen S. Walker, Office of the Federal Defender, Boston, MA, Tamar R. Birckhead, Federal Defender Office, Boston, MA, for Richard C. Reid, aka Abdul-Raheem, aka Abu Ibrahim Abdul Raheem.

Stephen G. Huggard, Washington, DC, for United States.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YOUNG, Chief Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Richard C. Reid ("Reid") asks this Court to suppress statements he made to federal investigators on two days, December 22 and 23, 2001—the date of the incident that brought him before this Court1 and the day after. Over the course of five days— June 11, 12, 18, 20, and 21, 2002this Court heard live testimony and argument at a suppression hearing, most of which related to questions this Court answered at the close of the hearing. Those questions were: whether sedatives administered to Reid after he allegedly tried but failed to detonate an explosive device on board a trans-Atlantic flight rendered involuntary any statements he made to investigators after the flight landed, and whether the sedatives rendered ineffectual any waiver he may have made of the protections afforded him by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The Court found that Reid was not under the influence of any sedatives when the interrogations challenged by Reid began, several hours after the sedatives were administered. Hr'g Tr. at 5:35 to 5:40 [Docket No. 91]. The Court therefore rejected Reid's arguments that the sedatives rendered any statements made by him to investigators involuntary, or any waiver of his Miranda protections ineffectual. Id. at 5:39.

This Memorandum addresses a separate question posed by Reid in his motion and developed through a stipulation reached by the parties [Docket No. 70]. It is the question whether a statement made by Reid to a Massachusetts State Police Trooper as he was being transported to a temporary detention facility at Logan Airport —"I have nothing else to say"—constitutes an assertion by him of his right to silence under Miranda that mandates the suppression of any subsequent statements he made to federal investigators.

After an exposition of the relevant facts, this Court considers the merits of Reid's argument.

II. BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from Reid's Motion to Suppress Statements ("Def.'s Mot.") [Docket No. 55] and from the Government's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress ("Gov't's Opp'n") [Docket No. 63], as well as the Stipulation of Facts submitted jointly by the parties ("Stip.") [Docket No. 70].2

On December 22, 2001, the police took Reid into police custody at approximately 12:55 p.m. Boston time, after the flight on which he allegedly attempted to detonate an explosive device—American Airlines Flight 63 from Paris to Miami—was diverted to and landed at Logan Airport in Boston. Four Massachusetts State Police officers boarded the plane, handcuffed Reid, and removed him from the plane. At around 1:00 p.m., one of the officers (it is unclear who) read Reid Miranda warnings. The officers then placed Reid inside a police cruiser so that he could be transported to the State Police barracks at the airport, where he would be detained temporarily. While in the car, the driver, State Trooper Louis Santiago ("Trooper Santiago"), asked Reid a number of questions, to which Reid responded by giving "non-committal answers." Def.'s Mot. at 2. Most of the questions Trooper Santiago asked Reid were mundane. For instance, Trooper Santiago asked Reid his name, to which Reid replied that his name could be taken from his passport. Stip.Ex. B (Interview of Trooper Santiago by Sergeant Michael F. Cronin, dated December 27, 2001) ("Cronin Interview"). Trooper Santiago also asked Reid where he was from, to which Reid stated Europe. Id. At some point while in the cruiser, Trooper Santiago also asked Reid "What happened on the plane?," which Reid answered by stating that nothing happened on the plane. Id. (Telephone interview with Trooper Santiago by FBI special agent Christopher A. Fullam, dated April 30, 2002) ("Fullam Interview"). Reid then asked Trooper Santiago "Where are the reporters?" Id. (Cronin Interview). Trooper Santiago answered that there were no reporters, because this was "not going to be a big deal." Id. Reid then asked a number of times where the media was and, according to Trooper Santiago, "eventually became indignant," and stated "You'll see. This will be a big deal." Id. Reid then said "I have nothing else to say." Id. At this point, the conversation between Reid and Trooper Santiago stopped. Def.'s Mot. at 3. For reasons not entirely clear, Reid was transferred from the cruiser driven by Trooper Santiago to another cruiser to be taken to the State Police barracks. Stip.Ex. B (Fullam Interview); Hr'g Tr. 1:41 to 1:42 (Testimony of FBI agent Charles J. Gianturco). Trooper Santiago was then assigned to another part of the investigation. Id.

Reid was taken to the State Police barracks at the airport at approximately 1:30 p.m. Gov't's Opp'n at 2. At 2:15 p.m., he was again read his Miranda warnings, although no questioning took place at that time. Def.'s Mot. at 3; Gov't's Opp'n at 3. Before any interrogation of Reid commenced, he rested in his cell and was given water. Def.'s Mot. at 5. Also before the interrogation, Reid was examined by Emergency Medical Technicians ("EMTs") Ian Riley ("Riley") and Steven Solletti ("Solletti"), who had been told by federal investigators that Reid had been forcibly medicated on board Flight 63 in unknown dosages. Id. at 3. After taking Reid's vital signs and observing that his blood pressure was elevated (130/100), and that his pulse was low (58), the EMTs recommended that Reid be taken to a hospital for further evaluation. Id. at 3-4. The federal investigators rejected the EMTs' recommendation, and proceeded instead to question Reid regarding what transpired on board the aircraft.

Federal investigators began interrogating Reid at around 5:07 p.m. The interview was conducted by FBI special agents Brad Davis ("Davis") and Charles Gianturco ("Gianturco"), and Department of State Diplomatic Security Service agent Dan Choldin ("Choldin"). At that time, the agents again informed Reid of his Miranda protections, which he said he understood. Gov't's Opp'n at 4. He agreed to be questioned by the federal investigators, who then proceeded with the interview. During the interview, Reid received water and was offered but declined food. Id. The interview lasted approximately two and a half hours. Reid answered many questions but declined to answer several others. Hr'g Tr. at 1:60 (Testimony of agent Gianturco) [Docket No. 77]; id. at 3:8, 3:10 to 3:11, 3:12 (Testimony of agent Davis) [Docket No. 79]; id. at 3:46, 3:49 (Testimony of agent Choldin). That evening, after the interview ended, Reid was transported to the Plymouth County Correctional Facility (the "Plymouth Facility").

The following day, December 23, 2001, agents Davis and Choldin resumed questioning Reid at the Plymouth Facility at around 5:10 p.m. They reminded him of his Miranda safeguards, which he said he understood. He also signed a form acknowledging that he understood his rights and agreed to be questioned. Def.'s Mot. at 5 & Ex. D (Miranda consent agreement, signed by Reid, dated December 23, 2001); Gov't's Opp'n at 4.

III. DISCUSSION

Reid argues that his statement to Trooper Santiago, "I have nothing else to say," constitutes an invocation of his right to silence under Miranda. Invocation of the right to silence, Reid argues, compels this Court to suppress any statements he made to federal investigators after the invocation, including the substance of the interviews by agents Gianturco, Davis, and Choldin on December 22 and 23. Def.'s Mot. at 6-7. The government responds by arguing, first, that Reid's statement to Trooper Santiago was not an unequivocal assertion of Reid's right to silence. Second, even if Reid's statement was an invocation of his right to silence, federal investigators scrupulously honored Reid's right to silence by waiting several hours after the statement before interviewing him and by asking him if he would like to discuss the events that transpired on board Flight 63 before reinitiating interrogation. According to the government, if this Court accepts either of these two propositions, then all of the statements Reid made to federal investigators after 5:00 p.m. on December 22 are admissible, because none of them were made in violation of the protections afforded Reid by Miranda.

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that the police inform individuals in custody and subject to interrogation regarding criminal activity that they have a right to remain silent in response to police questioning. Id. at 467-68, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Once this protection attaches, when the individual is in custody and subject to interrogation, "[i]f the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease." Id. at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. 1602. This passage raises two questions that are relevant to Reid's motion to suppress. First, how clearly must a suspect articulate a desire to remain silent in order for the request to act as a bar to subsequent police questioning? Second, when, if ever, may police reinitiate questioning once the suspect has stated his wish to remain silent?

As to the first question, Miranda itself says that a suspect's assertion of the right to remain silent "in any manner" compels the police to cease questioning. 384 U.S. at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. 1602. The Supreme Court has declined to say...

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