U.S. v. Rendelman

Decision Date08 April 2011
Docket NumberNo. 08–4486.,08–4486.
Citation641 F.3d 36
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,v.Scott Lewis RENDELMAN, Defendant–Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

ARGUED: Paresh S. Patel, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Sujit Raman, Office of the United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.Before NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges, and PATRICK MICHAEL DUFFY, Senior United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.Affirmed by published opinion. Judge KING wrote the opinion, in which Judge NIEMEYER and Senior Judge DUFFY joined.

OPINION

KING, Circuit Judge:

Following a jury trial in the District of Maryland, appellant Scott Lewis Rendelman was convicted and sentenced for multiple offenses relating to the mailing of communications containing threats against various persons, including the President of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c). On appeal, Rendelman challenges two of those convictions (Counts Two and Seven of the seven-count indictment) on several grounds: first, that both charges were fatally defective for failure to properly allege § 876(c) offenses; second, that the evidence was insufficient to prove either offense; and, third, that both charges were constructively amended such that Rendelman was deprived of his Fifth Amendment right to indictment by a grand jury. As explained below, we reject each of those contentions and affirm.

I.
A.

In 2005 and 2006, Rendelman mailed letters to the United States Marshals Service in Sacramento, California, threatening to kill the President of the United States and others. Those mailings constitute the predicate actions for the offenses underlying this appeal. Rendelman mailed the threatening letters from Maryland correctional institutions where he was incarcerated.

Rendelman's jury trial, in which he represented himself, was conducted in Greenbelt over a four-day period in December 2007. Rendelman contended at trial that the government's evidence was insufficient to support his convictions on Counts Two and Seven. More specifically, he maintained that the letters were simply protests against the authorities and that nothing in them constituted a threat. Rendelman also asserted that the evidence supporting Count Seven failed to show that the threatening communication mailed to the Marshals Service in California was “addressed to” the President or White House employees engaged in the performance of their official duties. On appeal, Rendelman has refined and further developed his arguments, a proper understanding of which requires us to identify the relevant allegations of the grand jury, ascertain and explain the pertinent statutory provisions, and assess whether the purported grounds for reversal were properly preserved in the district court.

B.

In July 2007, the grand jury in the District of Maryland returned its indictment against Rendelman. Prior to trial, the district court dismissed Count One at the request of the government. At trial, the jury found Rendelman guilty of the other six charges—Counts Two through Seven—each of which charged the mailing of a threatening communication, in contravention of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c). Although discussed in greater detail below, § 876(c) provides, in pertinent part:

Whoever knowingly so deposits or causes to be delivered as aforesaid, any communication ... addressed to any other person and containing ... any threat to injure the person of the addressee or of another, shall be ... imprisoned not more than five years.... If such a communication is addressed to ... an official who is covered by section 1114, the individual shall be ... imprisoned not more than 10 years....

§ 876(c) (emphasis added).1 As explained further below, the last sentence of § 876(c) is not pertinent to the Count Two offense, but relates only to the potential punishment on Count Seven.

According to the indictment, Rendelman mailed the threatening letter underlying Count Two on about November 11, 2005 (the 2005 Letter”). Four months later, on March 7, 2006, he mailed another threatening letter (the 2006 Letter”), which underpins Count Seven.

With respect to the 2005 Letter, the grand jury alleged, inter alia, that Rendelman “did knowingly cause to be delivered by the United States Postal Service according to the directions thereon a written communication” that was “addressed to” the ‘United States Marshal's Service’ Sacramento, CA 95814,” and which threatened [t]he President of the United States,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c). J.A. 14.2 Therein, Rendelman expressed several grievances against the government, particularly its penal system, and threatened to kill “government scumbags” and the President after being released from prison:

I've decided I'm going to commit suicide, and I'm going to take as many government scumbags with me as I possibly can. When I'm released, I'm going to go to the White House, and I will suicide bomb the White House.... I will kill the President, whoever will be in the office at the time.Id. at 625. Rendelman signed the 2005 Letter and placed it in an envelope directed to the Marshals Service in California. He then deposited the Letter in the mail at the Montgomery County Correctional Facility in Boyds, Maryland.

Regarding the 2006 Letter, the grand jury charged Rendelman with a separate violation of § 876(c), alleging that he

did knowingly cause to be delivered by the United States Postal Service according to the directions thereon a written communication addressed to “U.S. Marshall's Service, Federal Building, 501 I Street, Sacramento, CA 95814,” and containing a threat to injure officers and employees of the United States engaged in the performance of official duties and covered by [18 U.S.C. § 1114,] as follows: “the President and all White House employees.”

J.A. 15. In the 2006 Letter, Rendelman again expressed his disdain for the federal prison system and threatened to kill “the President and all White House employees” by bombing the White House. The 2006 Letter specified:

The President must die. When I am released I will kill him. I will suicide bomb the White House. I will strap a bomb to my body and go to the White House and set myself off. The President will die in the blast and the White House will be reduced to ruins.... So I will kill the President and all White House employees.

Id. at 627. Rendelman signed and mailed the 2006 Letter to the Marshals Service from the Maryland Correctional Institution in Hagerstown.

C.

About a week before his trial was to begin, Rendelman moved to dismiss his court-appointed counsel and represent himself. The trial court granted Rendelman's request and appointed the federal public defender as standby trial counsel. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (explaining that trial court may appoint standby counsel for pro se defendant).3 When the trial began on December 11, 2007, the prosecution's opening statement discussed Rendelman's history of sending threatening letters, and then described the communications underlying the relevant charges. A Marshals Service witness produced the 2005 and 2006 Letters, as well as the envelopes in which they had been mailed, and all were admitted into evidence.

At the close of the prosecution's case, Rendelman moved for judgment of acquittal on Counts Two and Seven, contending, inter alia, that the communications underlying those charges were not “true threats.” J.A. 589. 4 The trial court denied the acquittal motions, however, explaining its view that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the communications were indeed threatening and that both charges had been proved. Rendelman, who did not present any evidence, then rested his case and renewed his motions for judgment of acquittal.

At that point, Rendelman asserted an alternative ground for acquittal on Count Seven: that the 2006 Letter “was addressed to ‘U.S. Marshals Service,’ and that, as a result, “there is no evidence that it was addressed to” a federal law enforcement officer or an official covered by § 1114. J.A. 597. 5 Rendelman thus argued that the threatening communication underlying Count Seven was not addressed to the President or any White House employee engaged in the performance of official duties. The significance of § 1114 to the proof of Count Seven was that, pursuant to the last sentence of § 876(c), if the threatening communication underlying a § 876(c) charge “is addressed to ... an official who is covered by section 1114,” the maximum term of imprisonment increases from “not more than five years” to “not more than 10 years” (the “Enhancement Element”).6

In its response to Rendelman's motion, the prosecution argued that, although the envelope containing the 2006 Letter was addressed to the Marshals Service in California, the jury was entitled to assess the contents and context of the entire communication and decide whether, pursuant to § 1114, it was addressed or directed to the President and White House employees engaged in their official duties. The trial court then denied Rendelman's renewed motion for judgment of acquittal, explaining that,

[f]irst of all, it's not necessary that the addressee of the communication be the person threatened; secondly from the context of the communication, it's clear that it is threatening somebody within the scope of Section 1114.

J.A. 600.

Rendelman also objected to certain aspects of the proposed instructions on Count Seven, maintaining that they did not properly reflect the allegations of the indictment. As a result, the trial court modified its proposed instructions, and gave the following instruction concerning Count...

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