U.S. v. Reyes, 758
| Decision Date | 20 June 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 758,D,758 |
| Citation | 116 F.3d 67 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Andres REYES, Defendant-Appellant. ocket 96-1295. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Donald T. Kinsella, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Albany, NY (Thomas J. Maroney, United States Attorney, Northern District of New York, Albany, NY, of counsel), for Appellee.
Lee Greenstein, Albany, NY, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before: CARDAMONE and PARKER, Circuit Judges, and WEXLER, * District Judge.
Andres Reyes appeals from his sentence imposed on April 30, 1996 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (McAvoy, J.), after he plead guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Defendant's chief complaint on appeal is not that the sentence itself was in error, but that the sentencing court failed to comply with all the requirements of a federal statute governing the manner in which a criminal sentence ought to be announced.
A number of interests must be served at sentencing: the defendant, to whom a sentence of confinement is a severe punishment, is entitled to know if and for how long he is to be confined, and why he has been given a particular sentence; the public needs to learn that the defendant is being punished for the crime he committed; the appellate court, which reviews the record, must assure itself that the sentencing law was carefully followed. To serve these interests, the defendant must be brought before the sentencing court to be told publicly what his sentence is and the reasons for it; moreover, the sentence must fully reflect not only the district court's careful evaluation of all the circumstances of the crime, but also reflect its discharge of its statutory obligation according to both the spirit and the letter of the sentencing law. This appeal questions whether each of those interests was adequately served in this case.
In June 1995 a confidential informant told Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents that Andres Reyes was selling cocaine base in the cities of Albany and Troy in upstate New York. At the agents' request Two weeks later, on September 14, 1995, the informant and the DEA agent again called defendant and arranged a second crack cocaine buy at the same location as the August 29 transaction. A few minutes after the agent and the informant parked on Washington Avenue, Reyes drove past the area with an unidentified passenger in the front seat of his car. After stopping at the corner to let his passenger out, defendant parked behind the informant's car. Defendant entered the back seat of the informant's car, as he had before, but then told the informant he had to make a telephone call, exited the vehicle, and walked away. When Reyes left, the passenger who had been in Reyes' car got into the informant's car and sold the agent and the informant one ounce of crack cocaine for $900. A few minutes later, Reyes returned and said he was leaving because he had seen someone in the area taking pictures.
the informant paged defendant on August 29, 1995 to arrange a controlled drug purchase from him later that day in front of a restaurant on Washington Avenue in Albany. When the informant and an undercover DEA agent arrived at the designated location, Reyes and his girlfriend, Melissa Rodriguez, climbed into the back seat of the informant's car. Rodriguez then handed several plastic bags to Reyes, who gave them to the informant in exchange for $900 in cash.
Defendant and Melissa Rodriguez were arrested three weeks later, on October 2, 1995, as they were leaving their apartment in Troy. After they consented to a search of their apartment, officers discovered a variety of drug-related paraphernalia, including a laboratory scale, cocaine cutting agents, two beepers, and a handgun. Five small bags of cocaine base were found in Rodriguez' purse. Defendant was subsequently indicted on one count of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, two counts of distribution of cocaine base, and three counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. Several months later, he plead guilty, as earlier noted, to the conspiracy charge pursuant to a plea agreement.
As part of the agreement, Reyes acknowledged he would be subject to a minimum sentence of ten years and a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. The government estimated that defendant's base offense level would be 32 and that he would receive a three point downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. Reyes reserved the right to appeal a sentence of more that 87 months. In its presentence report (PSR) the Probation Office recommended upward adjustments pursuant to Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.2(a)(2), which enhances by one level the base offense level of a defendant who involves a minor in a drug offense, and § 2D1.1(b)(1), which provides for a two level enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon in connection with certain narcotics offenses.
In preparing the PSR, the Probation Office discovered that Reyes had a criminal record in Massachusetts, where he had been convicted of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon and two drug offenses. The prior convictions qualified Reyes as a career offender pursuant to Guidelines § 4B1.1, under which certain types of repeat offenders are subject to a mandatory minimum base offense level and a criminal history category of VI. Applying § 4B1.1, the Probation Office recommended a base offense level of 37. The PSR also adopted the three-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility suggested in the plea agreement, resulting in a total recommended offense level of 34.
The sentencing court concluded that defendant's total offense level was 34, based on a career offender offense level of 37 adjusted downward three points for acceptance of responsibility. It then granted the government's motion for a downward departure, pursuant to Guidelines § 5K1.1, in recognition of Reyes' "substantial assistance" to the government. The § 5K1.1 departure reduced Reyes' total offense level to 25, with the resulting sentencing range, under a criminal history category of VI, of 110-137 months. Reyes was sentenced to 121 months imprisonment, five years of supervised release, and a $50 special assessment.
We turn first to those requirements governing the manner in which a sentence upon a defendant is to be announced. In sentencing a criminal defendant, a federal court is required to state in open court its reasons for imposing a particular sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1) (1994). If the sentence is "of the kind, and within the range, [established under the Sentencing Guidelines] and that range exceeds 24 months," the court must also articulate why it selected a sentence at a specific point within the applicable range. Id. When the sentencing court fails to offer an adequate explanation for selecting a particular point within the sentencing range, the sentence will be vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing. See United States v. Zackson, 6 F.3d 911, 923-24 (2d Cir.1993); United States v. Chartier, 933 F.2d 111, 117 (2d Cir.1991).
The § 3553 statement of reasons requirement was one of a number of amendments to Title 18 included in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. In a Senate report discussing the effects of those amendments, Congress explained that the statement of reasons is intended to serve a number of purposes. First, it advises the defendant of the reasons for the imposition of a particular sentence, which gives the defendant an opportunity to challenge any perceived error in the judge's reasoning prior to the formal entry of judgment. Second, it is a prerequisite to meaningful appellate review of the sentence's reasonableness. Cf. United States v. Lawal, 17 F.3d 560, 563 (2d Cir.1994) (). Third, the statement of reasons may both educate the public and serve a deterrent function by informing the public why the defendant received a particular sentence and what consequences other citizens might expect to incur should they engage in similar criminal activities. Fourth, it provides valuable information to criminal justice researchers and the Sentencing Commission regarding the effectiveness of the Guidelines in achieving their stated aims. See S.Rep. No. 98-225, at 80 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3263; Lawal, 17 F.3d at 564.
Consistent with its informational function, the statement of reasons provision of § 3553 has been interpreted to require the sentencing judge to articulate a reason that demonstrates that he "thoughtfully discharged his statutory obligation, with a degree of care appropriate to the severity of the punishment ultimately selected." Chartier, 933 F.2d at 117; United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 344 (2d Cir.1993). It is not enough for a sentencing court simply to say that it has considered "everything," Zackson, 6 F.3d at 923, or to explain why it is not sentencing a defendant at the bottom of the range without also explaining why it is sentencing at the top of that range, see Chartier, 933 F.2d at 117 ().
Instead, a sentencing court complies with § 3553(c)(1) only when it includes in its statement of reasons some particularized discussion of those factors distinctive to the defendant that influenced the court's decision. Such factors may include,...
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