U.S. v. Richardson

Decision Date06 September 1978
Docket Number77-3094 and 78-1402,Nos. 76-2125,s. 76-2125
Citation586 F.2d 661
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Thomas P. RICHARDSON, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Richard G. Sherman (argued), Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant-appellant.

David R. Hinden (argued), Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before BARNES, HUFSTEDLER and TANG, Circuit Judges.

BARNES, Senior Circuit Judge:

I. INDICTMENT IN NO. 76-2125

Before us is the appeal of defendant Richardson of his conviction in No. 76-2125, (indictment for violation of Security Exchange Commission's charges) on six of the 46 counts of an indictment charging conspiracy, fraud in the sale of securities, filing a false financial statement with an agency of the United States Government, and wire fraud. Four other defendants were indicted with him, on one or more counts of the above mentioned crimes. All four co-defendants at one time or another prior to trial had entered pleas of guilty to one or more counts of this indictment. Appellant did not plead guilty, but pursuant to an agreement between the Government and Richardson, the Government proceeded to trial on six counts of the indictment. (The others were dismissed by stipulation.) Gov.Ex. 168(I) was the stipulation admitted into evidence which constituted the Government's case-in-chief.

Appearing in the margin is the description in the Government's Brief of appellant's conduct, 1 which was undisputed at the trial and is undisputed on this appeal. 2 This information was first voluntarily brought to the attention of the S.E.C. on 4/15/75 by co-defendant Thomas, and Richard R. Scott, Richardson's attorney. Prior to this date, appellant had been under investigation by two different agencies of the United States for violation of the Neutrality Act, (shipping guns to Robert Vesco in Costa Rica and/or Panama); and the Mann Act (transporting women across state or national boundaries for immoral purposes). Admitting the facts in the S.E.C. complaint, the appellant's sole defense was that he had been entrapped.

After the court heard several motions, appellant waived his right to trial by jury, waived findings of fact, and after argument, the court made the following findings:

"THE COURT: All right. I have considered the evidence presented during the trial, as well as the lengthy and detailed stipulation that the parties have entered into. I also have considered the evidence that was presented at the pretrial hearing and it has been incorporated into these proceedings.

"I find from the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did commit the acts that are charged in Counts One, Three, Four, Five, Seven and Thirty-seven of the indictment, and in committing (sic) those acts he did also commit the offense, and that when he committed these offenses, he did so knowingly and willfully with the intent that is the requisite of these crimes.

"Mr. Richardson has relied heavily on the defense of entrapment, and while it has been established by the evidence that Mr. Ginsburgs was working as an informant for the Customs Bureau and also for the Beverly Hills Police Department during the period set forth in this indictment, the only evidence is that his efforts were directed solely toward the Neutrality Act violations.

"But even putting that aside and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, Ginsburgs really was nothing more than a confederate of the defendant in his illegal acts, at the very best. Ginsburgs really merely said to the defendant, 'Why don't you do these illegal acts?'

"And the defendant knew that the proposal was illegal, and, however, with little hesitation he agreed to carry out the scheme that only he could accomplish, and he, in effect, said that, 'I know it is illegal, but it sounds good, and I will do it.'

"Mr. Richardson, I find, was not entrapped or induced to commit these offenses. I find that he was ready and willing to commit the crimes charged whenever the opportunity was afforded, and that is exactly what he ultimately did."

(R.T. 1223-1225 in No. 76-2125.)

Thus, there is no question but that defendant was guilty as charged in No. 76-2125, unless as a matter of law the trial judge erred in finding there was no entrapment.

A careful examination of several thousands of pages of pleadings, testimony and exhibits convinces us there was no error in that finding by the trial court. Richardson was not entrapped, save by his own volition and desires.

II. THE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL (OR FOR A DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT). APPEAL IN NO. 76-3094

After conviction and sentence, appellant changed attorneys, and made the above motion, and asked for an evidentiary hearing before the trial judge. After much maneuvering and argument, a partial evidentiary hearing was granted to permit the court to review the four issues now urged by appellant. 3

These four issues raised are expressed differently by the two parties. We prefer the Government's expression:

                      DEFENDANT'S ISSUES                    GOVERNMENT'S ISSUES
                  I.  Conduct of Government requires    I.  Did Government's conduct deprive
                      dismissal of case.                    defendant of due process of law
                                                            under the Fifth Amendment
                 II.  Appellant's motion to recuse     II.  Did denial of defendant's after
                      Government counsel should have        trial motion to recuse Government
                      been granted.                         counsel deprive defendant of due
                                                            process (Fifth Amendment)?
                III.  Evidential hearing should have  III.  Did defendant receive effective
                      been granted on issue of              assistance of counsel?
                      ineffective counsel.
                 IV.  Evidential hearing should have   IV.  Did the court err in failing to
                      been granted on issue of              initiate competency hearing for
                      insanity.                             defendant under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4244?
                

From the first, the defense was primarily based on the alleged fact that one Jack Ginsburgs, a producer of "adult" books and a close friend and confidant of appellant, and one Robert D. Hall, a private investigator, also a close friend and associate of appellant, Were informants against him in the S.E.C. investigation. Government counsel persistently denied this, saying Ginsburgs was an informant to Customs Agent Joseph Charles in the Neutrality Act investigation Only. Hall was murdered and Ginsburgs convicted of the murder and sent to state prison. Hall could not, and Ginsburgs would not, testify on behalf of appellant in the New Trial motion. This factor increased defendant's claim that his good friends, Ginsburgs and Hall, were informants against him during, and with respect to, the S.E.C. investigation.

At the hearing on the motion for a new trial, the "informant charges" made by appellant in the New Trial proceedings were categorically denied by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Marella and Wilson, Customs Agent Charles, and S.E.C. Counsel Mercer. The testimony given by Robert Hall in his two appearances before the grand jury was submitted to Judge Byrne In camera, together with a supplemental affidavit of Marella. Marella swore he had never heard or even known prior to March 1st, 1977, (almost two years after co-defendant Thomas and Attorney Scott for appellant had gone to the S.E.C.), of the twelve tape recordings given by Hall to Assistant U.S. Attorney Wilson. Marella also swore he had but one meeting or conversation with Jack Ginsburgs, and received no information from him.

Finally, (and most convincing if anyone could believe him) was the extensive testimony of Jack Ginsburgs himself (R.T. No. 76-2125, pp. 509-592), then under examination (actually cross-examination) of Mr. Sharp, co-counsel for appellant, that he was admittedly an informant to Agent Joseph Charles with respect to the latter's investigation of appellant for violation of the Neutrality Act, Alone. "I gave him information regarding the alleged gun running to Costa Rica. Yes." (Idem, 515.) "I had no contact with Charles after August, 1974 (p. 517), when I procured an attorney for him (appellant) in San Antonio (p. 519)." Ginsburgs did tell Agent Charles appellant Richardson had called his attorney Scott on the telephone and asked him (Scott) to please clear his (appellant's) driveway of the agents that were there in Bel Air (p. 523) after the S.E.C. investigation started.

Ginsburgs was present at many conversations, some of which while Mr. Sharp was present, concerning appellant's financial difficulties.

"Q (by Mr. Sharp) Did you at that time report Any of that particular conversation to Any Government Agent? (Emphasis added.)

"A No, sir. (p. 526, 11. 20-22).

"Q Did you ever report to any Government Agent any conversation that you overheard between me and Mr. Richardson regarding the allegations that had been made against him in this particular case?

"A No, sir." (pp. 527-528).

Ginsburgs' flat denial as to his furnishing any information respecting the Securities case, included any conversations with Assistant U.S. Attorney Marella.

Ginsburgs was also asked about his furnishing any documents to Captain Jack Egger of the Beverly Hills Police Department (now retired) which Ginsburgs, according to appellant's attorneys, had allegedly Purloined from appellant. Ginsburgs readily admitted he had furnished (1) copy of an appraisal concerning the value of appellant's house; (2) "a thing" on "Rich-Air-Son" (concerning the jet plane this subsidiary owned by Richardson used for plane travel to various places, including Costa Rica); (3) a list of employees of Richardson; and (4) "possibly" a copy of Richardson & Co., Inc.'s financial statement of November 30, 1973 (idem, p. 538), all of which...

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3 cases
  • Hernandez v. Ylst
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • December 3, 1990
    ...and Hernandez's own attorney did not perceive a reasonable cause to believe Hernandez was incompetent. See United States v. Richardson, 586 F.2d 661, 667 (9th Cir.1978). Hernandez points to the psychological evaluation report prepared by Dr. Lawrence Ratner at defense counsel's behest, issu......
  • U.S. v. Knight
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • March 1, 1990
    ...not have given those who observed him reasonable cause to believe that a competency hearing was necessary. See United States v. Richardson, 586 F.2d 661, 667 (9th Cir.1978). Knight next argues that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel because the distric......
  • U.S. v. Hoapili, s. 91-10448
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • December 17, 1992
    ...raise questions about a defendant's competency "tells a great deal about the validity" of such a claim. See United States v. Richardson, 586 F.2d 661, 667 (9th Cir.1978).3 The fact that the court found psychiatric rehabilitation desirable is not sufficient alone to raise a good faith doubt,......

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