U.S. v. Richardson
Decision Date | 06 September 1978 |
Docket Number | 77-3094 and 78-1402,Nos. 76-2125,s. 76-2125 |
Citation | 586 F.2d 661 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Thomas P. RICHARDSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Richard G. Sherman (argued), Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant-appellant.
David R. Hinden (argued), Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
Before BARNES, HUFSTEDLER and TANG, Circuit Judges.
I. INDICTMENT IN NO. 76-2125
Before us is the appeal of defendant Richardson of his conviction in No. 76-2125, (indictment for violation of Security Exchange Commission's charges) on six of the 46 counts of an indictment charging conspiracy, fraud in the sale of securities, filing a false financial statement with an agency of the United States Government, and wire fraud. Four other defendants were indicted with him, on one or more counts of the above mentioned crimes. All four co-defendants at one time or another prior to trial had entered pleas of guilty to one or more counts of this indictment. Appellant did not plead guilty, but pursuant to an agreement between the Government and Richardson, the Government proceeded to trial on six counts of the indictment. (The others were dismissed by stipulation.) Gov.Ex. 168(I) was the stipulation admitted into evidence which constituted the Government's case-in-chief.
Appearing in the margin is the description in the Government's Brief of appellant's conduct, 1 which was undisputed at the trial and is undisputed on this appeal. 2 This information was first voluntarily brought to the attention of the S.E.C. on 4/15/75 by co-defendant Thomas, and Richard R. Scott, Richardson's attorney. Prior to this date, appellant had been under investigation by two different agencies of the United States for violation of the Neutrality Act, (shipping guns to Robert Vesco in Costa Rica and/or Panama); and the Mann Act (transporting women across state or national boundaries for immoral purposes). Admitting the facts in the S.E.C. complaint, the appellant's sole defense was that he had been entrapped.
After the court heard several motions, appellant waived his right to trial by jury, waived findings of fact, and after argument, the court made the following findings:
(R.T. 1223-1225 in No. 76-2125.)
Thus, there is no question but that defendant was guilty as charged in No. 76-2125, unless as a matter of law the trial judge erred in finding there was no entrapment.
A careful examination of several thousands of pages of pleadings, testimony and exhibits convinces us there was no error in that finding by the trial court. Richardson was not entrapped, save by his own volition and desires.
II. THE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL (OR FOR A DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT). APPEAL IN NO. 76-3094
After conviction and sentence, appellant changed attorneys, and made the above motion, and asked for an evidentiary hearing before the trial judge. After much maneuvering and argument, a partial evidentiary hearing was granted to permit the court to review the four issues now urged by appellant. 3
These four issues raised are expressed differently by the two parties. We prefer the Government's expression:
DEFENDANT'S ISSUES GOVERNMENT'S ISSUES I. Conduct of Government requires I. Did Government's conduct deprive dismissal of case. defendant of due process of law under the Fifth Amendment II. Appellant's motion to recuse II. Did denial of defendant's after Government counsel should have trial motion to recuse Government been granted. counsel deprive defendant of due process (Fifth Amendment)? III. Evidential hearing should have III. Did defendant receive effective been granted on issue of assistance of counsel? ineffective counsel. IV. Evidential hearing should have IV. Did the court err in failing to been granted on issue of initiate competency hearing for insanity. defendant under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4244?
From the first, the defense was primarily based on the alleged fact that one Jack Ginsburgs, a producer of "adult" books and a close friend and confidant of appellant, and one Robert D. Hall, a private investigator, also a close friend and associate of appellant, Were informants against him in the S.E.C. investigation. Government counsel persistently denied this, saying Ginsburgs was an informant to Customs Agent Joseph Charles in the Neutrality Act investigation Only. Hall was murdered and Ginsburgs convicted of the murder and sent to state prison. Hall could not, and Ginsburgs would not, testify on behalf of appellant in the New Trial motion. This factor increased defendant's claim that his good friends, Ginsburgs and Hall, were informants against him during, and with respect to, the S.E.C. investigation.
At the hearing on the motion for a new trial, the "informant charges" made by appellant in the New Trial proceedings were categorically denied by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Marella and Wilson, Customs Agent Charles, and S.E.C. Counsel Mercer. The testimony given by Robert Hall in his two appearances before the grand jury was submitted to Judge Byrne In camera, together with a supplemental affidavit of Marella. Marella swore he had never heard or even known prior to March 1st, 1977, (almost two years after co-defendant Thomas and Attorney Scott for appellant had gone to the S.E.C.), of the twelve tape recordings given by Hall to Assistant U.S. Attorney Wilson. Marella also swore he had but one meeting or conversation with Jack Ginsburgs, and received no information from him.
Finally, (and most convincing if anyone could believe him) was the extensive testimony of Jack Ginsburgs himself (R.T. No. 76-2125, pp. 509-592), then under examination (actually cross-examination) of Mr. Sharp, co-counsel for appellant, that he was admittedly an informant to Agent Joseph Charles with respect to the latter's investigation of appellant for violation of the Neutrality Act, Alone. (Idem, 515.) "I had no contact with Charles after August, 1974 (p. 517), when I procured an attorney for him (appellant) in San Antonio (p. 519)." Ginsburgs did tell Agent Charles appellant Richardson had called his attorney Scott on the telephone and asked him (Scott) to please clear his (appellant's) driveway of the agents that were there in Bel Air (p. 523) after the S.E.C. investigation started.
Ginsburgs was present at many conversations, some of which while Mr. Sharp was present, concerning appellant's financial difficulties.
Ginsburgs' flat denial as to his furnishing any information respecting the Securities case, included any conversations with Assistant U.S. Attorney Marella.
Ginsburgs was also asked about his furnishing any documents to Captain Jack Egger of the Beverly Hills Police Department (now retired) which Ginsburgs, according to appellant's attorneys, had allegedly Purloined from appellant. Ginsburgs readily admitted he had furnished (1) copy of an appraisal concerning the value of appellant's house; (2) "a thing" on "Rich-Air-Son" (concerning the jet plane this subsidiary owned by Richardson used for plane travel to various places, including Costa Rica); (3) a list of employees of Richardson; and (4) "possibly" a copy of Richardson & Co., Inc.'s financial statement of November 30, 1973 (idem, p. 538), all of which...
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