U.S. v. Richardson

• Decision Date: 28 June 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-10107,95-10107
• Citation: 87 F.3d 706
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. L.D. RICHARDSON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 706

87 F.3d 706

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. L.D. RICHARDSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 95-10107.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 28, 1996.

Paul E. Coggins, Dallas, TX, C. Richard Baker, Steven M. Sucsy, Tanya K. Pierce, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, Office of the United States Attorney, Lubbock, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Kevin Thomas Glasheen, Fadduol & Glasheen, Lubbock, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before DUHE, BARKSDALE, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant L.D. Richardson argues that the district court abused its discretion when it applied a consecutive sentence pursuant to § 5G1.3(c) by failing to consider certain factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) which guide a court in its determination of whether to impose a concurrent or consecutive sentence. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.

BACKGROUND

On August 7, 1992, defendant L.D. Richardson was arrested for being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced in federal court to a term of 63 months in prison.

On March 23, 1994, a grand jury indicted Richardson and nine others in a seven-count indictment charging various drug trafficking crimes and related offenses. On October 6, 1994, Richardson agreed to plead guilty to a superseding information charging him with interstate travel in aid of racketeering enterprises and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) and (2). The government agreed to move to dismiss the original indictment and to not oppose Richardson's request that the sentence for interstate travel run concurrently with his prior felon-in-possession sentence. In his plea agreement, Richardson indicated that he understood that it was ultimately within the district court's discretion to decide whether the sentences would run concurrently or consecutively. The parties agreed that the statutory maximum prison sentence was five years.

A presentence investigation report ("PSR") was prepared and given to the district judge. The PSR stated that the sentencing guidelines range exceeded the five-year statutory maximum; therefore, the guideline range became 60 months. The PSR further stated that U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) ¹ On December 22, 1994, Richardson and the government entered into an amended plea agreement. In their amended agreement, Richardson and the government stipulated that U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c) should apply instead of U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b). The government again agreed not to oppose Richardson's request for a concurrent sentence. Richardson re-stated in his amended plea agreement that he understood that the district court had the discretion to order consecutive or concurrent sentences. ²

                should apply to the interstate travel sentence, thereby mandating concurrent sentences.   On November 9, 1994, the district court rejected both the plea agreement and Richardson's guilty plea
                

The district court accepted both Richardson's guilty plea and the parties' amended plea agreement. The next day, the probation officer amended the PSR to apply U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c).

On January 20, 1995, the district court held a sentencing hearing. At the hearing, Richardson did not object to the facts, as stated in the PSR, or the guideline calculation recommended therein. Richardson only asked the district court to make his sentence run concurrently with his felon-in-possession sentence. ³ The district court adopted the findings of the amended PSR and ordered a sentence of 60 months to run consecutively to Richardson's felon-in-possession sentence.

Richardson timely filed a notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

Richardson argues that the district court's application of a consecutive sentence was an abuse of discretion. Richardson does not dispute that § 5G1.3(c) is the applicable sentencing guideline ⁴, nor does he contest that District court decisions as to the application of consecutive or concurrent sentences are reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Brown, 920 F.2d 1212, 1216-17 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 925, 111 S.Ct. 2034, 114 L.Ed.2d 119 (1991).

                §   5G1.3(c) allows the district judge discretion in imposing either concurrent or consecutive sentences.   Rather, Richardson simply argues that, before imposing the sentence, the district court failed to consider specific factors enunciated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3584.   The government argues that this court's review should be limited to plain error because Richardson failed to object to either the PSR or the consecutive sentence at the sentencing hearing.   The government further argues that it was completely within the district court's discretion to impose a consecutive sentence under § 5G1.3(c), and that the district court made this decision after adequately considering the factors enumerated in § 3553(a)
                

Section 3584 states, in relevant part:

(a) Imposition of concurrent or consecutive terms. If multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant at the same time, or if a term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who is already subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment, the terms may run concurrently or consecutively.... Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at different times run consecutively unless the court orders that the terms are to run concurrently.

(b) Factors to be considered in imposing concurrent or consecutive terms. The court, in determining whether the terms imposed are to be ordered to run concurrently or consecutively, shall consider, as to each offense for which a term of imprisonment is being imposed, the factors set forth in § 3553(a).

18 U.S.C. § 3584. The factors set forth in § 3553(a) are as follows:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;

(2) the need for the sentence imposed--

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide punishment for the offense;

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and

(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;

(3) the kinds of sentences available (4) the kinds of sentence and the sentence range established for--

(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines that are issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to § 994(a)(1) of title 28 United States Code, and that are in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced ...

* * * * * *

(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2) that is in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced;

(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence discrepancies among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and

(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

In support of its order imposing consecutive sentences, the district court orally stated the following:

I will now state on the record the specific reasons for imposing the sentence that I have just imposed.

As to the term of incarceration, the statutory maximum is a 60-month term. That becomes the guideline range. I have imposed a term of incarceration of 60 months. I believe a sentence of 60 months does adequately address the sentencing objectives of punishment and deterrence.

No fine is assessed for the reason I do not believe the defendant has sufficient assets at this point to pay a fine. The three-year term of supervised release is imposed for reason I believe the defendant will need this amount of supervision to see that he reassimilates himself back into society, obtains suitable employment, and maintains a law-abiding lifestyle.

The $50 special assessment is imposed because the law mandates that it be.

Richardson argues that the district court's language does not evince a consideration of the seven factors enumerated in § 3553(a). Because § 3584 states that the district court shall consider the factors set forth in § 3553(a), Richardson argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to accord such consideration.

The government disagrees and argues that the district court's oral statement shows that it did give proper consideration to the factors in § 3553(a). Furthermore, the government asserts that we should apply a plain error standard of review because Richardson did not object to his sentence at the sentencing hearing.

Standard of Review

As to the applicable standard of review, it appears that Richardson did preserve his issue for appeal. In United States v. Hernandez, 64 F.3d 179 (5th Cir.1995), which was issued two weeks after the government filed its brief, we held:

Even though Hernandez failed to specifically cite to § 5G1.3(c) in arguing that his sentence should be imposed concurrently, he clearly requested that the "sentence run concurrent with the sentence that is undischarged in Florida ... [a]nd we ask that under § 5G1.3(c) of the Sentencing Guidelines." Although the specificity of Hernandez' request left something to be desired, it alerted the district court to the issue before it. This is not the case where a party completely and utterly failed to make an issue of the fact that his sentence should be imposed concurrently with an undischarged prison sentence.

Hernandez, 64 F.3d at 181. Accordingly, considering the facts of this case, we hold that Richardson raised this issue below. Therefore, Richardson's error was preserved for appeal. As such, "[a]lthough we review a district court's decision to order consecutive or concurrent sentences for abuse of discretion, see, e.g., United States v. Devaney, 992 F.2d 75, 77 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 886, 114 S.Ct. 237, 126 L.Ed.2d 191 (1993...