U.S. v. Rife

• Decision Date: 02 December 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-3105,86-3105
• Citation: 835 F.2d 154
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rita RIFE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 154

835 F.2d 154

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rita RIFE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 86-3105.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Sept. 10, 1987.

Decided Dec. 2, 1987.

Catherine M. FitzSimmons, Ottawa, Ill., for defendant-appellant.

Richard N. Cox, Asst. U.S. Atty., J. William Roberts, U.S. Atty., Springfield, Ill., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before WOOD and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges, and GORDON, Senior District Judge. ^*

MYRON L. GORDON, Senior District Judge.

The defendant, Rita Rife, appeals from the district court's order revoking her probation. She also complains that the sentence imposed upon her is excessive. We affirm both the probation revocation and the sentence imposed.

On February 24, 1984, Ms. Rife pleaded guilty to a charge of unlawful possession of food stamps in violation of 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2024. The sentence was suspended; Ms. Rife was given a three year term of probation and was ordered to pay restitution.

On August 14, 1986, Ms. Rife's probation officer presented a petition to the court for revocation of probation after Ms. Rife told her probation officer that she had frequently delivered marijuana to her imprisoned husband. In response to the petition, Ms. Rife filed a motion to suppress the statements which she had made to her probation officer and a motion for judgment for lack of cause. The district court denied both motions and revoked Ms. Rife's probation; subsequently, she was sentenced to three years imprisonment on the original charge of unlawful possession of food stamps.

Ms. Rife raises three issues on this appeal. First, she argues that the statements made to her probation officer should have been suppressed because the statements were not made voluntarily. Second, Ms. Rife maintains that she acted without the requisite criminal intent when, under duress, she delivered marijuana to her jailed husband. Finally, she urges that the sentence imposed is excessive.

As to the first issue, Ms. Rife asserted in her brief that the statements made to her probation officer were not made voluntarily, but rather, they were made after the probation officer's express assurances that her statements would be held in confidence. At oral argument, however, her counsel withdrew that contention, recognizing that it is unsupported by the record. The issue remains as to whether the probation officer impliedly assured Ms. Rife that her statements would be held in confidence.

A probationer is charged with knowledge that "the probation officer is duty bound to report wrongdoing by the [probationer] when it comes to his attention, even if by communication from the [probationer] himself." Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 720, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2569, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1978). However, if the probation officer has expressly or impliedly promised that a communication would be held in confidence, the aforementioned rule will not be applied. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 432, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 1144-45, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1983).

The meeting between Ms. Rife and her probation officer was a routine, regularly scheduled meeting. Ms. Rife initiated the conversation about her drug courier activities by indicating that she wanted to discuss a confidential matter. However, she did not allow the probation officer time to respond to that comment before she disclosed her illegal activities. After the probation officer heard her initial disclosure, he cautioned her that what she had said and what she was about to say could not be held in confidence. Even after this warning, Ms. Rife continued to delineate her involvement in delivering marijuana into the federal prison. We find that no implied promise of confidentiality can reasonably be extracted from these facts.

Ms. Rife contends that the district court erred in revoking her probation because of the defense of duress which she raised at her probation revocation hearing. The United States maintains that she did not put on sufficient evidence to meet her initial burden of establishing such defense. Ms. Rife argues that her husband was being threatened and that she felt she had to help him by bringing in marijuana. She contends that because she acted under pressure, she did not form the requisite mental state to commit a crime. We reject this argument.

Probation may be revoked if the district court is reasonably satisfied that a violation of probation conditions has occurred. United States v. Warner, 830 F.2d 651, 655 (7th Cir.1987). The standard used in reviewing a revocation of probation is a showing of an abuse of discretion. Id. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Ms. Rife's probation in light of her defense of duress? We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion.

Some federal and state cases suggest that a defendant's probation should not be revoked where his...