U.S. v. Rincon, 90-50491
Decision Date | 03 November 1992 |
Docket Number | No. 90-50491,90-50491 |
Citation | 984 F.2d 1003 |
Parties | 37 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1279 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Hugo RINCON, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Neison M. Marks, Deputy Federal Public Defender, Los Angeles, CA, for defendant-appellant.
Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Asst. U.S. Atty., Los Angeles, CA, for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
Before Chief Judge WALLACE, TROTT, and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
Hugo Rincon was convicted on two counts of unarmed bank robbery. On appeal, he contends that the district court erred in refusing to admit expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness testimony. He also argues the district court committed error when it allowed the jury to view Rincon next to a surveillance photograph after jury deliberations had begun.
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1988). We have jurisdiction over this timely appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. We affirm.
The indictment charged Rincon with the robbery of two different banks on different days in April, 1988. The demand note in each robbery was the same: The robber wore sunglasses during the first robbery, and in the second, the robber spoke Spanish and wore a baseball cap.
The teller at the first bank was unable to make an in-court identification, but had picked Rincon out of a photo spread three to four months after the robbery. Four witnesses testified to Rincon's identity as the robber of the second bank. One witness made an in-court identification, as well as having picked Rincon out of the photo spread three months after the robbery. Two witnesses were unable to make in-court identifications, but had picked Rincon out of a photo spread about a year after the robbery. One witness made an in-court identification, but did not make a photo spread identification.
All of the witnesses agreed that the robber did not have a mustache at the time of the robberies. Rincon had a mustache during the trial, but refused to shave it off when the district court ordered him to do so. The district court gave a consciousness of guilt instruction which is not challenged in this appeal.
The district court denied Rincon's pretrial motion in limine in which he sought a ruling that would allow him to introduce the testimony of an expert witness on eyewitness identification. Rincon offered the testimony of an "experimental psychologist" who was a full professor of the Claremont Graduate School of Psychology. She would offer no opinion about the specific eyewitness identifications involved in Rincon's case. Rather, she would discuss the phases of eyewitness identification and the effect of various psychological factors on each phase. In addition, she would state that empirical evidence contradicts numerous lay notions of eyewitness identifications. Rincon contends the district court erred in rejecting that expert testimony.
Rincon did not testify at the trial. His defense consisted of presenting himself to the jury in order to contrast his appearance with that of a surveillance photograph of the robber which the government had introduced as a trial exhibit.
After the jury had started deliberations, they communicated with the district judge, asking to see the defendant standing next to the surveillance photograph, with and without sunglasses. Over Rincon's objections, the district judge permitted them to view Rincon without sunglasses next to the photograph. Because no sunglasses were in evidence, the district judge denied the jury's request to see Rincon with sunglasses.
Rincon contends that the court erred in permitting this comparison while the jury was deliberating.
We review for abuse of discretion the district court's determination to exclude expert testimony regarding the unreliability of eyewitness identifications. United States v. Poole, 794 F.2d 462, 468 (9th Cir.) ("[t]he trial court has 'broad discretion' to admit or exclude expert testimony ... [and] [w]e will not reverse the trial court's ruling unless we conclude that it was 'manifestly erroneous' ") (citations omitted), amended on other grounds, 806 F.2d 853 (9th Cir.1986).
Expert testimony is admissible only when it will assist the jury in understanding the case. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that an expert may testify when it "will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue...." In addition, the advisory committee's note to Fed.R.Evid. 702 states that a common sense inquiry is appropriate to determine whether a juror would be qualified to decide an issue intelligently without enlightenment from an expert.
Thus, in order to determine whether the testimony was properly excluded, we must focus upon whether the jury would receive "appreciable help" from the expert testimony. United States v. Christophe, 833 F.2d 1296, 1299 (9th Cir.1987). Four criteria guide us in determining whether the expert testimony will assist the jury: "(1) qualified expert; (2) proper subject; (3) conformity to a generally accepted explanatory theory; and (4) probative value compared to prejudicial effect." United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir.1973); see also Fed.R.Evid. 702. Only the third and fourth factors are at issue here.
Before an expert is allowed to testify, the offering party must establish that the testimony is generally accepted in the particular field of expertise: "Unless the testimony conforms to a generally accepted explanatory theory, it will not be the best available approximation of truth in the judgment of the majority of scientists who work in the particular specialty involved." Christophe, 833 F.2d at 1299; see also Poole, 794 F.2d at 468 ( ).
In Christophe, this court faced the same issue presented here; i.e., whether the district court erred in excluding expert testimony on eyewitness identification. Christophe, 833 F.2d at 1299-1300. In affirming the district court, we stated that Id. ( ). We also noted that psychologists warn such expert testimony may make jurors overly skeptical of an eyewitness' testimony as a result of the expert's testimony. Id. at 1300 n. 1.
In this case, Rincon failed to convince the district court judge that the expert's testimony on eyewitness identification is generally accepted in the field. The judge stated: "no offer of proof had been made to show that the expert testimony had reached that degree of science as opposed to an opinion ... that makes it a science rather than an art." Although Rincon's counsel argued during his motion in limine that he thought the expert eyewitness testimony is well accepted in the scientific community, he only cited a few state and federal courts in support of that proposition, none of which control here.
In determining whether the eyewitness expert testimony was properly excluded, we must next consider its probative value in comparison to the prejudicial effect. We have stated that "a jury is helped appreciably when testimony is probative rather than prejudicial, confusing, or misleading." Christophe, 833 F.2d at 1299. Moreover, courts are not required to admit expert testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness testimony and we have continually upheld its exclusion. Id. (); United States v. Langford, 802 F.2d 1176, 1179-80 (9th Cir.1986) (, )cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1008, 107 S.Ct. 3235, 97 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987).
In this case, the district court determined that the proffered expert testimony would in fact confuse and mislead the jury. The judge made a determination that the prejudicial value of this expert testimony outweighed its probative value. In so deciding, he did not abuse his discretion; rather, his ruling was consistent with Ninth Circuit precedent.
Rincon next argues that the expert testimony offered in this case was admissible because it differed from that testimony excluded in our previous cases and it was tied to the specific eyewitness testimony presented in his case. However, the expert testimony we considered in Poole is almost identical to that proffered in the present case. 1 Both here and in Poole the expert testimony focused upon stress, cross-gender or cross-ethnic identifications,...
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