U.S. v. Roan Eagle
| Decision Date | 17 April 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-5437,87-5437 |
| Citation | 867 F.2d 436 |
| Parties | 27 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 648 UNITED STATES, Appellant, v. Angeline ROAN EAGLE, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Dennis H. Hill, Rapid City, S.D., for appellant.
Robert A. Mandel, Asst. U.S. Atty., Rapid City, S.D., for appellee.
Before LAY, Chief Judge, BROWN, Senior Circuit Judge, and BEAM, Circuit Judge.
Angeline Roan Eagle and Georgianna Brave were charged, in a single indictment, with first degree murder for the killing of Roland Belt. Because all three were American Indians and the crime took place on an Indian reservation, federal jurisdiction exists under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1153. 1
Brave pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1112, which carries a maximum 10 year sentence. As a part of the plea agreement she testified against Roan Eagle. Subsequently, Brave was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. Roan Eagle was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment. 2
Roan Eagle appeals, contending that the trial court erred in (i) allowing the prosecution to exercise a peremptory challenge as to prospective juror French, the only Indian venireman, (ii) allowing the prosecution to examine Brave and FBI agent Davis concerning a prior unsworn statement Brave made to Davis, (iii) limiting the defense's efforts to inquire into Brave's plea bargain, (iv) admitting certain statements under the excited utterance hearsay exception, and (v) refusing Roan Eagle's proposed jury instructions on intoxication and its negation of the specific intent to be an aider and abettor under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2. 3
We affirm.
Roland Belt was killed during what started out as a family social gathering but ended in bloodshed hours later. Belt, Brave, Roan Eagle, and other participants had been drinking throughout the evening. Brave's sixteen-year-old son Richard Little was among those present at the gathering, but according to his own account had not been drinking.
Little later testified that when Roland Belt got up to leave shortly before 4:00 AM, he and his niece Georgianna Brave began arguing. Brave then started hitting Belt, and Roan Eagle soon joined in. All three fell to the floor during the fighting. A momentary lull in the struggle then occurred, during which Brave went to the kitchen and returned with a knife. Brave stabbed Belt in the upper body a number of times, then dropped the knife and went back to the kitchen to wash blood off her jacket. Roan Eagle then picked up the knife and began stabbing Belt repeatedly in the chest. 4
Sometime afterward, the police were called. Officer James Yellow Boy was the first to arrive. He later testified that Little waved down Yellow Boy's patrol car and told him that "[m]y mother stabbed [Belt]." About an hour had elapsed since the stabbing, according to the government. At the time, Little was crying. Yellow Boy then went to check Belt's body, which was just inside the front doorway. More or less contemporaneously, he overheard Brave drunkenly bragging that she had stabbed Belt. Yellow Boy arrested Brave. Little--still crying--then approached Yellow Boy and volunteered that "[m]y mom, along with my aunt [Roan Eagle], stabbed [Belt]." Little also told Yellow Boy that the murder weapon was a "brown-handled butcher knife, with the blade curved upward."
Officer George Twiss arrived about 4:30 or 4:35 a.m. About 15 minutes after his arrival, Twiss questioned Little. 5 Sergeant Frank Martinez arrived at 4:36 a.m. He checked Belt's body for himself, and then talked with Little, although briefly. 6
The officers' testimony as to Little's statements to them was admitted under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, F.R.Evid. 803(2). 7
A subsequent autopsy determined that Belt died as a result of multiple stab wounds. Brave and Roan Eagle were both charged with first degree murder. Brave pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1112, and agreed to testify against Roan Eagle.
Before Roan Eagle's trial, the prosecution raised the question of the extent to which the defense would be permitted to reveal to the jury the details of the Brave's plea bargain. The court ruled that in assaying Brave's credibility the jury could be made aware of (i) the charge in the indictment, (ii) her cooperation with the prosecution, and (iii) the fact that she was allowed to plead guilty to a lesser charge: but the court expressly prohibited any inquiry into (i) the specific lesser charge (manslaughter) to which she pleaded, or (ii) the sentence to which she was exposed, or might receive. The court also elected to defer sentencing Brave until it had heard "what the total facts are as brought out in [Roan Eagle's] case."
During jury selection, the prosecution exercised a peremptory challenge to strike prospective juror French, the only Indian venireman. In response to Roan Eagle's charge that the peremptory was racially motivated and in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, the prosecution recited three reasons which were accepted by the trial court as racially neutral and adequate to justify the peremptory.
At trial, the prosecution called Brave, and asked her if she recalled speaking to an FBI agent the day after Belt was killed. Brave responded affirmatively, but elaborated that she told the agent that she didn't remember anything that had happened the previous night after a relatively early point in the evening, before the altercation began. On cross-examination, in conformity with the court's pretrial ruling, the defense could not and did not inquire about Brave's sentence or the specific reduced charge to which Brave pleaded or the potential sentence she knew might be imposed.
FBI Agent Davis then testified that during their interview, Brave initially denied having any recollection about the stabbing of Belt, but subsequently admitted remembering the stabbing. He testified that Brave had then given a "somewhat detailed statement" of the facts surrounding that stabbing, which included an explanation of when and how it had occurred. He did not relate the content of that statement to the jury, quote Brave's words, or otherwise elaborate. This was the entire substance of Davis' testimony.
Roan Eagle was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment. Brave was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment, the maximum penalty for voluntary manslaughter.
Roan Eagle appeals, contending that the trial court erred in the five particulars previously stated.
Many Are Chosen, Few Shall Serve, (More Are Struck)
Batson v. Kentucky requires that when a defendant makes a prima facie showing that the prosecution has exercised its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory fashion by peremptorily challenging jurors of a particular race, the prosecution must then come forward with a racially neutral explanation to justify the challenge. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).
A prima facie case is established when the defendant can show that "he is a member of a cognizable racial group, ... and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race." Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1713, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, 87 (citations omitted).
First, both French and Roan Eagle are American Indians. This is a recognized minority group for purposes of a Batson inquiry. United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir.1987).
Second, citing United States v. Porter, the Government argues that Roan Eagle "woefully" failed to make a prima facie case. United States v. Porter, 831 F.2d 760 (8th Cir.1987). We do not agree. Porter found no prima facie case when one of two black veniremen was struck. One black venireman, however, remained and served on the jury. In the case of Roan Eagle, there was one potential American Indian juror and that juror was struck.
Other circuits have developed this area of the Batson inquiry along similar lines. The Third Circuit found that a prima facie case existed when the only two black veniremen were struck. United States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741 (3rd Cir.1988). 8
The Tenth Circuit has gone further and determined that whenever the government strikes all members of the defendant's race, a prima facie Batson case has been made. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir.1987.)
As we see it, it is the prosecution that, by arguing that there was no prima facie case, has "woefully" failed. We therefore conclude that a Batson inquiry into the striking of the juror was called for.
A Batson inquiry next raises the procedural question as to how the judge is to handle the inquiry. Essentially, is the Judge required to hold an evidentiary hearing or some sort of mini-trial on the merits of the claim?
On the whole, we think not. In a recent decision, Judge Butzner, for the Fourth Circuit, wrote that the defendant-appellant's
insistence on an evidentiary hearing in which the prosecutors and defense attorneys and possibly other witnesses would be examined and cross-examined misconceives the Batson inquiry.... Batson does not require this intrusion on the trial proceedings....Batson requires the prosecutor to "articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case ..."
United States v. Garrison, 849 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir.1988) (citations omitted).
Therefore "If the trial court believes the prosecutor's explanation, a reviewing court ordinarily should give this credibility finding 'great deference.' " Id.
The nature of the inquiry, although adversarial, does not rise to the level of a mini-trial. Rather, in the context of the Batson inquiry, once the prosecutor...
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