U.S. v. Robinson
| Citation | 389 F.3d 582 |
| Decision Date | 12 November 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-2232.,02-2232. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Christopher ROBINSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit) |
Richard D. Korn, Detroit, MI, for Appellant. Jennifer J. Peregord, Assistant United States Attorney, Detroit, MI, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF:
Richard D. Korn, Detroit, MI, for Appellant. Jennifer J. Peregord, Assistant United States Attorney, Detroit, MI, for Appellee.
Before: GILMAN and ROGERS, Circuit Judges; FORESTER, Chief District Judge.*
Christopher Robinson appeals his conviction on two counts of bank robbery and two counts of carrying a gun in connection with the robberies. He raises five assignments of error. First, Robinson argues that the district court erred when it dismissed his first indictment without prejudice, pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq. Second, Robinson maintains that the district court erred by failing to make specific findings as to whether he aided and abetted the brandishing of firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence. Third, Robinson claims that the Government's evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of aiding and abetting the use of firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence. Fourth, Robinson argues that the district court erred in admitting the affidavit of Vanessa J. Best because it deprived Robinson of his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses. Finally, Robinson contends that the Bank Robbery Statute is unconstitutional on its face because it fails to establish the requisite nexus requirement to acquire Commerce Clause jurisdiction. Because we are not persuaded by Robinson's arguments, we affirm the judgment of the district court in all respects.
On August 5, 1999, Stanley Grundy, Ernie Johnson and Robinson robbed a National City Bank branch in Detroit, Michigan. J.A. 463-70, 593-600. Johnson and Grundy drove Grundy's car to a meeting spot close to the bank, where they met Robinson. Robinson parked his car near the bank branch, then drove the co-defendants to the bank branch in Grundy's car. After dropping off the co-defendants, Robinson left the bank in Grundy's car and drove to Grundy's house. During the robbery, Johnson watched the floor of the bank while Grundy took the money from teller drawers. Robinson allowed the co-defendants to use his automobile to leave the bank after the robbery. J.A. 463-70, 593-596. After the robbery, Grundy and Johnson drove Robinson's car to Grundy's house where the money was divided. J.A. 466-67. Both Johnson and Grundy carried guns into the bank during the robbery. J.A. 468-70; 598. Grundy testified that he left those guns in Robinson's car after the robbery. J.A. 472.
Almost three months after the first robbery, the conspirators planned to rob the same National City Bank branch for a second time. On October 25, 1999, Grundy, Johnson, Robinson and Lantz Smith again robbed the bank. J.A. 474-79; 521-25; 604-611. Grundy and Johnson rode with Robinson in his burgundy Cutlass, while Smith picked up a stolen van. They parked the Cutlass a couple of blocks from the bank and then drove the van to the bank. Robinson waited in the van while Grundy, Johnson and Smith went in and robbed the bank. J.A. 475; 521-25; 604-611. Grundy took money out of the vault, while Johnson took money from the teller drawers. Smith watched the floor of the bank while Grundy and Johnson were taking the money, and Robinson drove the getaway van. J.A. 475; 605. After the robbery, Robinson drove the co-defendants to his Cutlass, where they abandoned the van and drove the Cutlass to Stephanie Cooper's house. J.A. 525; 611-612. The co-defendants then decided to rent a hotel room so that they could distribute the money between them. Robinson went to the hotel room where they counted and divided the money. J.A. 480-82; 526-27; 611-613.
Robinson was indicted for these crimes on November 29, 1999 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, and charged with two counts of Bank Robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), two counts of Use of Firearms During and in Relation to a Crime of Violence, 18 U.S.C. § 824(c) and one count of Felon in Possession of Firearms, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). J.A. 32-36. On September 15, 2000, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq. J.A. 75-76. Robinson filed subsequent motions to dismiss on October 2, 2000 and December 26, 2000. J.A. 79-80; 84-91. On March 14, 2001, the district court granted Robinson's motion by dismissing the indictment without prejudice. J.A. 92.
The government filed a superseding indictment on April 18, 2001, alleging essentially the same charges. J.A. 38-41. A jury trial began on April 23, 2002. The jury found Robinson guilty on two counts of bank robbery and on two counts of use of firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence, but not guilty of being a felon in possession of firearms. On May 6, 2002, Robinson filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, requesting that the jury "verdict" that firearms had been brandished during and in relation to a crime of violence be vacated since Robinson was not charged with that offense and the jury was not instructed as to the elements of that offense. J.A. 97-102. The district court denied Robinson's motion. J.A. 103-105.
On October 7, 2002, Robinson was sentenced to a period of incarceration of 150 months on the two bank robbery convictions, 84 months on the first use of firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence and 300 months on the second use of firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence. The two use-of-firearms sentences are statutorily mandated to run consecutive to each other and to the bank robbery sentences, for a total period of imprisonment of 44½ years.
Robinson argues on appeal that his indictment should have been dismissed with prejudice under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161-74. It is undisputed that a violation of the Speedy Trial Act occurred and that the Act demands dismissal of the first indictment against the defendant. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3162(a)(2). The question before this Court is whether the district court properly dismissed the indictment without prejudice, allowing Robinson to be reprosecuted.
The Speedy Trial Act does not specify whether dismissal should be with or without prejudice, nor does it contain a default presumption one way or the other. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3162(a)(2); United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 334, 108 S.Ct. 2413, 101 L.Ed.2d 297 (1988). Congress did, however, provide three factors for a court to consider when making this determination. They are "the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of this chapter and on the administration of justice." Id. at 333, 108 S.Ct. 2413.
In Taylor, the Supreme Court discussed the importance of the analysis:
Where, as here, Congress has declared that a decision will be governed by consideration of particular factors, a district court must carefully consider those factors as applied to the particular case and, whatever its decision, clearly articulate their effect in order to permit meaningful appellate review. Only then can an appellate court ascertain whether a district court has ignored or slighted a factor that Congress has deemed pertinent to the choice of remedy, thereby failing to act within the limits prescribed by Congress.
Id. at 336-37, 108 S.Ct. 2413. The Court noted that the district court had not fully explicated its reasons for dismissing the indictment with prejudice, so the Court was "left to speculate in response to some of the parties' arguments pro and con." Id. at 337, 108 S.Ct. 2413. The Court thus undertook analysis of the Speedy Trial Act factors and determined that the lower court had abused its discretion.
This Court, on multiple occasions, has had the opportunity to examine a district court's analysis of a Speedy Trial Act violation. In United States v. Pierce, 17 F.3d 146 (6th Cir.1994), we reviewed a district court's dismissal of the defendant's indictment without prejudice. The Court found that the district court had discussed the three statutory factors when it dismissed the indictment without prejudice and again when it reaffirmed its previous decision. Id. at 148. After carefully examining the district court's discussion of the three statutory factors, the Court found that the district court had acted within its discretion in choosing to dismiss without prejudice. Id. at 148-49. In Pierce, this Court stated, "Because Congress has given specific factors to be considered, a district court that does not set forth written findings with regard to these factors has abused its discretion and will be reversed." Id. at 148 ( Taylor, 487 U.S. at 336, 108 S.Ct. 2413). Since the district court had set forth written findings with regard to these factors, this statement is dictum. The holding in Pierce actually turned on whether the district court's analysis was substantially sustainable.
Likewise, in United States v. Moss, 217 F.3d 426 (6th Cir.2000), the district court reviewed the three statutory factors in determining whether to dismiss the defendant's indictment without prejudice. The Court focused on the fact that the district court had implied that the defendant alone caused the delay and had failed to recognize its own role in not issuing a ruling on the defendant's pending motion. Id. at 431. Moreover, the Court looked at the district court's analysis of the last factor. The district court had found that reprosecution would not hinder the administration of the Speedy Trial Act, nor the administration...
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