U.S. v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 04 November 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-CR-80412.,02-CR-80412.
• Citation: 290 F.Supp.2d 808
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Ray Reci ROBINSON, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

290 F.Supp.2d 808

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Ray Reci ROBINSON, Defendant.

No. 02-CR-80412.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

November 4, 2003.

Patricia Uetz, AUSA, Regina McCulloug, AUSA, Steven Hiyama, AUSA, Detroit, for plaintiff.

John F. Royal, Esq., Detroit, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO DISMISS INDICTMENT

ROSEN, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

The above-captioned criminal action is presently before the Court on Defendant Ray Reci Robinson's two separately-filed motions to dismiss. Although the motions were originally filed and briefed by both Defendant and the Government in the fall of 2002, Defendant's original counsel (who filed the motions on behalf of Defendant Robinson) was granted leave to withdraw, and new counsel requested, and was granted, leave to supplement the motions. The Government, in turn, requested, and was granted, the opportunity to respond to any such supplemental briefs.

Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of his motions to dismiss was filed on July 8, 2003 and the Government responded to this Supplemental Memorandum on August 28, 2003. The Court heard oral argument on this matter on October 29, 2003. Having reviewed and considered the parties' briefs and the oral arguments of counsel, the Court is now prepared to rule on this matter. This Opinion and Order sets forth the Court's ruling.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Defendant Ray Reci Robinson, a previously convicted felon, was arrested by Detroit Police Officers on April 27, 2001 during the execution of a search warrant of a Detroit home. Robinson was found to be in possession of a .32 caliber revolver at that time. There was also, at the time of his arrest, an outstanding warrant on Robinson for a controlled substance probation violation, pursuant to which Robinson was immediately taken into custody and lodged at the Wayne County Jail. On May 2, 2001, Robinson entered a plea of guilty on the probation violation and, on May 18, 2001, he was sentenced on the state law controlled substance offense by the Wayne County Circuit Court to a prison term of 3½ to 20 years. He was subsequently remanded to the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections and transported to the Macomb Correctional Facility on May 21, 2001 to serve his state sentence.

Meanwhile on May 14, 2001, the federal authorities charged Robinson in a one-count criminal Complaint with being a felon-in-possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and a warrant for his arrest on this federal charge was issued at the same time. Robinson, however, never appeared on the Complaint. According to the Government, a "Detainer against Unsentenced Prisoner" was lodged against Robinson by the U.S. Marshal on May 15, 2001 [see Defendant's Supplemental Brief, Ex. 5] but, as indicated on the face of this detainer, it was directed to the Wayne County Jail. This detainer was correct at the time because on May 15, Defendant was not a "prisoner", i.e., someone who was convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment who was serving that term at a correctional facility.¹ It was not until he was transferred to the Michigan Department of Corrections on May 21, 2001 that Robinson became a "prisoner" within the meaning of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (the "IAD").² According to the Government, a different federal detainer is designed to be used against a "prisoner," i.e., the Form USM-17, captioned "Detainer Against Sentenced Prisoner."³ The Government concedes that, "on account of a communication breakdown," no Form USM-17 was lodged against Defendant Robinson after May 21, 2001. Therefore, the only detainer that the Michigan Department of Corrections had in its possession was the May 15, 2001 Detainer that was issued before Robinson became a "prisoner" under the IAD. The Michigan Department of Corrections acknowledged receipt of the detainer forwarded to it from the Wayne County Jail on May 29, 2001,⁴ and so advised then U.S. Marshal James Douglas in writing as follows,

We are in receipt of your request for detainer placement. We have lodged a detainer against Mr. Robinson for your jurisdiction. Mr. Robinson will be informed of your detainer and your desire to take custody upon release from the Michigan Department of Corrections. Approximately 60 days prior to Mr. Robinson's release a determination will be made as to whether a waiver of extradition is necessary.

Mr. Robinson is serving a 3 year 6 month to 20 year sentence for Controlled Substance. His earliest release date is 4/01/2004 and his maximum release date is 3/25/2021.

If we can be of further assistance, do not hesitate to contact this office.

[Defendant's Supp. Ex. 6.]

Defendant does not dispute that he was notified by the MDOC of the federal detainer lodged against him. He maintains, however, that he was never informed by any officials of the MDOC of his right to demand a speedy trial on the federal charges, nor provided any form notifying him of his speedy trial rights under the IAD or what he had to do in order to demand a speedy trial. He does not claim, however, that he was unaware of his speedy trial rights, only that he "did not demand a speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act or the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. . . because [he] did not know how to do so." [See Robinson Affidavit, ¶ 11.]

Robinson was subsequently indicted by the Grand Jury on May 8, 2002, and was charged in a two count Indictment with being a felon-in-possession of a firearm (Count I) and possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine (Count II). On May 20, 2002, Robinson appeared for the first time on the Indictment and on May 21st, he was arraigned.

On August 28, 2002, through previous counsel, Robinson, filed two separate motions to dismiss the indictment. In the first motion to dismiss, Defendant argues that his rights under the Speedy Trial Act 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), have been violated due to the fact that he was not brought before the Court sooner on the charges. In his second motion, Defendant argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the felon-in-possession statute, violates his constitutional right to equal protection under the law. Robinson's theory with regard to this latter motion is that a defendant in a state that manufactures firearms is immune from conviction under Section 922(g) but a similarly-situated defendant (such as he) from a state that does not manufacture firearms can be charged and convicted under the same statute based on the "jurisdictional element" of the statute.

After the Government responded to Defendants' motions and Defendant replied, the matter was scheduled for hearing on November 7, 2002. However, prior to the scheduled hearing, Defendant's counsel moved for, and was granted, leave to withdraw. After new defense counsel was appointed, Defendant requested, and was granted, permission to supplement his motions. Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum was filed on July 8, 2003. The Government filed its Response to Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum on August 28, 2003.

In his Supplemental Memorandum, Defendant supplements his Speedy Trial Act motion with two new arguments. First, Defendant maintains that the failure of the MDOC or the Federal Government to inform him of his speedy trial rights in conjunction with the federal detainer lodged against him violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers and mandates dismissal of this case. Second, Defendant argues that in addition to the Speedy Trial Act violation that he argued in his original motion to dismiss, his Constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated.

III. DISCUSSION

A. THE COMPLAINED OF VIOLATION OF THE IAD IS NOT SANCTIONABLE BY DISMISSAL OF THE CHARGES AGAINST DEFENDANT ROBINSON

When a federal detainer based on pending criminal charges is lodged against a state prisoner, both the Speedy Trial Act and the Interstate Agreement on Detainers require that the warden of the state correctional facility notify the defendant of the pending charges and his right to a speedy trial on those charges.

18 U.S.C. § 3161(j) provides:

(j)(1) If the attorney for the Government knows that a person charged with an offense is serving a term of imprisonment in any penal institution he shall promptly -

(A) undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial; or

(B) cause a detainer to be filed with the person having custody of the prisoner and request him to so advise the prisoner of his right to demand trial.

(2) If the person having custody of such prisoner receives a detainer, he shall promptly advise the prisoner of the charge [on which the detainer is based] and of the prisoner's right to demand trail. If at any time thereafter the prisoner informs the person having custody that he does demand trial, such person shall cause notice to that effect to be sent promptly to the attorney for the Government who caused the detainer to be filed.

18 U.S.C. § 3161(j).

The IAD contains a similar provision:

(c) The warden, commissioner of corrections, or other official having custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the source and contents of any detainer lodged against him and shall also inform him of his right to make a request for final disposition of the indictment, information or complaint on which the detainer is based.

18 U.S.C. app. 2, § 2, art. III(c).

In this case, the Government concedes that Defendant Robinson was not informed by Michigan prison officials that he had the right to demand a trial on the federal charges pending against him. However, the failure to inform a prisoner of his right to demand trial is not sanctionable by the dismissal of the pending criminal charges. United States v. Lualemaga, 280 F.3d 1260, 1265 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 949, 122 S.Ct. 2641, 153 L.Ed.2d 820 (2002) ("[W]e hold that dismissal of an indictment is not an available form of relief where the notice requirement of the...