U.S. v. Rodriguez

• Decision Date: 24 April 2019
• Docket Number: No. 17-10233,17-10233
• Citation: 921 F.3d 1149
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Emilio Huaracha RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

921 F.3d 1149

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Emilio Huaracha RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-10233

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted September 7, 2018 San Francisco, California

Filed April 24, 2019

BERZON, Circuit Judge:

Our central question is whether uncontested drug quantities in a court-adopted presentence investigation report ("PSR") constitute specific drug quantity findings that bind district courts in subsequent 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction proceedings. We clarify that, without an explicit and specific drug quantity finding by the original sentencing judge, drug quantities in an adopted PSR are not binding in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings.

We therefore reverse and remand to the district court for supplemental findings of drug quantity and, if appropriate, resentencing.

I

A

We begin with the statutory framework for deciding sentence reduction motions. Ordinarily, a federal court "may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Congress has, however, provided a narrow exception to this rule of finality. A court may modify a defendant’s term of imprisonment if the defendant was "sentenced ... based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered" pursuant to a retroactive amendment to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines"). Id. The purpose of this limited exception is to provide the defendant with "the benefit of later enacted adjustments to the judgments reflected in the [Sentencing] Guidelines" without engaging in plenary resentencing proceedings. United States v. Mercado-Moreno , 869 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Dillon v. United States , 560 U.S. 817, 828, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010) ).

Section 3582(c)(2) sets forth a two-step inquiry for determining whether a defendant is entitled to sentence reduction. At the first step, the reviewing district court decides eligibility by determining whether a reduction is consistent with U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.10, the policy statement that implements § 3582(c)(2). Dillon , 560 U.S. at 826, 130 S.Ct. 2683 ; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Section 1B1.10 permits a reduction if, but only if, the amendment has the "effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable [G]uideline[s] range." U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ("U.S.S.G.") § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). A court determines whether the retroactive amendment lowered the defendant’s Guidelines range by calculating the "amended [G]uideline[s] range that would have been applicable to the defendant if the [relevant amendment] to the [G]uidelines ... had been in effect at the time the defendant was sentenced." Id. § 1B1.10(b)(1). Only "the relevant amendment for the ‘corresponding guideline provisions ... applied when the defendant was sentenced’ " may be considered in the first step of the analysis, and the court "must ‘leave all other guideline application decisions unaffected.’ " Mercado-Moreno , 869 F.3d at 949 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1) ).

A district court is generally prohibited from reducing a sentence if the reduction would place the defendant’s term of imprisonment below the lower end of the amended Guidelines range. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A). The only exception is when the defendant’s original term of imprisonment is below the Guidelines range because he or she received a reduction for substantially assisting authorities and the revised term is comparably below the amended Guidelines range. See id. at § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B).¹

At the second step, the court must consider all applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and determine whether, in its discretion, "the authorized reduction is warranted, either in whole or in part." Dillon , 560 U.S. at 826, 130 S.Ct. 2683 ; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).² But the court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors may not "serve to transform the proceedings under § 3582(c)(2) into plenary resentencing proceedings." Dillon , 560 U.S. at 827, 130 S.Ct. 2683.

B

The Guidelines use a drug quantity table, based on drug type and weight, to establish the base offense levels for drug-related offenses, with a maximum of level 38. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c). Amendment 782, adopted by the U.S. Sentencing Commission ("Commission") in 2014, modified the drug quantity table by reducing the base offense level for most drugs and quantities by two levels. U.S.S.G. supp. app. C. amend. 782 (Nov. 1, 2014). Shortly thereafter, the Commission made Amendment 782 retroactive for defendants, like Rodriguez, who had been sentenced before the change to the Guidelines. U.S.S.G. supp. app. C amend. 788 (Nov. 1, 2014). Pursuant to Amendment 782, the quantity of actual methamphetamine that triggers the maximum base offense level of 38 moved from 1.5 kilograms to 4.5 kilograms. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(1).³

II

A

In 2011, the California Highway Patrol conducted a traffic stop of Emilio Huaracha Rodriguez, a suspected drug trafficker, in Sacramento County. A drug detection dog alerted to Rodriguez’s vehicle, and a search revealed 11 pounds (roughly 4.9 kilograms or 4,989 grams) of methamphetamine. After a search of Rodriguez’s vehicle, law enforcement officers obtained a search warrant for his apartment. There, the officers found an additional quantity of methamphetamine and various types of drug paraphernalia. Rodriguez was charged with one count of possession with intent to distribute over 500 grams of methamphetamine mixture or substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).

In January 2012, Rodriguez pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement. As the factual basis for his guilty plea, Rodriguez admitted to "knowingly possess[ing] over 500 grams of a mixture or substance that contained a detectable amount of methamphetamine ... with the intent to deliver it to another person" and further stipulated to the maximum base offense level of 38. The factual basis also specified that law enforcement seized 11 pounds of methamphetamine from Rodriguez’s vehicle and that the methamphetamine "was laboratory tested and found to contain over 1,500 grams of actual methamphetamine." At his plea colloquy, Rodriguez confirmed that "each and every fact" in the factual basis was "true and correct."

The PSR prepared for Rodriguez’s sentencing stated that he "possessed approximately 4.8 kilograms of methamphetamine (actual) in his vehicle" and "186 grams of a mixture of methamphetamine at his residence."⁴ Because the amount of methamphetamine mixture in his residence was a relatively small quantity, the PSR disregarded it for purposes of calculating his base offense level. On the basis of the quantity of methamphetamine in his vehicle alone, which "involved 1.5 kilograms or more of methamphetamine (actual)," the PSR recommended the highest base offense level for drug-related offenses, level 38. The PSR further determined that Rodriguez had a Category II criminal history, see U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1, and recommended a three-level reduction for accepting responsibility and cooperating with authorities. The PSR calculations yielded a total offense level of 35 and a Guidelines range of 188 to 235 months imprisonment.

Rodriguez’s sole objection to the PSR, lodged before sentencing, was that the PSR overstated his criminal history. Neither Rodriguez nor the government contested the PSR’s findings regarding the quantity of methamphetamine attributable to Rodriguez.

At sentencing, the judge concluded that the PSR did overstate Rodriguez’s criminal history and so departed slightly from the recommended Guidelines range, imposing a sentence commensurate with a Category I criminal history. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b). Aside from that slight departure, the sentencing judge "agree[d] with the justifications set forth in the [PSR]."⁵ Rodriguez was sentenced to 168 months imprisonment.

B

In May 2016, Rodriguez filed a pro se § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction motion. The motion was assigned to his original sentencing judge. The following year, with the assistance of later-appointed counsel, Rodriguez filed an amended motion for sentence reduction. Rodriguez seeks to reduce his base offense level from 38 to 36, the level corresponding to 1.5 kilograms of methamphetamine under Amendment 782, which after the three-level reduction from original sentencing would result in a total offense level of 33.

At Rodriguez’s sentence reduction hearing in May 2017, the district court assumed that he had generally adopted the findings in Rodriguez’s PSR at the original sentencing hearing. The government argued that the uncontested drug quantities used in the calculations in Rodriguez’s PSR, 4.8 kilograms and 186 grams of methamphetamine, controlled. Consequently, the government maintained, Rodriguez was ineligible for sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2), because the PSR’s drug quantity would not lower Rodriguez’s Guidelines range. Rodriguez argued to the contrary—that the only finding at the original sentencing hearing was that he possessed at least 1.5 kilograms of methamphetamine, which is not a finding as to a drug quantity that makes Rodriguez ineligible for sentence reduction.

The district court accepted Rodriguez’s argument, agreeing that it had not made a disqualifying drug quantity finding at the original sentencing by adopting the PSR’s findings. The court concluded that Rodriguez was eligible for § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction and reduced Rodriguez’s sentence from 168 months to 151 months. In so ruling, the court did not engage in supplemental fact-finding to determine the drug quantity actually attributable to Rodriguez. The government’s appeal followed.

III

We review a district court’s § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction decision for abuse of discretion. United States v. Dunn , 728 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2013). "A district court may abuse its discretion if it does not apply the correct law or if it rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of material fact." United States v....