U.S. v. Rodriguez-Arreola
| Decision Date | 22 December 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. CR 00-40071.,CR 00-40071. |
| Citation | 217 F.Supp.2d 962 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Manuel RODRIGUEZ-ARREOLA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota |
Michelle G. Tapken, U.S. Attorney's Office, Sioux Falls, SD, for Plaintiff.
Julie L. Irvine, Federal Public Defender's Office, Sioux Falls, SD, Jana M. Miner, Federal Public Defender's Office, Pierre, SD, for Defendant.
Defendant, Manuel Rodriguez-Arreola, is charged with illegal re-entry after deportation, a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Defendant is also subject to a sentencing enhancement under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) for having been convicted of an aggravated felony prior to deportation. Before trial, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress all evidence and statements obtained as a result of his encounter with an officer of the South Dakota Highway Patrol. Magistrate Judge John E. Simko filed a Report and Recommendation that the Motion be granted, and the Government timely filed objections. For the reasons stated below, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation, with slight modifications, and grants the Motion to Suppress.
On September 14, 2000, Defendant was a passenger in car driven by Estaban Molina, which was stopped for speeding by South Dakota Highway Patrolman Chris Koltz. As described more fully in the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, Trooper Koltz questioned Molina, and then questioned Defendant. After questioning both men, Trooper Koltz had Molina and Defendant stand in a ditch beside the road, while a drug dog sniffed Molina's car. Trooper Koltz next contacted the INS Command Center in Chicago, and Defendant talked to an INS agent. After this conversation, the INS agent told Trooper Koltz to detain Defendant and take him to the nearest jail. Molina was given a speeding ticket and allowed to leave.
The Government has filed the following three factual objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation:
(1) The Magistrate failed to note that Trooper Koltz noted that the vehicle had tinted windows.
(2) The Magistrate failed to note that Molina (the driver) had previously told Trooper Koltz that Defendant did not have a green card and was not a legal alien.
(3) The Magistrate made a finding that the defendant was detained because of his race, when the Defendant was detained because the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) determined that he was an aggravated felon.
The Government also objects to the Magistrate Judge's legal conclusions that the stop of Defendant violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment and Miranda v. Arizona, and that evidence obtained as a result of that stop must be suppressed.
Upon the filing of objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, a judge of the district court "shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The first two factual objections raised by the Government are supported by the record, and are granted by the Court. The Magistrate Judge's findings of fact are modified to add that Trooper Koltz noticed that Molina's car had tinted windows, and that, prior to Koltz's questioning of Defendant, Molina told trooper Koltz that Defendant did not have a green card and was not a legal alien. (Having viewed the videotape of this stop, the Court also notes that the tint in the car windows was light, and allowed objects inside the vehicle to be seen from the outside.) For the reasons stated below, however, the addition of this information does not affect the validity of the Magistrate Judge's legal recommendations.
The Government's third objection—to the finding that Defendant was detained because of his race—is overruled. The Magistrate Judge's finding refers to the initial detention of Defendant, and thus is not affected by the fact that Officer Koltz eventually let Molina go.
The Government suggests that Trooper Koltz's observation of tinted windows on Molina's car provided an additional reason for him to detain the vehicle, and to question Defendant. The Court assumes, for the sake of argument, that some types of tinted windows might under certain circumstances contribute to reasonable suspicion that certain types of criminal activity are afoot. It should be noted that almost all vehicles have windows that are tinted to some degree. There is no sound reason, however for concluding that the presence of tinted windows on Molina's car supported a reasonable suspicion that Defendant was an illegal alien. Without such a suspicion, there was no basis for Trooper Koltz to expand the traffic stop to ask either Molina or Defendant about Defendant's alienage.
The Government also argues that, because Trooper Koltz had already been told by Molina that Defendant was in the country illegally, the subsequent stop and questioning of Defendant was permissible. Trooper Koltz, however, only obtained this information from Molina by first impermissibly expanding the scope of his questioning from Molina's driver's license, registration, destination and purpose to whether Molina and Defendant were illegal aliens. As explained by Magistrate Judge Simko, information gleaned from these questions could not provide a reasonable suspicion to stop and question Defendant. (Id. at 12-13.) See United States v. Restrepo, 890 F.Supp. 180 (E.D.N.Y.1995).
In its objections, the Government states that Trooper Koltz did not violate Miranda because Defendant "was free to go until the INS told Trooper Koltz that [Defendant] should be held because he was an aggravated felon." From the videotape, it is clear that Defendant was not free to go. Trooper Koltz instructed him to stand in beside the highway, had a drug dog sniff Molina's car, and, for a substantial amount of time, took possession of the car keys. Defendant was not going anywhere until Trooper Koltz heard back from the INS.
Finally, the Government argues that, even if Trooper Koltz's questioning violated Defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment and Miranda v. Arizona, the evidence of Defendant's identity obtained as a result of those questions cannot be excluded from Defendant's trial. See United States v. Guzman-Bruno, 27 F.3d 420, 421-22 (9th Cir.1994) (). Acceptance of the Government's argument would leave no real remedy for violations of Fourth Amendment rights in the realm of suspected immigration offenses. As noted in a previous decision of this Court, such a result contradicts the Supreme Court's statement that Congress "cannot diminish the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens who might be mistaken for aliens," and renders legal aliens and even citizens subject to abuse at the hands of law enforcement. See United States v. Mendoza-Carrillo, 107 F.Supp.2d 1098, 1107 (D.S.D.2000) (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2581, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975)). Based on these considerations, this Court held in Mendoza-Carrillo that evidence resulting from the illegal detention of an alien can be suppressed at his criminal trial. See id. The Court declines the Government's invitation to reconsider its holding.
IT IS ORDERED:
(1) that, subject to the modifications mentioned above, the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation is adopted; and
(2) that the Motion to Suppress (Docket No. 12) is granted.
This matter is before the court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress (Doc. 12). A hearing on the motion was held on Monday, November 6, 2000. Plaintiff was represented by its counsel of record, Assistant United States Attorney Michelle Tapken. Defendant appeared in person and was represented by his counsel of record, Julie Irvine. The court has reviewed the Defendant's motion and brief, the brief of the United States, and listened carefully to the testimony of the witnesses and arguments of counsel, as well as reviewed a videotape1 of the incident. Based upon that review the court makes the following:
RECOMMENDATION
Based upon the Facts and Discussion below, the Court recommends that the Defendant's Motion to Suppress be GRANTED.
This criminal proceeding is before the Court pursuant to an Indictment charging the Defendant, Manuel Rodriguez-Arreola, with illegal re-entry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). The Defendant's Motion to Suppress was referred to the Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation to the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
On September 14, 2000 at approximately 1:42 p.m., South Dakota Highway Patrolman Chris Koltz initiated a traffic stop for speeding on a vehicle driven by Esteban Molina (hereinafter "Molina".) (TR 7-9; 44-45.) Trooper Koltz approached the vehicle and asked Molina for his license and registration, which were produced. (VT 1:43:10; TR 9.) Trooper Koltz advised Molina he had been stopped for speeding and asked him to come back to the patrol car. (VT 1:43:35; TR 10.)
While writing the speeding ticket, the trooper questioned Molina about the origin, destination and purpose for his trip. (VT 1:44:50; TR 12-13.) Three minutes into the traffic stop Trooper Koltz asked if Molina was a United States citizen, if he was a resident alien, and whether he had a green card with him. (VT 1:46:13; TR 14.)2 After some confusion at his response, Molina clarified that he did, in fact, have a green card but did not have it in his possession at the time and was in the United States legally. (VT 1:47:00; TR 57.) Trooper Koltz's questioning then turned to the passenger, Defendant Manuel Rodriguez-Arreola (hereinafter "Rodriguez"), i.e., did he speak English and did he have a green card. (VT 1:47:30.)...
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