U.S. v. Roen, 03-CR-63.
Decision Date | 25 February 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 03-CR-63.,03-CR-63. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Marquis ROEN, Defendant. |
Mario Gonzales, Milwaukee, WI, for Plaintiff.
Brian Mullins, Milwaukee, WI, for Defendant.
SENTENCING MEMORANDUM
In United States v. Booker, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), the Supreme Court held that the federal sentencing guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment. As a remedy, the Court excised the provision of the Sentencing Reform Act that made the guidelines mandatory, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), and the provision that required the courts of appeals to enforce the guidelines, 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e). With these excisions, the Court made the guidelines "effectively advisory." Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 757. Additionally, the Court directed appellate courts to henceforth review sentences for "unreasonableness." Id. at 765.
Although Booker imposes new responsibilities, a body of law exists to which courts can look for guidance. District courts imposing sentences following revocation of probation or supervised release have long used advisory guidelines, see U.S.S.G. ch. 7, pt. A, and appellate courts have reviewed such sentences to determine whether they were "plainly unreasonable," e.g., United States v. Kelley, 359 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir.2004); United States v. Marvin, 135 F.3d 1129, 1143 (7th Cir.1998). See United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 115 (2d Cir.2005) ( ).
Before Booker, district courts sentenced defendants in revocation cases as, I believe, they now should in all cases. See United States v. Ranum, 353 F.Supp.2d 984, 984-87 (E.D.Wis.2005) ( ). This is so because in revocation cases the Sentencing Commission promulgated advisory "policy statements" rather than mandatory guidelines. U.S.S.G. ch. 7, pt. A. Thus, in a revocation case, while a district court has to "consider" the guideline range, it is "thereafter free to impose a sentence outside the designated range, subject to the maximum sentence allowable under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)," the statute governing revocation of supervised release. United States v. Hale, 107 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir.1997).
In sentencing defendants after revocation, courts have considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), as they now should in all cases. These factors include:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense, and the history and characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed to —
(a) reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(b) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(c) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(d) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the applicable range set by the guidelines;
(5) any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission;
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); see also Hale, 107 F.3d at 530 () Although § 3553(a) directs that courts "shall" consider the above factors, courts need not make specific findings as to each one but rather must make "comments reflecting that the appropriate factors were considered." Hale, 107 F.3d at 530; see also Kelley, 359 F.3d at 1305 ( ).
Finally, because the guidelines in revocation (and now all) cases are advisory only, a sentence outside the advisory guideline range is not considered a "departure." See, e.g., Marvin, 135 F.3d at 1143 ( ). Thus, courts imposing sentences higher or lower than the guideline range are not required to cite factors that take the case outside the heartland, but only to explain why the sentence imposed was necessary and reasonable in light of all of the relevant factors under § 3553(a). See, e.g., United States v. Patton, No. 04-6142, 118 Fed.Appx. 427, 430-31, 2004 U.S.App. LEXIS 25286, at *9-10 (10th Cir. Dec. 9, 2004) ( ); United States v. White Face, 383 F.3d 733, 738, 740 (8th Cir.2004) (8th Cir.2004) (§ 7B1.4 range is not a departure, and rejecting defense argument that such sentence is proper only "when unusual factual circumstances are present") that a sentence outside the ;1 United States v. Cook, 291 F.3d 1297, 1302 (11th Cir.2002) ( ); United States v. Tadeo, 222 F.3d 623, 626 (9th Cir.2000) ( ); United States v. Shaw, 180 F.3d 920, 922 (8th Cir.1999) (per curiam) ( ); United States v. McClanahan, 136 F.3d 1146, 1152 (7th Cir.1998) ( ).
In the present case, I was called upon to apply the above-described methodology in sentencing defendant Marquis Roen after revoking his supervised release.
In 2003, defendant appeared before me on five counts of mail fraud arising out of a scheme he devised to defraud Northwestern Mutual Life ("NML") and dozens of vendors and merchants by writing checks on closed bank accounts. The scheme had two aspects. First, defendant induced NML to issue him loans against a life insurance policy, which he "repaid" with checks drawn on closed accounts at Northern Trust Bank ("NTB") and North Shore Bank ("NSB"). Defendant's scheme cost NML $19,254.82, the amount it loaned him less the value of the life insurance policy. The second aspect of the scheme involved an account defendant opened at NTB after promising to wire $600,000 from a non-existent Swiss bank account. NTB gave defendant pre-printed checks, which he used to attempt to acquire various high priced items totaling $1,200,000. Because defendant never wired the money, NTB closed the account, none of the checks were honored, and defendant failed to obtain any goods. United States v. Roen, 279 F.Supp.2d 986, 986-87 (E.D.Wis.2003).
Defendant pled guilty to the charges, and the pre-sentence report ("PSR") recommended an offense level of 19 (base level 6, U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a), plus 16 based on the amount of loss, § 2B1.1(b)(1), minus 3 for acceptance of responsibility, § 3E1.1), and a criminal history category of VI. I overruled defendant's objection to the loss amount but granted him a downward departure of nine levels because that amount bore no relation to "economic reality." Roen, 279 F.Supp.2d at 987-92. With the departure, the range was 24-30 months, and I imposed a sentence at the low end. I also ordered defendant to pay $19,403.73 in restitution to NML.
In November 2004, the Bureau of Prisons released defendant, and he commenced three years of supervised release. The conditions of release included drug testing and treatment; no consumption of alcohol; monthly restitution payments; restrictions on employment with fiduciary responsibilities and the opening of new lines of credit or bank accounts; submission of monthly reports and financial information; cooperation with the Child Support Enforcement Unit; and mental health treatment.
Upon release, defendant immediately began lying to his probation officer. He reported that he had secured employment at "Magnus Group," a real estate firm, as an assistant director with a gross monthly income of $5000. He reported that the firm was located at 250 East Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 1800 in Milwaukee and was directed by a John Engel. The probation officer conducted a field visit and found that the site consisted of a common reception area and a number of offices. The receptionist advised the probation officer that defendant was rarely present and that she had no knowledge of Mr. Engel. The probation officer ultimately discovered that defendant had leased the office in September 2004 while he was still in a halfway house and not permitted to lease property. When the probation officer questioned defendant...
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Termination, modification and revocation of probation and supervised release
...advisory guideline range, imposed upon revocation, is not considered as a “departure” in the traditional sense. United States v. Roen, 360 F. Supp. 2d 926, 928 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (courts imposing sentence higher PROBATION, SUPERVISED RELEASE §16:41 Federal Criminal Practice 16-14 or lower tha......