U.S. v. Roth

Decision Date06 December 1988
Docket Number88-1519,No. 87-2611,87-2611
Citation860 F.2d 1382
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bruce ROTH, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

William VanDercreek, Dallas, Tex., for defendant-appellant.

Stephen P. Sinnott, Asst. U.S. Atty., Anton R. Valukas, U.S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before CUDAHY, POSNER and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge.

Bruce Roth, the defendant in this Greylord prosecution, was a crooked lawyer. He made a living bribing crooked judges. Often Roth played the broker's role, matching lawyers who did not know which judges would take money with judges who did not know which lawyers would pay it. For these services he has been convicted of violating the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1951, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1961-68; he was sentenced to 10 years in prison. The only substantial issues, the only ones we discuss, are whether Roth waived his right to conflict-free defense counsel and whether serving as bagman to three judges amounts to "association" with the court for purposes of RICO.

I

With a federal judge's approval, the Greylord investigators installed a microphone in the chambers of Wayne Olson, a judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County. The first day the bug was used, it picked up a conversation between Olson and Roth. Roth asked Olson whether Elsie, the secretary to the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court, would accept money to assign a felony case to a judge Roth preferred (doubtless because the judge also was on the take). Olson did not know; Roth suggested that Dean Wolfson, another corrupt lawyer, might. The conversation continued:

OLSON: ... I'll ask Dean if he can do it.

ROTH: Would you do that if you remember Judge?

OLSON: I'll--you--I'll tell you what, he's not, he's gonna be here tomorrow morning. I'll tell what I'll do. I'll, I'll say Dean I heard, that over, here's what I heard that Elsie takes dough. Now Dean, you know that he's gonna tell me the truth. He's either gonna say yes, he's gonna say no, or he's gonna say I don't believe it. I never heard of that. But he's gonna be legit with me. I'll ask him tomorrow morning.

ROTH: Could you remember I'd appreciate it.

OLSON: Oh, I'll remember cause it's interesting to me.

ROTH: You got, you got me, I think I'll be back Wednesday anyway.

OLSON: I love people that take dough, cause you know exactly where you stand.

ROTH: Sure, that's the way to do business.

OLSON: (Laughs)

The easy familiarity with the judge in such ex parte conversations could not have been spontaneous. Yet Roth and Olson had not then reached their own financial modus vivendi. Wednesday came, and Roth appeared to represent two criminal defendants. Olson directed three more to Roth. During a recess Roth stopped by Olson's chambers again.

OLSON: [T]he state was going to drop the charges. I asked them if they had a lawyer Kales. They said no we don't want Kales. You go talk to them.

ROTH: Dancy and Brooks?

OLSON: There's 400 for us (inaudible). Tell them you're a lawyer and the judge asked you to talk to 'em.

ROTH: Thank you Judge (inaudible).

OLSON: Did you get that other one?

ROTH: Yeah, I think so. I haven't finished talking to (inaudible).

There was "400 for us" in the representation because once the defendants were free (assured since the prosecutor planned to drop the charges) the judge could assign to Roth the "cash bond refund" owed to them. In Illinois defendants post with the court 10% of the appearance bond. If they show up as required, the court refunds this money less a fee; the court can direct the refund to the lawyer to cover legal costs. The lawyer can funnel part of the refund to the judge for services rendered--either steering the case to the lawyer, or changing its outcome. This method of bribery has been a staple of the Greylord prosecutions. E.g., United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1526-27 (7th Cir.1985); United States v. Blackwood, 768 F.2d 131 (7th Cir.1985); Ward v. United States, 845 F.2d 1459 (7th Cir.1988). Judge Olson shortly dismissed the cases in question and ordered the court to remit the defendants' money to Roth. There followed a negotiation in Olson's chambers:

ROTH: Cleared 765 for the day (inaudible). I gave you a deuce [$200]. If it's not enough just tell me. Whatever the deal is. What's the deal (inaudible)?

OLSON: I got a guy who gives me half of what he gets.

ROTH: Fine.

OLSON: But I'd rather do business with you.

ROTH: Fine. No problem.

OLSON: But the problem is see, the problem is that he's here everyday. It's just some days I get nothing. It's a shame to have a guy come here and not have anything.

ROTH: Well I couldn't come everyday (inaudible).

OLSON: When you're here I'll give you what I, everything I can.

ROTH: Fine. Let me know (inaudible) I cleared 765.

OLSON: Another one [$100] is fine.

ROTH: Alright.

* * *

ROTH: I got a case next week in Evanston, a big dope case in the 2nd District, 10 G's (inaudible) ... ten grand we're talking to get rid of it. (Inaudible) case.

OLSON: I didn't think you could drop in the 2nd District.

ROTH: Ah there's a couple people out there (inaudible).

There were indeed judges in the Second District willing to take bribes, and the business there was too lucrative to permit Roth to appear daily before Judge Olson. Scooping up cash bond refunds from Wayne Olson was small beer compared to the rewards of serving as broker and bagman for Judge Alan Lane of that district. The evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, shows that in one armed robbery case Judge Lane told defense counsel he had "a pretty good motion" to suppress the defendant's confession but appeared reluctant to grant it. Lane told counsel to "call Bruce Roth", a direction counsel construed (correctly) as a demand for a bribe to be paid through Roth. The discussion between defense counsel and Roth revealed that Roth and Lane had discussed the case and that Lane would like to "help out" the defendant but was "not a charitable man". After Roth received $2,000 as Lane's agent, the judge suppressed the confession. Roth then collected another $2,000 to ensure a favorable outcome on the merits--a payment that turned out to be unnecessary when the state elected not to proceed without the suppressed evidence. Roth and Lane did not refund the second $2,000.

Roth and Lane were a durable pair, and the arrangement was lucrative. Roth managed to have the case of Rocco Filliponio (involving cocaine and a machine gun) transferred from an honest judge to Lane, who acquitted the defendant in exchange for some $15,000. Roth took home an additional $10,000 as his fee. In still another case, Lane had convicted Michael Davis of several felonies, including rape. Roth, who had nothing to do with the case so far, dropped in on Davis in jail and told Davis that for $10,000, half for Lane and half for Roth, he could ensure success in post-trial motions. Roth later called Davis's girlfriend and told her curtly that she must produce $10,000 if she ever wanted to see Davis again.

Arrangements with Judge Adam Stillo called for still larger sums. Three persons were charged with selling cocaine to an undercover agent. Roth represented one. Judge Stillo acquitted Roth's client and convicted the two others. Roth offered to pitch in on behalf of the convicted defendants--if they would pitch in $25,000 apiece for Judge Stillo and "a contact". Roth told them it was too late to get an acquittal, but that money could palliate things. Stillo "doesn't read case law", Roth said, but knows that money talks. On the morning Judge Stillo was scheduled to rule on post-trial motions, one of the two convicted defendants delivered $25,000 in $100 bills to Roth's secretary. The secretary received a call from Joe Stillo, Judge Adam Stillo's nephew. The secretary said: "The papers are in order." Judge Stillo sentenced the paying defendant to three years' probation; the non-paying defendant was sent to jail for six years.

II

Roth obviously needed a good lawyer. He hired Patrick Tuite, one of Chicago's leading criminal defense attorneys and the engineer of the only total acquittal that had then been obtained in any Greylord prosecution. Tuite represented several judges and lawyers in connection with charges of corruption, and at the time Roth hired him Tuite had been retained by others under investigation. This created potential conflicts of interest. Roth might find it in his interests to strike a deal with the prosecutors, who would require Roth to sing for his supper. Roth's information might inculpate one or more of Tuite's other clients. Tuite therefore said that he could not represent Roth in connection with a plea bargain; Roth agreed to this condition. Tuite properly called the potential for conflict to the attention of the court. Judge Getzendanner then questioned Roth--formerly a state prosecutor, and a member of the bar for more than 20 years--about his understanding of the situation.

The prosecutor expressed concern that in state court Tuite had represented co-defendants of both Filliponio and Davis, who were to testify for the government. In the Filliponio case, a trial for conspiracy to commit perjury, Roth himself had been among the defendants. The prosecutor wanted to be sure that Roth understood that Tuite might have learned secrets on which he would be forbidden to capitalize in defending Roth. Tuite told Judge Getzendanner that he had learned nothing that would affect or curtail his cross-examination of Filliponio and Davis. Roth informed the court that he had discussed these matters with Tuite "at some great length, and I am well aware of all of the potential conflicts. And I don't believe are there [sic] any conflicts. And if there were some potential...

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