U.S. v. Roy, 86-1382
| Citation | 830 F.2d 628 |
| Decision Date | 04 September 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-1382,86-1382 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael ROY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit) |
Charles W. Hoffman, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellant.
Mark Pollack, Asst. U.S. Atty., Anton R. Valukas, U.S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before WOOD, and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges, and ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge.
Appellant, Michael Roy, appeals from a judgment of conviction for escape from federal custody in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 751. Through counsel, Mr. Roy claims that his indictment should have been dismissed because the government failed to comply with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. In a brief filed pro se, Mr. Roy raises a variety of other challenges to his conviction. Because we find no merit to Mr. Roy's contentions, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
The appellant was taken into custody in Illinois upon a warrant issued for his arrest by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The warrant charged Mr. Roy with bank robbery. On the date of his arrest, Mr. Roy was brought before a United States Magistrate in the Northern District of Illinois who issued a temporary commitment order and set bond at $500,000. Pursuant to the magistrate's order, Mr. Roy was held at the Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) in Chicago, Illinois. He did not post the required bond and therefore remained in custody.
The evidence at trial established that Mr. Roy escaped from the MCC about a month after his commitment. The escape was effectuated by cutting through a vent in a warehouse area that permitted passage to the street.
Two months after his escape from the MCC, Mr. Roy was apprehended in Weathersfield, Connecticut. At trial, he did not contest that he had escaped from the MCC but, proceeding pro se, 1 offered the defenses of duress and insanity.
Mr. Roy's activities from the time of his apprehension in Connecticut until his trial on the charge before us in this appeal are also relevant to the issue raised by his appointed counsel. Counsel has provided the court in his brief with a helpful chronology that, with several minor adjustments in the interest of clarity, will provide a foundation for our analysis.
Defendant was arrested by officers of the Rocky Hill, Connecticut Police Department. He was incarcerated at the Hartford Community Correctional Center (Hartford CCC) in lieu of bail as a state pretrial detainee on a state criminal charge of attempted robbery.
A federal detainer was filed against defendant at the Hartford CCC based on a federal escape charge pending against defendant in the Northern District of Illinois, that alleged that, on October 3, 1982, defendant had escaped from the MCC in Chicago. This is the charge before the court in this case.
Defendant was transferred from the Hartford CCC to another state institution, the Connecticut Correctional Institution at Somers, Connecticut (Somers CCI).
Defendant's Connecticut state parole (from a previous state conviction) was revoked. Defendant's status changed from a state pretrial detainee to a state prisoner serving a state sentence in a state institution.
A detainer was filed at Somers CCI by California state authorities relating to pending charges in that state. A similar detainer was filed by Massachusetts.
Defendant was indicted in the federal District of Connecticut for federal weapons violations. A federal detainer based on these charges was lodged with the Hartford CCC, although the defendant had been at Somers CCI since December 16, 1982. This detainer was forwarded to Somers, arriving there on March 3, 1983.
The federal government secured a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum in regard to the federal weapons charge pending in the District of Connecticut.
Pursuant to an order to produce based upon the writ, the defendant was transferred to the custody of the U.S. Marshals Service and Transported from Somers CCI to federal district court in Bridgeport, Connecticut. On that same date, defendant was transported back to state custody at Somers CCI.
Defendant filed several pretrial motions in the Connecticut federal case, including a motion to suppress evidence.
Defendant delivered to officials of the Somers CCI a request that they file demands for speedy trial on all detainers pending against him.
Pursuant to a second order to produce based on the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum issued on February 28, 1983, regarding the federal weapons charge pending in the District of Connecticut, U.S. Marshals again took defendant into federal custody at Somers CCI and transported him to federal court at Bridgeport, Connecticut for a hearing on defendant's motion to suppress.
Defendant was housed overnight at the Community Correctional Center in Bridgeport, Connecticut as a federal holdover prisoner in federal custody.
Defendant was transferred from federal custody back to state custody at Somers CCI.
Defendant delivered to officials of the Somers CCI a second request that they file demands for speedy trial on the detainer pending against him for escape from federal custody in Chicago.
Defendant was transported to California for resolution of pending charges in that state.
The California charges were dismissed.
August 2, 1983
Defendant was returned from California to Somers CCI.
The federal district court in Connecticut granted defendant's motion to suppress evidence.
A third federal detainer was filed at Somers CCI relating to bank robbery charges pending against defendant in federal court in Florida.
The government filed a notice of appeal from the order of the Connecticut District Court granting defendant's motion to suppress.
Defendant filed a demand for speedy trial on the pending federal charges in Florida.
A writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum was filed at Somers CCI regarding the federal charges pending in Florida.
Defendant was transported by federal officials from Somers CCI to federal custody in Florida for trial.
While defendant was a state prisoner in temporary federal custody in Florida, his Connecticut state sentence expired and he became a federal pretrial detainee.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the ruling of the Connecticut District Court on the motion to suppress and remanded the case for trial.
After disposition (by acquittal) of the federal charges in Florida, defendant returned to Somers CCI (as a federal pretrial detainee) for trial on the federal charges pending in Connecticut.
Defendant was convicted of federal weapons violations in the District of Connecticut.
Defendant was sentenced on the Connecticut federal conviction. 2
A writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum was issued and forwarded to the FCI at Danbury, Connecticut with respect to the federal escape charge pending in the Northern District of Illinois.
Defendant was arraigned in federal court in the Northern District of Illinois on the federal escape charge.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the escape charge based on alleged violations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. See Appellant's Br. at 8-13. Mr. Roy's motion was denied. After a jury trial, he was convicted of escape under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 751(a) on January 17, 1986.
Through his appointed counsel, Mr. Roy brings several contentions based on the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), 18 U.S.C. App. III Sec. 2. Mr. Roy submits that the indictment should be dismissed: 1) because he was not tried within 180 days of his request for speedy trial on all detainers lodged against him in violation of art. III(a); and 2) because he was taken from state custody to federal custody and returned to state custody without being tried on this federal charge in violation of art. IV(e).
Mr. Roy also raises, in his pro se brief, numerous other challenges to his conviction. He claims that the court erroneously refused to instruct the jury regarding several aspects of his defense. Additionally, he claims that the section of the criminal code under which he was convicted, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 751(a) is unconstitutional. He also submits that he suffered undue prejudice because: 1) the court failed to appoint an investigator and issue subpoenas for him; 2) jail officials violated his rights by interfering with his preparation of a defense; and 3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (the Agreement or IAD), 18 U.S.C. App. III Sec. 2, provides an interstate mechanism by which a prisoner in a signatory jurisdiction (sending state) may secure trial on all charges for which detainers have been lodged against him by other signatory jurisdictions (receiving states). Id. at art. III(a). While not directly relevant here, the IAD also provides that a receiving state may also initiate a request for a prisoner from the sending state in the absence of a request by the prisoner. Id. at art. IV(a). As Judge Newman pointed out for the Second Circuit in affirming Mr. Roy's conviction for federal firearms violations in Connecticut:
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (the "Agreement"), 18 U.S.C. App. pp. 545-48 (1982), provides a mechanism by which a prosecutor in one jurisdiction, the "[r]eceiving [s]tate," id. art. II(c), may secure the presence of...
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