U.S.A. v. Saari

Citation272 F.3d 804
Decision Date26 April 2001
Docket NumberNo. 00-5061,00-5061
Parties(6th Cir. 2001) United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael Saari, Defendant-Appellee. Argued:
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee at Memphis. No. 99-20077. Julia S. Gibbons, District Judge.

Frederick H. Godwin (argued), Tony R. Arvin, Tracy L. Berry (briefed), Assistant United States Attorneys, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellant.

Michael J. Stengal (argued and briefed), Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellee.

Before: BOGGS and CLAY, Circuit Judges; ROBERTS, District Judge. *

OPINION

ROBERTS, District Judge.

In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1382, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), the Court summarized its now familiar holding as follows:

In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.

At issue in the instant appeal taken by the United States is whether the actions of the law enforcement officers who arrested Defendant Michael Saari crossed that firm line. We hold that they did and, therefore AFFIRM the district court's decision to suppress the tainted evidence.

I. Background

Defendant was indicted on thirteen counts of possession of firearms and ammunition after a protective order was entered against him, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8). His case was assigned to United States District Judge Julia S. Gibbons, who referred Defendant's Motion to Suppress the firearms and ammunition to Magistrate Judge Diane Vescovo for a report and recommendation. After an October 25, 1999 evidentiary hearing, Magistrate Judge Vescovo recommended that the Motion be granted. The Government filed objections and Judge Gibbons held an additional evidentiary hearing on December 10, 1999. Subsequently, Judge Gibbons granted Defendant's Motion to Suppress. United States v. Saari, 88 F. Supp. 2d 835 (W. D. Tenn. 1999). This appeal followed.

In her opinion, Judge Gibbons adopted Magistrate Judge Vescovo's proposed findings of fact, with certain modifications. On brief, the Government agreed that the district court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous. 1 Thus, the following factual findings are not in dispute.

On March 14, 1999, Memphis Police Department Officers James Currin, Roberts Bridges, Galeocredo Bateman and Wilton Cleveland responded to a call regarding "shots fired" at the residence of Defendant's ex-wife, Anne Saari. Before proceeding to Defendant's apartment, Officers Bateman and Bridges went to speak to Ms. Saari. While there, Officers Bateman and Bridges learned that shots had not actually been fired. Rather, Defendant was observed standing in Ms. Saari's window with what appeared to be a pistol in his hand. 2 Ms. Saari informed the officers that Defendant was armed at all times. Additionally, Officer Currin testified that he received information from an unknown source that Defendant possessed explosives. Officer Cleveland testified that he was advised by an "unknown source" that Defendant belonged to a militia group and was heavily armed.

Eventually, the four officers went to Defendant's apartment, where the district court found the following transpired:

Upon arriving at defendant's apartment, the four officers decided to approach the house and make contact with defendant. Cleveland testified that the front door was closed and the shades were drawn, but he saw some movement inside the apartment through the drawn shades. Defendant's apartment was on the second floor. Cleveland and Currin positioned themselves on a landing approximately in front of defendant's front door. Bridges stood about four steps down from the landing and Bateman was positioned at the bottom of the steps. Cleveland had a 12-gauge, pump-action shotgun drawn and in a 'low ready' position, that is, pointed at approximately forty-five degrees toward the ground in front of the door. Currin had his service weapon drawn. Bridges testified that he drew his service weapon after officers Cleveland and Currin made contact with defendant and then immediately went to the top of the stairs. Bateman testified that she waited on the first floor with her gun drawn until she heard that defendant had been disarmed at which time she went to the second floor.

Cleveland and Currin knocked forcefully on defendant's apartment door and identified themselves as police as defendant answered the door. The officers were approximately four feet away from defendant. Cleveland testified that he thinks that defendant's door was still closed when the officers announced 'police.' Neither Currin nor Cleveland was able to recall whether defendant was ordered out or whether he came out. However, Cleveland testified that the officers would not have permitted defendant to stay inside his apartment. (Tr. at 65.) Defendant, on the other hand, specifically testified that when he opened the door, he was standing inside his apartment in the doorway. According to defendant, the officers had their weapons pointed at him and instructed him to step outside. The court finds defendant's uncontroverted testimony that he was ordered to come out of the apartment to be credible and finds as a fact that such order was given. Defendant testified that he stepped outside because he was ordered to do so and he was afraid of being shot. He stepped out with his hands above his head. While the guns were still trained on the defendant, one of the officers asked him if he had any weapons. Defendant informed the officers that he had a gun in the waistband of his pants. The officers then removed a handgun from defendant's waistband and placed him in handcuffs. Because it was dark, neither officer was able to see the weapon before they asked defendant to step outside and asked him if he had a weapon.

Saari, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 838.

The officers cuffed Defendant and they entered his apartment. While the officers claimed that Defendant was asked to re-enter his apartment, Defendant testified that he was instructed to do so. Officer Currin observed several videotapes, a parabolic antenna and two green metal ammunition boxes in Defendant's living room. Over Defendant's vocal objections, the other officers began searching the apartment. They discovered rifles in a walk-in closet and in a closed bag in the bedroom, and a pistol and blow-dart gun in the bedroom. The items were not removed at that time, but, pursuant to a search warrant which issued two days later, the officers seized the items. The affidavit in support of the search warrant was based solely upon knowledge that the officers acquired when they had been in the apartment on the day of Defendant's arrest.

In his Motion to Suppress, Defendant argued that the rifles, guns and ammunition the officers found during the arrest and search of his apartment should be suppressed. The Motion was granted in its entirety. In this appeal, the Government asks this Court to "deny the defendant's motion to suppress the weapon seized from the waistband of his pants." Appellant's Brief, p. 32. Hence, the narrow issue before the Court is whether the district court erred in suppressing the gun found in Defendant's waistband at the time of his arrest.

II. Discussion
A.

The Government argues that it was merely attempting to interview Defendant in furtherance of its investigation, and that the officers acted reasonably in protecting themselves by having their guns drawn before initiating the interview. Further, the Government contends that the Defendant voluntarily exposed himself to the public by opening his door to the police. Consequently, the Payton proscription on warrantless in-home arrests does not apply. The district court disagreed, holding, "The record indicates that 'as a practical matter' defendant was under arrest from the inception of his encounter with the officers." Saari, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 838, citing United States v. Morgan, 743 F. 2d 1158, 1163 (6th Cir. 1984). This Court agrees.

The standard for determining whether an arrest has occurred was provided in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554,100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980):

We conclude that a person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled.

Here, the officers positioned themselves in front of the only exit from Defendant's apartment with their guns drawn. They knocked forcefully on the door and announced that they were the police. Upon opening the door, Defendant was instructed to come outside, which he did. Under these circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. Tellingly, Officer Cleveland acknowledged that Defendant would not have been permitted to stay inside of his apartment. 3

B.

This case is, in all relevant respects, indistinguishable from Morgan, supra. In Morgan, the defendant was accused of shooting in a public park. After the defendant's car was spotted and followed to his mother's home, several officers proceeded there. Upon their arrival, the officers surrounded the house, flooded it with spotlights and summoned the defendant with a bullhorn. The defendant responded to the coercive activity by appearing at the front door with a pistol in his hand. He complied with the officers' demand that h...

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