U.S. v. Salvatore
Decision Date | 14 April 1997 |
Docket Number | No. 96-30221,96-30221 |
Citation | 110 F.3d 1131 |
Parties | 46 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1407 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sebastian SALVATORE, also known as Buster, also known as Harry, Anthony Joseph Tusa, Jr., Also Known As A.J., Victor Joseph Tusa, Sr., Also Known as Vic, Defendants-Appellants. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Stephen A. Higginson, Asst. U.S. Atty., James B. Letten, Salvador Robert Perricone, Steven Jay Irwin, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Herbert V. Larson, Jr., New Orleans, LA, for Defendant-Appellant Salvatore.
Frank G. DeSalvo, Edward K. Newman, New Orleans, LA, for Defendants-Appellants Anthony and Victor Tusa.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.
Before DUHE, BENAVIDES and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
Anthony Tusa, Victor Tusa, and Sebastian Salvatore appeal their convictions arising from their participation in a scheme to operate certain organized crime-controlled companies that circumvented the licensing requirements of Louisiana's Video Draw Poker Devices Control Law. For reasons that follow, we affirm.
In 1991, Louisiana enacted the "Video Draw Poker Devices Control Law" (hereinafter "the Video Poker Law" or "the Act"), which legalized video poker machines in Louisiana subject to the terms of the Act. See La. R.S. 33:4862.1 et seq. (recodified at La. R.S. 27:301-:324 (West Supp.1997)). To operate in the State, all video poker machine manufacturers, distributors, and owners must be licensed. See id. at 33:4862.11 (recodified at La. R.S. 27:311). To be licensed, each applicant must satisfy certain "suitability" criteria, which provide that no license will be issued to any person convicted of certain criminal offenses, and which require each applicant to be a person of good character who does not pose a threat to the public interest. See id. at 33:4862.10(A)-(B) (recodified at La. R.S. 27:310(A)-(B)). The Act also creates a continuing duty on the part of all licensees to inform the Video Gaming Division of the Louisiana State Police--the agency charged with overseeing the video poker industry--of any facts that they believe would be a violation of the Video Poker Law. See id. at 33:4862.10(C) (recodified at La. R.S. 27:310(C)).
The Appellants, and fourteen co-defendants, were indicted for operating a criminal enterprise that subverted the licensing requirements of Louisiana's Video Poker Law. The purpose of the enterprise was to own and operate organized crime-controlled companies engaged in the video poker industry. To this end, certain of the co-defendants known to be involved in organized crime conspired with apparently legitimate "front men" or "straw men," who obtained video poker licenses from Louisiana by intentionally concealing the presence of organized crime from the Video Gaming Division. Once established and licensed, these "front companies" obtained funding and purchased video poker machines from Bally Gaming, Inc. ("Bally Gaming"), a licensed video poker machine manufacturer. Thereafter, the enterprise sought to "skim, divert, and steal" funds collected by these crime-controlled companies and to funnel such money to associates of New Orleans-based and New York-based organized crime families.
The heart of the Government's case-in-chief consisted of the testimony of Christopher Tanfield and FBI Agent Richard McHenry. Tanfield, a cooperating co-defendant, provided an inside view of the business side of the criminal enterprise. Agent McHenry, the primary case agent, testified to the meaning of numerous conversations and the identity of individuals covertly recorded by an FBI microphone, telephone wiretap, and video camera, all hidden inside Frank's Deli on Decatur Street, a primary meeting spot of the conspirators.
Tanfield testified that he and Steven Bolson, another co-defendant who pleaded guilty, incorporated and operated two businesses known as Worldwide Gaming of Louisiana, Inc. ("Worldwide Gaming") and Louisiana Route Operators, Inc. ("LRO" or "Louisiana Route Operators"). Worldwide Gaming was licensed to sell and distribute video poker machines in Louisiana. LRO was licensed as a route operator company, meaning that it could own video poker machines, place the machines in businesses, and receive revenues from the operation of the machines. As apparently legitimate "front men," Tanfield and Bolson, initially designated as vice-president and president of Worldwide Gaming and LRO, respectively, obtained licenses for these companies from the Video Gaming Division by deliberately concealing the fact that the companies were, in reality, fronts for organized crime. Tanfield described his dealings with individuals associated both with the New Orleans-based Marcello crime family, including Anthony Carollo (the "boss" of the family), Joseph Marcello, Jr., Frank Gagliano, Sr., Joseph Gagliano, and Sebastian Salvatore, and with the New York-based Gambino crime family, including Joseph Corozzo and John Gammarano. All of these individuals were co-defendants of the Appellants who pleaded guilty before the Appellants' trial.
Through Worldwide Gaming and LRO, Tanfield and Bolson operated under the direction of organized crime as wholesalers in the video poker industry. After buying video poker machines and borrowing money from Bally Gaming, Worldwide Gaming and LRO would then sell these machines to and participate in the routes of certain businesses in Louisiana. Money thus received by Worldwide Gaming and LRO was then funneled to organized crime. One of the businesses with which Tanfield dealt was Bayou Casino Inc. ("Bayou Casino"), the route operator company owned and operated by Victor and Anthony Tusa. As outlined below, Tanfield repeatedly inculpated the Tusas and Salvatore in the criminal enterprise.
Before trial, all of the indicted co-defendants, except for the three Appellants, pleaded guilty to various federal offenses. The Appellants proceeded to trial and were convicted. Anthony and Victor Tusa were each convicted of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (counts 12-14). Sebastian Salvatore was found guilty of violating the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962 (count 1); conspiracy to violate the RICO Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (count 2); mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (counts 3-7, 9-10); conducting an illegal gambling business, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1955 (counts 8, 11); wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (counts 16-31); and interstate travel and communication in aid of racketeering, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (count 37). The Tusas were each sentenced to 10 months incarceration on all counts to run concurrently, and each was ordered to pay restitution of $37,048 and a fine of $11,838. Salvatore was sentenced to 18 months incarceration on all counts to run concurrently, and was ordered to pay restitution of $25,000.
A criminal conviction must be upheld if any rational jury could have found that the evidence established the essential elements of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); United States v. Ismoila, 100 F.3d 380, 387 (5th Cir.1996). We view the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom and all credibility determinations, in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See United States v. Resio-Trejo, 45 F.3d 907, 910 (5th Cir.1995). The evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, see United States v. McCord, 33 F.3d 1434, 1439 (5th Cir.1994), but if the evidence "gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence," the conviction must be reversed. United States v. Salazar, 66 F.3d 723, 728 (5th Cir.1995).
To sustain the Tusas' mail fraud convictions, the Government had to prove: (1) the existence of a scheme to defraud, (2) the use of the mails to execute the scheme, and (3) the specific intent on the part of the defendants to commit fraud. See United States v. Fagan, 821 F.2d 1002, 1008 (5th Cir.1987). The Tusas assert that they were legitimate businessmen operating within the confines of the Video Poker Law, and they maintain that the Government did not establish that Bayou Casino was controlled by organized crime. Accordingly, they contend that the Government failed to establish that they had the specific intent to defraud. The Tusas repeatedly draw exculpatory inferences from the evidence purportedly showing that they operated a legitimate business, but we must accept all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Resio-Trejo, 45 F.3d at 910. Doing so, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the Tusas' mail fraud convictions.
In establishing that Bayou Casino, the Tusas' video poker route operator company, was controlled by organized crime, the Government relied primarily upon the testimony of Christopher Tanfield and the audiotapes of numerous inculpatory conversations between the Tusas and other co-defendants recorded by the Government microphone and telephone wiretap hidden at Frank's Deli. Tanfield's testimony establishes that organized crime did have significant control over Bayou Casino, and it is undisputed that the Tusas did not inform the Video Gaming Division of such control, as required by the Video Poker Law. Specifically, Tanfield testified that Joseph Marcello Jr. both instructed Tanfield to give the Tusas preferential treatment and also mediated disputes that arose between the Tusas and other companies involved in the enterprise. In addition, Tanfield testified that Bayou Casino eventually (in November 1992) became a front company for organized crime.
Tanfield's testimony was supported by the audiotaped conversations and FBI Agent Richard McHenry's testimony regarding those conversations. Although the actual...
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