U.S. v. Sampson

Decision Date26 August 2004
Docket NumberNo. 01-10384-MLW.,01-10384-MLW.
Citation332 F.Supp.2d 325
PartiesUNITED STATES of America v. Gary Lee SAMPSON
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

David A. Ruhnke, Ruhnke & Barrett, Montclair, NJ, Robert L. Sheketoff, for Gary Lee Sampson (1), Defendants.

Frank M. Gaziano, United States Attorney's Office, George W. Vien, United States Attorney's Office, John A. Wortmann, Jr., United States Attorney's Office, Boston, for USA, Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER CONCERNING POST-TRIAL MOTIONS

WOLF, District Judge.

This memorandum is based on the transcript of the decisions rendered orally on January 26, 2004, in which the court denied defendant Gary Sampson's various post-trial motions and renewed challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. This memorandum adds some citations, clarifies some language, expands some discussion, and deletes some colloquies between the court and counsel.

* * * * * *

I. MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR A HEARING BASED ON POST-VERDICT STATEMENTS BY JURORS

For the reasons described below, the court is denying the defendant's motion for a new penalty phase trial or for a hearing at which jurors will be questioned about their deliberative process.

The motion relates to press reports of post-verdict statements made by one of the deliberating jurors, Wendy Putnam. The defendant seeks a new penalty phase trial, arguing that these statements reveal a fundamental misunderstanding of the court's instructions. He states that in the event that the court "is not satisfied to proceed on the basis of the statements attributed to Ms. Putnam ... a hearing is specifically requested at which all deliberating jurors will be directed to appear and to respond to questions concerning the legal standard that was applied by the jury on the issue of mental health and whether Ms. Putnam's observations are accurate." Def.'s Mot. at 4.

This is primarily a motion for a new trial under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. This motion was timely filed on January 9, 2004, the time prescribed for the filing of such motions by the December 23, 2003 Order. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 33(b)(2).

Rule 33 states that "the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires." The government has acknowledged that Rule 33 applies generally in this case to the penalty phase of the trial that the court conducted. See Govt.'s Resp. to the Court's June 16, 2003 Order at 2.

The government contends that both Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) and the common law on which it is based prohibit any inquiry into the jurors' deliberative process or consideration by the court of the jurors' extrajudicial statements concerning that process. The government further argues that there is no evidence or information properly before the court to justify any of the relief sought.

The court agrees that Ms. Putnam's reported statements do not justify either questioning of the jurors or a new trial.

The defendant focuses the court's attention on the following press reports. A December 31, 2003 Boston Herald article reports that the following statements were made by Ms. Putnam:

After hearing the prosecution psychiatrist testify, Putnam said she could not accept defense claims that Sampson couldn't control himself once he embarked on the six-day killing spree.

"It went back to him knowing the difference between right and wrong," Putnam said, "and that was the fulcrum on which everything else balanced. He was able to know the difference, and he was able to control himself. He could have done differently."

J.M. Lawrence, "Jurors Still Wondering What Made Sampson Kill," Boston Herald, Dec. 31, 2003, at 14.

In addition, another article published on December 31, 2003 reports that Ms. Putnam said:

He knew right from wrong — he said that himself in his confession — and that was said by almost every single mental health professional, and that's what we based our decision on.

Denise Lavoie, "Sampson Jurors Say Multiple Killings Made Death Appropriate Punishment," Assoc. Press Wire Svc., Dec. 31, 2003.

The defendant contends that these statements show that the jury did not understand or follow the court's instructions regarding impaired capacity and mental illness. Thus, the defendant asserts that he was unlawfully convicted and should receive a new trial.

It is, however, not permissible or appropriate for the court to consider Ms. Putnam's reported statements. In addition, even if they are considered, along with the reported statements of other jurors, they do not justify an evidentiary hearing or a new trial.

Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) applies to this proceeding and prohibits the introduction of evidence concerning the jurors' deliberative process. It states that:

Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.

Ms. Putnam's statements are the type excluded by the rule. As the Fifth Circuit has stated: "Rule 606(b) has consistently been used to bar testimony when [it is alleged that] the jury misunderstood [the] instructions." United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232, 245 (5th Cir.1998). In Jones, the Fifth Circuit held that Rule 606(b) applies and precludes consideration of affidavits indicating the jurors were confused by the court's instructions in the penalty phase of a Federal Death Penalty Act case. See 132 F.3d at 245. Other federal courts have also applied Rule 606(b) to issues arising in Federal Death Penalty Act cases. See United States v. Battle, 264 F.Supp.2d 1088, 1191-93 (N.D.Ga.2003); United States v. Chandler, 950 F.Supp. 1545, 1579 (N.D.Ala.1996); United States v. McVeigh, 118 F.Supp.2d 1137, 1152 (D.Colo.2000); United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1186 (10th Cir.1998). In addition, a 1972 Advisory Committee note concerning Rule 606(b) indicates that the Rule is intended to exclude testimony and affidavits of jurors when it is claimed that they misinterpreted instructions on the law. See Fed.R.Evid. 606 Advisory Committee's Notes to 1972 Proposed Rules ("[T]estimony or affidavits of jurors have been held incompetent to show ... misinterpretation of instructions.").

This court agrees that Rule 606(b) applies to the instant motion. Rule 1101(b) states that the Federal Rules of Evidence apply generally to criminal cases and proceedings. Pursuant to Rule 1101(d)(3), the Rules do not apply to certain miscellaneous criminal proceedings, including sentencings. However, the present proceeding is a hearing on a motion for a new trial, not a sentencing hearing.

More significantly, Rule 1101 does not directly address the unique nature of the proceedings to determine the sentence in capital cases, which involve a jury trial. All of the purposes served by Rule 606(b) as applied to a conventional criminal trial are also served by applying the Rule in the present circumstances.

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Federal Death Penalty Act does not state that the Federal Rules of Evidence are wholly inapplicable in federal capital cases. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c), on which the defendant relies, is captioned, "Proof of mitigating and aggravating factors." It states, in pertinent part, that in the penalty phase of a Federal Death Penalty Act case, "[i]nformation is admissible regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials." Rule 606(b) is not a rule that determines what evidence is admissible at trial. Rather, it is captioned, "Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment." It addresses what information may be introduced and considered after a trial has been completed.

The conclusion that Rule 606(b) applies is not qualified by the fact that the Supreme Court has often stated that "death is different" and the Eighth Amendment requires procedures to ensure heightened reliability when the death sentence is imposed. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 605-06, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 383-84, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (plurality opinion); Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 172, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring).

The Supreme Court in Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120-21, 107 S.Ct. 2739, 97 L.Ed.2d 90 (1987) stated that, generally, full and frank discussions in the jury room and jurors' willingness to return an unpopular verdict would be undermined by a barrage of post-verdict scrutiny of juror conduct. See also United States v. Connolly, 341 F.3d 16, 34 (1st Cir.2003); Plummer v. Springfield Terminal Railway Co., 5 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1993). Promoting full and frank discussion and protecting jurors from fear that they would be subject to scrutiny if they return unpopular verdicts are also important concerns in capital cases. To this degree, Rule...

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