U.S. v. Sampson
| Decision Date | 26 August 2004 |
| Docket Number | Cr. No. 01-10384-MLW. |
| Citation | 335 F.Supp.2d 166 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Gary Lee SAMPSON |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
David A. Ruhnke, Ruhnke & Barrett, Montclair, NJ, Robert L. Sheketoff, Boston, MA, for Judge Mark L. Wolf, Defendants.
Frank M. Gaziano, United States Attorney's Office, George W. Vien, United States Attorney's Office, John A. Wortmann, Jr., United States Attorney's Office, for USA, Plaintiff.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER CONCERNING TRIAL RULINGS
On January 29, 2004, pursuant to the jury's verdict, this court sentenced the defendant, Gary Sampson, to be executed on each of two counts of carjacking resulting in death in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119(3). See 300 F.Supp.2d 275 (D.Mass.2004). This death sentence is the first imposed in the District of Massachusetts or any other district within the First Circuit since Congress and the President reinstituted a federal death penalty in 1988. Consequently, as this case was being tried, the court found that there were few binding precedents interpreting and applying the Federal Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3598 (the "FDPA").
This Memorandum and Order summarizes and explains some of the decisions the court made during the pretrial proceedings and the trial. These include: (1) a clarification of the procedural protections concerning jury selection afforded the defendant in a capital case under 18 U.S.C. § 3432; (2) evidentiary rulings applying the standard set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c); (3) a discussion of the court's power to strike an aggravating factor because the government failed to introduce sufficient evidence to prove the factor beyond a reasonable doubt; (4) explanations of rulings and jury instructions relating to aggravating factors; (5) explanations of rulings and jury instructions relating to mitigating factors; (6) explanations of general FDPA jury instructions; and (7) explanations of rulings relating to the provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.2 that address issues relating to a capital defendant's mental condition.
The court is issuing a separate Memorandum and Order concerning its oral decisions on Sampson's post-trial motions.
The court is issuing this Memorandum and Order to memorialize some of its decisions and for the instructive value they may have in view of the limited body of capital case law in the First Circuit. It is not, however, intended to be a substitute for the oral rulings issued from the bench as reflected in the transcripts of the proceedings.1 Unlike the transcripts, the Memorandum and Order does not include all of the rulings made at trial or all of the reasoning articulated by the court at the time the rulings were made. Instead, the Memorandum and Order focuses on those aspects of the court's rulings that are most likely to be at issue in future FDPA cases. To the extent, if any, that there appears to be an inconsistency between the summaries in the Memorandum and the court's oral explanations for its decisions, the oral explanations should generally be regarded as more accurate and complete.
After committing a series of bank robberies in North Carolina in May, June and July 2001, Sampson fled to the Boston area. On July 23, 2001, Sampson called the Boston office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the "FBI") in an attempt to turn himself in. However, his call was disconnected and, although he waited to be arrested, the FBI failed to arrive and arrest him. See United States v. Anderson, 229 F.Supp.2d 17, 19 (D.Mass.2002); United States v. Anderson, 260 F.Supp.2d 310, 312 (D.Mass.2003).
On July 24, 2001, Phillip McCloskey, a 69-year old retiree, picked up Sampson, who was hitchhiking. Sampson subsequently murdered McCloskey with a knife and attempted to steal his automobile.
On July 27, 2001, Sampson was hitchhiking again. He was picked up by Jonathan Rizzo, a college student. Sampson murdered Rizzo by tying him to a tree and then stabbing him to death. Sampson then stole Rizzo's automobile.
On July 30, 2001, Sampson encountered Robert Whitney in New Hampshire. Sampson murdered Whitney by tying him to a chair and strangling him to death. Sampson then stole Whitney's automobile.
On July 31, 2001, William Gregory picked up Sampson, who was hitchhiking in Vermont. Sampson pulled a knife and ordered Gregory to drive down a dirt road. Gregory, however, jumped out of his automobile, which Sampson drove away. Gregory reported that his car had been stolen. Shortly thereafter, Sampson called 911 to surrender.
Sampson was arrested by the Vermont State Police and quickly confessed his crimes, including the murders of McCloskey, Rizzo, and Whitney. He gave an additional tape-recorded confession to two Massachusetts State Police troopers who traveled to Vermont to question Sampson. On August 1, 2001, Sampson was brought back to Massachusetts, where he gave another tape-recorded confession to troopers of the Massachusetts State Police.
Later that month, Sampson was charged by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for the murders of McCloskey and Rizzo. On October 24, 2001, Sampson was also indicted in this federal case. The Massachusetts charges against Sampson were dismissed in deference to this federal prosecution. Sampson offered to plead guilty and accept a federal sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Department of Justice did not accept this offer. Rather, on November 19, 2002, the...
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