U.S. v. Sanchez

• Decision Date: 03 April 2009
• Docket Number: No. 08-1847.,08-1847.
• Citation: 562 F.3d 275
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Eric SANCHEZ, a/k/a "E", Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

562 F.3d 275

UNITED STATES of America v. Eric SANCHEZ, a/k/a "E", Appellant.

No. 08-1847.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) February 2, 2009.

Filed April 3, 2009.

James V. Wade, Ronald A. Krauss, Federal Public Defender—Appeals, Harrisburg, PA, for Appellant.

Martin C. Carlson, Christy H. Fawcett, United States Attorney's Office, Harrisburg, PA, for Appellee.

Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

JORDAN, Circuit Judge.

Eric Sanchez appeals the order of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denying his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), the statutory provision allowing a court to reduce a sentence which is "based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission...." Id. The District Court determined that Sanchez was convicted of an offense that carried a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment and that he was therefore ineligible for the requested relief. For the following reasons, we will affirm.

I. Background

On August 8, 2001, Sanchez was charged in a seven-count superseding indictment with various federal offenses related to the distribution of crack cocaine.¹ He originally pled not guilty, but, after three days of trial, he appeared before the District Court to plead guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine. At the change-of-plea hearing, Sanchez reported, through counsel, that he and the government had reached a plea agreement which they wanted to be binding under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(1)(C),² and pursuant to which, in exchange for Sanchez's plea, the government promised to drop the remaining counts of the indictment. In addition, the prosecutor told the Court that the parties stipulated that the quantity of crack cocaine involved in the conspiracy was "between 35 to 50 grams." (App. at 35.) Most significantly, the prosecutor explained that "the intent of the plea agreement [was] that the defendant w[ould] receive a sentence of ten years." (Id.)

The Court responded by acknowledging its understanding "that the amount of drugs ... is agreed to be between 35 and 50 grams." (Id. at 36.) Then, at the specific request of Sanchez's counsel, the Court further acknowledged that the terms of the agreement, if accepted by the Court, were to be binding under Rule 11(e)(1)(C). Later in the hearing, the Court asked the government to put on the record the facts supporting its case against Sanchez. The prosecutor said that the government would be able to prove that "the quantity of crack cocaine that was conspired to be distributed or possessed with intent to distribute was between 35 and 50 grams." (Id. at 38.) Sanchez orally agreed to the amount and entered a guilty plea, which the Court accepted. Then, although the binding agreement provided that Sanchez would receive a sentence involving ten years' imprisonment, the Court rightly deferred sentencing pending its receipt of a presentence report ("PSR").³

The parties had not reduced their agreement to writing by the time of the change-of-plea hearing, and nothing in the record indicates that they ever did, but the District Court apparently shared their understanding that the agreement was binding. Accordingly, it instructed the government to indicate "in your plea agreement, when it is drafted, ... that this is pursuant to Rule 11(e)(1)(C), and that the Court has accepted this plea agreement." (App. at 39.)

Sanchez was sentenced on August 30, 2002. The probation officer who prepared the PSR calculated the sentencing range— based on a drug weight of 50 grams or more of crack cocaine—at 121 to 151 months, but he acknowledged that, pursuant to the parties' agreement, Sanchez would be sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. Although Sanchez objected to the amount of drugs attributed to him in the PSR, he and his counsel expressly agreed at sentencing that the objection was rendered moot by the stipulated term of imprisonment in the plea agreement. In keeping with that agreement, the Court sentenced Sanchez to 120 months' imprisonment. In its Statement of Reasons in support of the sentence, the Court adopted the factual findings in the PSR and stated that it was departing from the Guidelines range due to the binding plea agreement under Rule 11(e)(1)(C).

Subsequently, the U.S. Sentencing Commission announced a two-level reduction on crack cocaine offenses and made that amendment retroactive. Sanchez then moved pro se for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). On March 12, 2008, the District Court denied his motion on the basis that he had received a mandatory minimum sentence—ten years imprisonment—for conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine. Such sentences, according to the Court, were not eligible for reduction under the retroactive crack cocaine amendments. Sanchez's timely appeal followed.

II. Discussion

The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The District Court ruled that it lacked the authority to reduce Sanchez's sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which presents a legal issue subject to de novo review.⁴ See United States v. Edwards, 309 F.3d 110 (3d Cir.2002) ("Our review over legal questions concerning the proper interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines is plenary." (internal citation omitted)).

According to Sanchez, the District Court erred by treating his ten-year prison sentence as a mandatory minimum and denying on that basis his motion for a sentence reduction. Sanchez pled guilty to Count Five of the indictment, which expressly charged him with conspiracy to distribute "50 grams and more" of crack cocaine (App. at 28), a crime for which 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), in conjunction with 21 U.S.C. § 846, imposes a 120-month minimum sentence. Sanchez contends, however, that while his sentence may have been in accord with a statutory minimum, it was based on a Rule 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement, in which he and the government stipulated that he was responsible for "between 35 to 50 grams" of the drug and would receive a sentence including 120 months' imprisonment. (App. at 35.) That stipulation, he argues, should be read as meaning "at least 35, but less than 50, grams," a quantity that would not have subjected him to the mandatory minimum of ten years under § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii).

Although the count of the indictment to which Sanchez pled guilty clearly charged him with responsibility for "50 grams and more" of crack cocaine (App. at 28), Sanchez's position cannot be dismissed out of hand. First, it has some logical force in the abstract. Fifty grams is a highly significant amount when it comes to crack cocaine sentencing, one that triggers a ten-year, rather than a five-year, mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), and leads to a higher base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines, see U.S.S.G. § 2D 1.1(c)(5), (6) (providing a base offense level of 30 for "[a]t least 50 g[rams] but less than 150 g[rams] of cocaine base" and a level of 28 for "[a]t least 35 g[rams] but less than 50 g[rams]" of the substance). It would be odd to stipulate to a range of crack cocaine amounts that, depending on how the stipulation is read, straddles penalty provisions in both the applicable statute and the Sentencing Guidelines.

Second, Sanchez's argument has some support in the record. During the plea colloquy, the District Court said, "It is my understanding that the amount of drugs in this [case] is agreed to be between 35 and 50 grams, and that there is apparently an indication that he would receive ten years." (App. at 36-37.) Counsel for the government assented, saying, "That's correct, Your Honor. I should specify between 35 and 50 grams of crack cocaine." (Id. at 37.) Given that all were in accord that Sanchez's part in the charged conspiracy involved 35 to 50 grams of crack, it can be argued that everyone in the courtroom was trying to give effect to a deal exposing Sanchez to punishment geared to their specific agreement, not to the minimum mandatory punishment set forth in § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). Moreover, despite the unambiguous wording of the charging document, the government, in the brief it submitted to us, concedes that it is "unclear ... whether Sanchez was subject to a[ten]-year mandatory minimum sentence based on the quantity of crack cocaine involved...." (Gov't Br. at 14.)

We need not sort out the conflicting signals in the record, however, because we are able to affirm on the alternative ground that Sanchez's sentence was the result of a binding plea agreement and is therefore not subject to reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).⁵ "An appellate court may affirm a result reached by the District Court on different reasons, as long as the record supports the judgment." Guthrie v. Lady Jane Collieries, Inc., 722 F.2d 1141, 1145 n. 1 (3d Cir.1983) (citing Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245, 58 S.Ct. 154, 82 L.Ed. 224 (1937)). Here, despite the contradictory character of the colloquy and the charging language, the record is clear at least in this: Sanchez was sentenced pursuant to a stipulation in a Rule 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement.

To stave off that conclusion, Sanchez contends that there is insufficient evidence that the District Court ever accepted his plea. The record, however, definitively proves the opposite. Although Sanchez leans heavily on the District Court's decision to delay sentencing until it had received the PSR—a fact that, out of context, might indicate that the Court had yet to accept the binding plea agreement— that deferral must be seen in light of two statements indicating the Court's acceptance of the plea at the change-of-plea hearing. First, after Sanchez's counsel confirmed that the parties were agreed as to the plea's...