U.S. v. Sanders

• Decision Date: 30 July 2010
• Docket Number: Case No.: 8:10-cr-00096-EAK-MAP
• Citation: 731 F.Supp.2d 1261
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, v. Courtney Antoine SANDERS.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

731 F.Supp.2d 1261

UNITED STATES of America,

v.Courtney Antoine SANDERS.

Case No.: 8:10-cr-00096-EAK-MAP.

United States District Court,

M.D. Florida,

Tampa Division.

July 30, 2010.

James A. Muench, U.S. Attorney's Office, Tampa, FL, for United States of America.

Daniel L. Castillo, Attorney at Law, Tampa, FL, for Courtney Antoine Sanders.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DECLARE TITLE 21 U.S.C., SECTION 841 UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT TWO OF THE INDICTMENT AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW

ELIZABETH A. KOVACHEVICH, District Judge.

This cause comes before the Court for consideration of Defendant Courtney Antoine Sanders' Motion to Declare Title U.S.C., Section 841 Unconstitutional, Motion to Dismiss Count Two of the Indictment, and Memorandum of Law in support thereof (Dkt. 86), and the Government's response in opposition to Defendant's two motions. (Dkt. 88) (hereinafter Motions). For the reasons set forth below, the Defendant's Motions are denied.

BACKGROUND

This is a brief summary of the facts of Courtney Antoine Sanders' Motions pending before the Court. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12, the Defendant, Courtney Antoine Sanders (hereinafter Defendant), moves the Court to declare Title 21, United States Code, Section 841 unconstitutional and to dismiss Count Two of the Indictment in the instant case as being unconstitutional as applied.

The Defendant is named in three (3) counts in an Indictment. In Count Two of the Indictment, the Defendant, a black male, is charged with violating Title 21 U.S.C. Sections 846 and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) for being a knowingly and willful conspiratorwith his co-conspirators in order to distribute fifty (50) or more grams of cocaine base, or "crack cocaine", from an unknown date in 2006 through on or about December 16, 2009. This offense alleged in Count Two carries with it a mandatory minimum prison sentence of ten (10) years imprisonment according to Title 21 U.S.C. Section 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). If convicted of any or all the enumerated counts, the Defendant will be subject to this minimum mandatory prison sentence provided for by said statute.

The penalty established by Title 21 U.S.C. Section 841(b)(1)(A) is a mandatory minimum sentence of ten (10) years for persona possessing or distributing five (5) kilograms or more of powder cocaine or fifty (50) grams or more of cocaine base, the latter of which is the violation at issue here. Therefore, the statutory construction results in a powder-to-base ratio of 100:1, or, in other words, a punishment for cocaine base offenses that is one hundred (100) times more than powder cocaine offenses involving the same quantity.

The Defendant's motion to dismiss these three counts alleges that 21 U.S.C. § 841 violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution. (Dkt. 86, p. 2-3).

DISCUSSION

The Defendant's Motions and the Government's Response raise two main issues that warrant analysis. First, the Government contends that the Defendant lacks the requisite standing to challenge the constitutionality of 21 U.S.C. § 841 as a violation of the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. (Dkt. 88, p. 3). Second, the Defendant claims that the minimum mandatory base or crack cocaine sentencing provisions of Title 21 U.S.C. § 841 are unconstitutional, and, thus. Count Two is unconstitutional as applied (Dkt. 86).

I. STANDING CHALLENGE

First and foremost, the Government objects to the Defendant's cruel and unusual punishment attack on the sentencing requirements laid out in 21 U.S.C. § 841 on the ground that the Defendant lacks standing to bring his claim. (Dkt. 34, p. 3). Therefore, the Court must address the question of ripeness of the constitutional challenges raised by the Defendant.

Standing is a threshold question in every case before a federal court. Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution underpins standing jurisprudence in that it limits the power of federal courts to decide "cases" and "controversies." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000). The standing inquiry, therefore, is the question of whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of particular issues. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984).

The essence of standing is whether the party invoking the court's jurisdiction has demonstrated a direct or "personal stake in the outcome" of the controversy. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). This condition of a "personal stake", which has been refined by subsequent reformulation, has come to be understood as to require three elements. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (U.S.1978). In order to establish the irreducible constitutional minimum of Article III standing to challenge a law as unconstitutional, theparty seeking review by the court must show the following: (1) he has personally suffered an "injury in fact"; (2) a fairly traceable causal connection between the alleged injury and the challenged action; and (3) a substantial likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Horne v. Flores, --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 2579, 2585, 174 L.Ed.2d 406 (2009) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)).

An injury in fact, the requirement embodied in the first prong, has been suffered where there is an invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Horne, 129 S.Ct. at 2585. Such an injury has also been described as one that is "actual or threatened distinct and palpable". Diamond, 476 U.S. at 62, 106 S.Ct. 1697; see also Gladstone Realtors v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617-18, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973). The validity of legislation is open to attack only by those persons whose constitutional rights are personally or directly affected by the application of the challenged law. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984).

The Government maintains that the possibility that the Defendant may receive the minimum mandatory sentence if he is convicted does not constitute the requisite injury in fact necessary to bring such a claim. (Dkt. 88, p. 3). In fact, the Defendant admits that "he has not yet been sentenced and it is unknown if the minimum mandatory sentence would be applied at this time." (Dkt. 86, p. 7 n. 11). Nevertheless, the Government's argument is unsuccessful.

In order to establish standing where a law has yet to be enforced against the party invoking the court's authority, that party "must show an actual and well-founded fear that the law will be enforced against [him]." Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 393, 108 S.Ct. 636, 98 L.Ed.2d 782 (1988); see also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974) (standing to challenge a statute is established if the party shows "a real and immediate threat that she will be prosecuted" under the challenged statute in the future); Doctor John's, Inc. v. City of Roy, 465 F.3d 1150, 1156 (10th Cir.2006) (standing is established when "a credible threat of prosecution or other consequences following from the statute's enforcement is shown"); Pac. Capital Bank, N.A. v. Connecticut, 542 F.3d 341, 350 (2d Cir.2008) (to show injury, a party bringing a pre-enforcement challenge against a statute need not demonstrate to a certainty that it will be prosecuted under the statute, but only that it may legitimately fear that it will face enforcement of the statute); State v. Benitez, 395 So.2d 514, 517 (Fla.1981) (a party, not yet convicted but subject to criminal prosecution, clearly has a sufficient personal stake in the penalty which the offense carries to have standing; this is wholly unlike cases where criminal defendants challenged portions of a statute having nothing to do with their prosecution).

If, according to the Supreme Court, standing, and, thus, an injury in fact, may be found where the law has yet to be enforced against the party so long as he can show a well-founded fear of enforcement or imminent threat of prosecution, then surely an injury in fact shall be found where, as here, the party invoking the court's authority has already been indicted and is facing trial. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41-42, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971) (the Supreme Court found that, of the appellees challenging the constitutionality of a statute, the one whohad been indicted and was being prosecuted for violation of a statute had an acute, live controversy; the other parties who had not been indicted, arrested, or even threatened by the prosecutor did not have standing).

Although, as the Government noted, the Defendant has yet to be convicted or sentenced, it is undisputed that the Defendant has been indicted and is being subject to a criminal prosecution for violation of Section 841, subsection (a). (Dkt. 86, p. 1, 7 n. 11). A conviction, with the corresponding application of the minimum mandatory sentence ¹, is not certain, but the indictment, itself, acts as a real and legitimate threat of the penalty that the charged offense carries. Contrary to the Government's contention, the Defendant has suffered an injury in fact because, although the injury suffered is not an actual injury, it is imminent or threatened.

Therefore, even though the Defendant has not been convicted, he has sufficient personal stake in this penalty-oriented statute for the Court to find that he possesses the requisite Article III standing to raise his constitutional attacks against Section 841.

II....