U.S. v. Santiago-Rodriguez, 97-098 (HL).
| Decision Date | 22 January 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-098 (HL).,97-098 (HL). |
| Citation | 993 F.Supp. 31 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, v. Luis SANTIAGO-RODRIGUEZ, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Joseph C. Laws, Federal Public Defender, Hato Rey, PR, Esther Castro-Schmidt, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.
Before the Court is Defendant Luis Santiago-Rodríguez' request to request the Puerto Rico United States Attorney's Office and to compel the Government to specifically perform a proffer letter agreement entered into between the Government and Santiago-Rodríguez.1 On January 13, 1998, the Court held an evidentiary hearing on this request. Santiago-Rodríguez and his attorney Esther Castro Schmidt ("Castro Schmidt") both testified. Santiago-Rodríguez also attempted to call Assistant United States Attorney ("AUSA") José Quiles as a witness, but the Government opposed and the Court denied the request. AUSA's Edwin Vázquez, Stephen Muldrow, and Desiree Laborde also testified. Based on the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the Court makes the following findings.
A five-count indictment returned on May 14, 19972, charged Santiago-Rodríguez and four other defendants with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, 952(a), and 963. In June 1997, the Government and Santiago-Rodríguez entered into a proffer letter agreement ("the Agreement"). At the time, Edwin Vázquez was the AUSA assigned to the case. The Agreement reads in part as follows:
The purpose of the following is to particularize a preliminary agreement to be entered into between the United States Government and Luis Santiago-Rodríguez, in an effort to commence negotiations related to his possible cooperation. Neither the U.S. Government nor Luis Santiago-Rodríguez are bound by this writing to reach a cooperation agreement; rather, this preliminary agreement is intended to set the base from which negotiations will ensue.
Should Luis Santiago-Rodríguez enter into this preliminary agreement, arrangements will be made by the U.S. Department of Justice to have him fully debriefed in a secured setting offering guarantees of confidentiality. The specific time, place, and mode of transportation will be determined by the U.S. Bureau of Prisons and/or the U.S. Marshal Service, or the appropriate designated authority. His debriefing will include all his knowledge of his criminal activities and of his associates. The substance of his debriefing need not to [sic] be limited to his criminal activities, but Luis Santiago-Rodríguez is to reveal all his knowledge regarding criminal activity involving drug trafficking, illegal use or possession of firearms, murders, and any other criminal activity.
For the purpose of allowing the prosecution to assess the credibility and value of the evidence and possible testimony that he may provide, it will be agreed that Luis Santiago-Rodríguez will first reveal everything that he knows about these crimes, and that he will do so completely, truthfully and without guilt. It is also understood in this regard that Luis Santiago-Rodríguez is not entitled at this juncture to any specific consideration regarding the charges against him just because he will have given to the prosecution such a statement. Any such consideration, if any at all, will be unilaterally determined by the Department of Justice only after the statement is made.
Docket no. 63, exhibit 1.
Vázquez told Castro Schmidt that the debriefing called for in the Agreement would be postponed because the Government was preparing a superseding indictment in another criminal case in which Santiago-Rodríguez was to be added as a defendant.3 If the debriefing had been done prior to the return of the superseding indictment, the Government would have been confronted with a Kastigar v. U.S., 406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 issue.4 At the January 13, 1998, hearing Vázquez testified that there was a second reason why the Government was delaying its debriefing of Santiago-Rodríguez: the Government was in the process of interviewing another individual whose testimony would make any debriefing of Santiago-Rodríguez unnecessary.
Castro Schmidt alleged in her motion and at the hearing, however, that the Government had an ulterior motive for not debriefing Santiago-Rodríguez. She claimed that a series of incidents involving her and the U.S. Attorney's Office has created an atmosphere of animosity and that the U.S. Attorney's Office is conducting a "vendetta" against her. The result of this vendetta, she further alleged, is an infringement of her client's Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice.
The first incident between Castro Schmidt and the U.S. Attorney's Office arose in a case before Judge Casellas.5 At a status conference held on August 13, 1997, she claimed that perjured testimony or unreliable evidence might have been presented to the grand jury. At the conference she requested a copy of the grand jury transcripts. Judge Casellas granted her request. Castro Schmidt further claimed that at the conference, AUSA José Quiles became so upset at Castro Schmidt's suggestion regarding perjured testimony that the other attorneys present at the conference had to calm him down. Castro Schmidt subsequently withdrew from the case, and the individual she had been representing entered a guilty plea through new counsel. He is currently awaiting sentencing.
Second, Castro Schmidt claimed that shortly after the status conference, AUSA Quiles embarked on a "smear campaign" against her, made disparaging remarks about her to court personnel, and stated to other defense attorneys that he was going to get even with Castro Schmidt. At the Court's January 13, 1998, hearing, however, Castro Schmidt was unable to present any evidence to substantiate these claims regarding any comments made by Quiles.
The third incident involved a case before Chief Judge Cerezo.6 In that case Castro Schmidt represented an individual who had previously been a defendant in a criminal case that Castro Schmidt had prosecuted when she was an AUSA in 1991. She first made an appearance in that case on August 13, 1997. On August 19, 1997, the Government informed her that she had to withdraw because of a conflict of interest. On August 20, 1997, she requested a hearing on this matter. She alleged that the Government threatened her with prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 207 if she did not withdraw from the case. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Arenas for a hearing. On August 27, 1997, he issued a report and recommendation that Castro Schmidt be allowed to remain in the case unless her client decided that she should withdraw. In a separate order dated November 12, 1997, Chief Judge Cerezo adopted the report and recommendation and found the conduct of the U.S. Attorney's Office in the matter to be "troubling."
The fourth incident arose in a case before Judge Pérez-Gimenez in which Santiago-Rodríguez was added as a defendant in a superseding indictment returned on November 12, 1997.7 On November 21, 1997, Castro Schmidt made an appearance on behalf of Santiago-Rodríguez. At the time she was also representing another defendant in that case. The Government filed a motion on November 28, 1997, raising the issue of a possible conflict of interest in Castro Schmidt's representation of two defendants in the same case. A Foster hearing was held before Judge Pérez-Gimenez on the subject, and a waiver of conflict was accepted. At the Court's January 13, 1998 evidentiary hearing, Castro Schmidt acknowledged that a Foster hearing must be held when one attorney represents two defendants in the same case. See United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1972). She also acknowledged that it was proper for the Government to raise this issue.
Castro Schmidt alleges that these incidents are indicative of a campaign being mounted against her by the U.S. Attorney's Office. She further alleges that in the present case, the Government has, as part of its campaign against her, refused to return her telephone calls and now refuses to debrief Santiago-Rodríguez as provided for in the Agreement. In a letter dated November 21, 1997, the Government returned Santiago-Rodríguez' proffer agreement and informed her that it was no longer interested in debriefing her client. She claims that Government' Sixth Amendment right to the counsel of his choice is being threatened as a result of this vendetta. On December 17, 1997, Castro Schmidt first raised this issue in a sealed motion. She requested that a hearing be held on the matter as soon as possible. Following a pretrial conference held for this case on December 22, 1997, the Court met with Castro Schmidt and the Government attorneys to address this controversy.8 At the meeting, the Court ordered the parties to meet on December 29, 1997, to try to resolve their differences.
The two sides met on December 30, 1997. No debriefing took place, but the parties did discuss the possibility of a change of plea. Castro Schmidt testified that in the meeting, the Government agreed to adjustments that would result in a sentence of approximately 22 years if Santiago-Rodríguez were to change his plea. At the hearing held on January 13, 1998. Castro Schmidt acknowledged that if Santiago-Rodríguez went to trial he could receive a life sentence. At the December 30 meeting, however, the parties were unable to reach an agreement. On January 7, 1998, Castro Schmidt filed another sealed motion in which she again requested a hearing on this matter as soon as possible.9 In an order dated January 8, 1998, the Court scheduled a hearing for January 13, 1998.10
Santiago-Rodríguez seeks to enforce the Agreement. Contract law principles serve as a useful reference for construing pre-trial agreements between the Government and a criminal defendant. See United States v. Cobblah, 118 F.3d 549, 551 (7th Cir.1997) (proffer...
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