U.S. v. Santos, 93-2446

Citation20 F.3d 280
Decision Date26 April 1994
Docket NumberNo. 93-2446,93-2446
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alfredo SANTOS, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

William J. Lipscomb (argued), Office of the U.S. Atty., Milwaukee, WI, for U.S.

Gerald P. Boyle (argued), Wendy A. Patrickus, Peter Kovac, Milwaukee, WI, for Alfredo Santos.

Before ESCHBACH, RIPPLE, and MANION, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge.

Alfredo Santos was convicted by a jury of one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)-(ii), 371, and 2; and two counts of money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 2, and 1956(a)(3)(A). Santos asserts that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient as a matter of law to support his convictions, and that the district court erroneously denied his motion for a new trial under Fed.R.Crim.P. 33. We affirm.

I. Facts

Santos owned and operated Santos International Travel ("Santos Travel"), a travel agency in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, from 1981 to 1992. Santos also owned a Western Union money transfer franchise, which he operated as an agent of Western Union, Inc. Western Union distributed a document entitled "Bank Secrecy Act Compliance Manual" to each of its agents. Santos received a copy of this manual in 1989 and in 1991. In accordance with federal law, the manual required the filing of a Currency Transaction Report ("CTR") (also called an IRS Form 4789) for all money transfer transactions exceeding $10,000, including multiple currency transactions on the same day by, or on behalf of, the same person. 1 The manual also required the filing of a CTR when "the sending or receiving Agent suspects that a given transaction is part of a scheme to avoid filing a Form 4789 or is otherwise part of some illegal activity...."

Santos was charged in a superseding indictment with conspiracy to possess cocaine and marijuana with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. Secs. 841(a)(1) and 846, and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2; two counts of laundering of monetary instruments, 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 2, and 1956(a)(3)(A); possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C Sec. 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2; and conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)-(ii), 371, and 2. Santos was tried with codefendant Francisco Espino. Although Santos filed a motion for severance of defendants and counts following the original indictment, Santos did not file a motion in response to the superseding indictment.

Charles Purpero testified that he sold five to six kilograms of cocaine a month in Milwaukee from 1983 to August 1987 and used Santos Travel to wire the proceeds of his cocaine sales to his "runner" in Florida to pay for his supply. He "talked freely" with Santos about his cocaine transactions in 1985 and in 1986. Santos requested cocaine and marijuana from Purpero on several occasions. Santos permitted him to send money under five or six different names, and Santos explained that he had to send "under $10,000; otherwise, it would send up a red flag. And he said you send it under so many different names and break it down and they will never know." Purpero identified eight transactions in 1987 in which he sent money through Santos Travel under the name "Al Yanke."

Purpero also testified that, on March 25, 1992, at the instruction of agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"), he met Santos at Santos Travel. This meeting was recorded through a recording device worn by Purpero. A transcript of the conversation was introduced into evidence at trial, and the recording was played to the jury. During this meeting, Purpero told Santos that he had sent his "runner" to Florida to purchase ten kilograms of cocaine, and that he needed to wire $11,000 more to the "runner" as a result of the price being "jacked up" by the supplier. Santos stated, "[i]f it is ten, then you have to do the form." Santos permitted Purpero to send the $8,000 under the name "Al Yanke" to "Antonio Carbone," a name given Purpero by a DEA agent. DEA agent Jeffrey Boobar testified that the $8,000 was subsequently received by an agent of the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") in Florida.

Senovio Rodriguez testified that he and Genaro Rodriguez, a cousin with whom he was involved in cocaine trafficking, sent money to Mexico through Santos Travel in 1991. Santos told Genaro not to send more than $5,000 to Mexico because "the government was watching," and allowed Genaro to send money under several different names. In the summer of 1991, Santos delivered approximately $40,000 in cash to Genaro for the purchase of cocaine. Senovio also observed Genaro deliver a package to Santos which he believed to contain two to three kilograms of cocaine. In late 1991, Senovio delivered one-half kilogram of cocaine to Santos on two occasions, and delivered one kilogram of cocaine to Santos once.

Rosa Ibanez testified that she and her common-law husband sold cocaine in Milwaukee in 1991, and that her husband used Santos Travel to send proceeds of the cocaine sales to the source of their supply in California.

Johnny Robles testified that in the fall of 1990 he transferred a 1984 Corvette automobile to Espino for $6,000 and six pounds of marijuana. Espino told Robles four or five months later that he had placed title to the automobile in Santos' name because "[h]e couldn't show for it more or less what he paid for it or how he paid for it." Santos acknowledged at trial that he had title to the 1984 Corvette automobile.

Santos was convicted of conspiracy to commit money laundering and both counts of money laundering, and acquitted of all other charges. Following the trial, Santos filed a motion for judgment of acquittal under Fed.R.Crim.P. 29, and a motion for a new trial under Fed.R.Crim.P. 33. The district court denied both motions and sentenced Santos to three concurrent terms of 75 months' imprisonment, three concurrent terms of three years' supervised release, and a $12,500 fine.

II. Analysis
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial, this court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and ask whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original). The verdict of a jury must be sustained if there was substantial evidence to support it. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). "In conducting this review, '[w]e will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses,' " which is the function of the jury, not an appellate court. United States v. Campbell, 985 F.2d 341, 344 (7th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Van Wyhe, 965 F.2d 528, 531 (7th Cir.1992)). Santos thus has a "heavy burden" in requesting that his conviction be overturned because it was supported by insufficient evidence. Id.

1. Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering Conviction

A conspiracy is a confederation of two or more persons formed for the purpose of committing, by their joint efforts, a criminal act. To prove that a defendant was a member of a conspiracy, the Government must demonstrate a participatory link between the conspiracy and the defendant. To establish that participatory link, the Government must offer sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the defendant knew of the conspiracy and that he intended to join and associate himself with its criminal design and purpose. When reviewing conspiracy convictions, we must be certain that the Government presented substantial evidence that the defendant was a conspirator. The evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence so long as the total evidence permits a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Campbell, 985 F.2d at 344-45 (citations omitted). The grand jury charged that the conspiracy's object was to conduct financial transactions involving the proceeds of cocaine trafficking with knowledge that the proceeds were from an unlawful activity. The grand jury also charged that the transactions were designed to promote cocaine trafficking, "to conceal and disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, and control" of the proceeds of the cocaine trafficking, and to avoid the transaction reporting requirements of 31 U.S.C. Sec. 5313. 2 The overt acts consisted of knowingly and intentionally utilizing "a Western Union outlet at Santos International Travel to wire transfer drug-trafficking proceeds and funds intended to facilitate drug trafficking from drug traffickers in Milwaukee, Wisconsin to those in various source cities."

The prosecution presented overwhelming evidence to convict Santos of participation in the conspiracy. Purpero testified in detail that he sent the proceeds of his cocaine sales through Santos Travel under false names in order to purchase more cocaine, and that Santos knew of his extensive cocaine trafficking. Senovio Rodriguez testified that he and his cousin sent money to Mexico through Santos Travel in 1991. His testimony showed that Santos knew that both Senovio and Genaro Rodriguez were engaged in cocaine trafficking, since Santos had purchased cocaine from each of them. Rosa Ibanez also testified that her husband used Santos Travel to send proceeds of cocaine sales to the source of their supply in California in 1991. When viewed in the light most favorable to the government, this evidence was sufficient to establish Santos' participation in the charged conspiracy.

2. Money Laundering Convictions

Santos was convicted of one count of violating 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1956(a)(3)(A) 3 by conducting a wire transfer through Western Union of $8,000, purportedly from Al...

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