U.S. v. Scantleberry-Frank
| Decision Date | 28 July 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-2392,SCANTLEBERRY-FRANK,97-2392 |
| Citation | 158 F.3d 612 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Guillermo, a/k/a Gillermo Scantlebrury, a/k/a Guillermo Scantlebury, a/k/a Guillermo Scantleberry, Defendant, Appellant. . Heard |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Tina Schneider, by appointment of the Court, on brief, for appellant.
Antoinette E.M. Leoney, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.
Before TORRUELLA, Chief Judge, WELLFORD, * Senior Circuit Judge, and LYNCH, Circuit Judge.
Defendant-appellant, Guillermo Scantleberry-Frank ("Scantleberry"), appeals his conviction of illegal reentry into the United States after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. On appeal, Scantleberry argues: (1) that his rights under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, were violated; and (2) that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. For the following reasons, we affirm.
In November 1979, Scantleberry, a citizen of Panama, illegally entered the United States at New York City. On June 4, 1987, the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") found Scantleberry at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Concord where he was serving a state sentence on unrelated charges. On November 2, 1992, Scantleberry was deported to Panama after completing his sentence in the Massachusetts prison system. Before Scantleberry boarded the plane to Panama, an INS Deportation Officer fingerprinted his right thumb.
On January 7, 1997, INS Deportation Officers and Massachusetts State Police Officers found Scantleberry in Worcester, and placed him under arrest for illegally re-entering the country after deportation. After he was taken into custody, the INS took Scantleberry's fingerprints, for comparison with the right thumbprint taken prior to Scantleberry's deportation to Panama. Expert testimony submitted at trial determined that the thumbprints were identical.
On January 15, 1997, Scantleberry was indicted for illegal re-entry into the United States after deportation. On January 17, 1997, he appeared in court for his initial appearance and was arraigned on the indictment. On January 21, 1997, the magistrate judge issued an order of excludable time pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act commencing on January 17, 1997--the date of the defendant's initial appearance and arraignment--and concluding on February 21, 1997--the date by which the government was directed to file its responses to any pretrial discovery motions. Additionally, the magistrate judge issued a preliminary status report to the district court, stating that, assuming no further allowances for excludable time, this case had to be tried on or before May 2, 1997.
On April 3, 1997, the district court held a pretrial/status conference at which the possibility of a negotiated plea was discussed. In response to the court's attempt to set a trial date, the government stated that it was unavailable between April 13 and April 27, and on April 29. Defendant's counsel stated that she was unavailable between April 29 and May 12. Based on these representations, the district court set the trial date for May 12, 1997.
On May 8, 1997, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that his trial had not commenced within the time required under the Speedy Trial Act, and on May 19, 1997, the government filed a motion in opposition. On May 9, 1997, the defendant's counsel filed a motion for a continuance of the May 12 trial date on the ground that she was engaged in trial on another unrelated matter. On May 22, 1997, the district court issued written findings pursuant to a Speedy Trial Order, and denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment without a hearing. In its May 22, 1997 Speedy Trial Order the district court reset the trial for June 16, 1997, and excluded the period from April 3, 1997 until May 22, 1997. On June 16, 1997, the day Scantleberry's trial commenced, the defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of the motion to dismiss and
a second motion to dismiss the indictment under the Speedy Trial Act. The district court orally denied both motions, and entered a further order excluding the time from May 12, 1997, until June 16, 1997.
The Speedy Trial Act ("STA"), 18 U.S.C. § 3161, is designed "to protect a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy ... trial, and to serve the public interest in bringing prompt criminal proceedings." United States v. Santiago-Becerril, 130 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Saltzman, 984 F.2d 1087, 1090 (10th Cir.1993)). The STA provides that the government must bring a criminal defendant to trial no more than seventy days after the later of the filing date of the information or indictment, or the date on which the criminal defendant first appears before a judicial officer of a court in which the charge is pending. See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1)). In calculating the seventy days, the STA excludes certain time periods. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)-(9); see also Santiago-Becerril, 130 F.3d at 15. If a criminal indictment is not brought to trial within the seventy-day time limit imposed by § 3161(c)(1), as extended by operation of § 3161(h)(1)-(9), the penalty provisions of the STA mandate that "the information or indictment shall be dismissed on motion of the defendant." 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2).
Scantleberry argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment. He contends that the period between April 3 (the date of the pretrial conference) and May 8 (the date the motion to dismiss was filed) was improperly excluded from the speedy trial calculus. As a result, the delay in his being brought to trial added up to more than the number of statutorily allowable days. In response, the government asserts that, at worst, only sixty-five non-excludable days passed before Scantleberry was brought to trial.
We find no error in the district court's refusal to dismiss the superseding indictment. This Court reviews the disposition of a STA issue for clear error as to factual findings and de novo as to legal rulings. See Santiago-Becerril, 130 F.3d at 15; United States v. Rodriguez, 63 F.3d 1159, 1162 (1st Cir.1995). We conclude that fewer than seventy non-excludable days elapsed before Scantleberry was brought to trial.
A. April 3, 1997 to May 8, 1997
In holding that the period from April 3 to May 8 was excludable from the speedy trial calculus under § 3161(h)(1), the district court stated in its Speedy Trial Order that at the April 3 pretrial/status conference, "counsel for Scantleberry announced on several occasions that Scantleberry would plead guilty and that a trial would be unnecessary." As a result, the district court excluded the time period commencing from the date on which Scantleberry allegedly informed the court of his intention to plead guilty--April 3--until the date he indicated that he was not going to plead guilty--May 8--the date on which he filed the motion to dismiss.
Scantleberry argues that the district court erred in excluding that time period from the speedy trial calculus. He asserts that the transcript of the conference clearly indicates that his counsel's only intention was to discuss the government's offer of a plea bargain. Scantleberry cites the following exchange between the district court and his counsel:
We will notify the Court if we reach an agreement.
THE COURT: Yes. You can get a date for a Rule 11 Hearing if that's necessary.
April 3, 1997 Status Conference, Tr. 6-7. In Scantleberry's view, only the possibility, and not the certainty of a change of plea was presented to the district court.
The government argues that the time was properly excluded by the district court because Scantleberry's counsel created the expectation that there would be a change of plea and that additional time was necessary to complete negotiations. It cites the following [GOVERNMENT]: [T]he government has presented a proposed plea agreement to Miss Thompson [counsel for Scantleberry], and Miss Thompson, I'm sure, can speak on the point. She is in the process of trying to make arrangements with her client to go over the agreement, and we're hopeful that, as opposed to a trial date, that we'll actually be looking for a Rule 11 hearing date.
exchange between the district court and counsel:
April 3, 1997 Status Conference, Tr. 1-2.
Secondly, the government argues that the trial date was set for May 12, 1997, largely in order to accommodate defense counsel who also had other trial dates. It argues that at the April 3 status conference, the government told the court that it was unavailable between April 13 and April 29, while defense counsel stated that she was unavailable between April 29 and May 12. The transcript of that discussion reads as follows:
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