U.S. v. Serafini
| Decision Date | 07 April 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:CR-97-225.,3:CR-97-225. |
| Citation | 7 F.Supp.2d 529 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, v. Frank SERAFINI, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
Bruce Brandler, Asst. U.S. Atty., Harrisburg, PA, for U.S.
Daniel T. Brier, Sal J. Cognetti, Scranton, PA, for Defendants.
Defendant Frank Serafini has been indicted for allegedly making perjurious statements to the grand jury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623. This charge is the last count in a 140-count indictment that accuses four other co-defendants of conspiring to and violating, inter alia, the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431, et seq., by, inter alia, funneling corporate funds into campaign committees of various candidates for federal elected offices.1 The indictment accuses Mr. Serafini of falsely testifying to the grand jury that he was not reimbursed for a $1,000 contribution he made to the Dole for President Committee, and that, other than a $2,000 check payable to him from his nephew, Michael Serafini, he was unaware of any other check "connected to" the grand jury's investigation.
Mr. Serafini has filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. (Dkt. Entry 46.) As the government observes, the challenge to the indictment requires separate consideration of each of the five alleged perjurious statements charged in Count 140. Because Mr. Serafini has demonstrated that the grand jury questioning in regard to his knowledge of other checks related to the alleged contribution scheme was so ambiguous and unclear as to preclude a perjury conviction, his motion to dismiss the indictment as to his knowledge of other checks will be granted. In all other respects, his motion to dismiss the indictment will be denied as he has failed to demonstrate that the indictment is fatally defective under the applicable precedents.
Mr. Serafini has also filed a motion for a bill of particulars (Dkt. Entry 30), and a motion for misjoinder or, alternatively, for severance. (Dkt. Entry 48.) Because the indictment provides sufficient information concerning the alleged perjurious conduct, the motion for a bill of particulars will be denied. Because Mr. Serafini has demonstrated that severe prejudice will result if he is forced to defend himself in a joint trial with the other codefendants, the motion for severance will be granted, without deciding the misjoinder issue.
On October 7, 1997, a federal grand jury in this District returned a 140-count indictment against six defendants, Renato P. Mariani Michael L. Serafini, Leo R. Del Serra, Alan W. Stephens, Robert Giglio, and Frank Serafini. The first 134 counts essentially concern alleged illegal campaign contributions under the Federal Election Campaign Act. Counts 135 through 138 concern obstruction of justice charges leveled against defendants Michael L. Serafini and Leo R. Del Serra. Count 139 charges defendant Robert Giglio with having presented perjured testimony to the grand jury. This is the only count in which Giglio is named as a defendant. Count 140 levels the same charge against defendant Frank Serafini, who is a Pennsylvania State Representative, having been elected to represent the 114th Legislative District in Pennsylvania. Defendant Frank Serafini is named as a defendant only in Count 140.2
As the exact nature of the alleged perjurious statements are challenged by defendant Frank Serafini's motions, they must be produced verbatim. To facilitate reference, however, this Court will number the statements so that they need not be reproduced throughout this Memorandum.3 The alleged perjurious statements are as follows:
Statement 1.
Statement 2.
Statement 3.
(Indictment (Dkt. Entry 1) ¶ 4, at 57.)
Statement 4.
(Indictment (Dkt. Entry 1) ¶ 4, at 57.)
Statement 5.
Q: I am going to wrap this up. I want to make sure we are absolutely on the same page here, there is no misunderstanding. It is your testimony under oath, as you sit here today, that as far as you know, there is no connection between the check that you wrote to Dole for President dated April 27 of '95 for $1000, check 3781, and the check that you received from the Michael Serafini-Melinda Marcotte account dated April 25th of '95 for $2,000, it is your testimony that there is no connection between these two items?
A. In my mind I can honestly say that there is no connection between those two checks, the thousand and the two thousand. In my, I mean in my mind I know I contributed to Bob Dole because I wanted to contribute to him without reimbursement. The $2,000, I truly believe I cashed that check and spent it to, for another reason, I am assuming it was when I was fixing his vehicle.
Q. Are you drawing any distinctions when you answer that question similar to the distinctions you drew when you were interviewed by Frank Schultz [sic] regarding whether or not people were hallucinating, or were a hundred percent incorrect that you were receiving a per ton fee from Empire Landfill, are you drawing a similar kind of fine line distinction here?
A. Let me say this. When I am talking to Frank Schultz [sic] I am not under oath. Frank Schultz [sic] questions me and I give him an answer. There is no fine line distinctions here as there was when, as there is when I talk to Frank Schultz [sic]. Frank Schultz [sic] is an entirely different person, he is not a U.S. Attorney.
(Indictment (Dkt. Entry 1) ¶ 4, at 57.)
The indictment alleges that the above underscored testimony was false in that:
(1) Defendant Michael L. Serafini issued a check dated April 25, 1995 payable to Frank Serafini in the amount of $2,000 which was subsequently negotiated on May 1, 1995 and which reimbursed Frank Serafini for his $1,000 contribution to the Dole Committee and also reimbursed him for the expense of reimbursing Thomas Harrison, his former legislative aide, $1,000 for a contribution Thomas Harrison made to the Dole Committee in the amount of $1,000 which was solicited by Frank Serafini and reimbursed by Frank Serafini; and (2) there were at least two other checks connected to this transaction other than what was displayed during the grand jury proceeding, i.e., a $1,000 check dated April 27, 1995 drawn on the account of Thomas G. or Maureen J. Harrison payable to the Dole Committee which was solicited and received by Frank Serafini, and a $1,000 check dated April 27, 1995 drawn on the account of Frank A. Serafini and Louis Serafini payable to cash which was used to reimburse Thomas Harrison for his Dole Committee contribution.
Defendant Frank Serafini argues that the questioning of him in the grand jury was fundamentally unfair in that in was ambiguous, unclear and imprecise. It is well-established that to sustain a perjury charge, a prosecutor must present careful questioning in order to demonstrate that the defendant was aware of the meaning of the question and the falsity of his answer. As noted by the United States Supreme Court:
If a witness evades, it is the lawyer's responsibility to recognize the evasion and to bring the witness back to the mark, to flush out the whole truth with the tools of adversary examination.... The burden is on the questioner to pin the witness down to the specific object of the questioner's inquiry.
Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 358-60, 93 S.Ct. 595, 34 L.Ed.2d 568 (1973). In this regard, the meaning of the prosecutor's...
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