U.S. v. Shay
| Decision Date | 10 October 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-2141,93-2141 |
| Citation | 57 F.3d 126 |
| Parties | 42 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 341 UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Thomas A. SHAY, Defendant-Appellant. . Heard |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Kathy B. Weinman, Boston, MA, by Appointment of the Court, with whom Amy Baron-Evans, and Dwyer & Collora were on brief for appellant.
Frank A. Libby, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Donald K. Stern, U.S. Atty., and Paul V. Kelly, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, DC, were on brief for appellee.
Before TORRUELLA, Chief Judge, BOUDIN, Circuit Judge, and BARBADORO, * District Judge.
Thomas Shay Jr. was found guilty of conspiracy and aiding and abetting an attempt to blow up his father's car. In proving its case, the government relied in part on incriminating statements that Shay Jr. made to the police, the media, and fellow inmates. The defendant responded by arguing that his statements were unreliable and should be disregarded. In this opinion, we determine whether the court properly prevented the defendant from supporting his argument by calling a psychiatrist to testify that he suffered from a mental disorder that causes its victims to make false and grandiose statements without regard to the consequences. We also address various other issues that the defendant raises on appeal.
Two officers from the Boston Police Department Bomb Squad were sent to the home of Shay Jr.'s father, Thomas Shay Sr., after Shay Sr. informed the police that he had discovered a suspicious black box in his driveway that had become dislodged from the undercarriage of his car. While the officers were examining the box, it exploded, killing Officer Jeremiah Hurley and seriously wounding Officer Frances Foley. Agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, working with the Boston Police Department, later determined that the box contained two to three sticks of repackaged dynamite, a remote control device and other components necessary to detonate the bomb from a remote location.
The government's trial theory was that Shay Jr. conspired with a friend, Alfred Trenkler, to kill Shay Jr.'s father by blowing up his car. In proving its case, the government relied primarily on several incriminating statements that Shay Jr. made after the bombing. We describe his most damaging statements to illustrate their importance to the government's case.
1. Shortly after the bombing, Shay Jr. told a police officer, "he was sorry about it and wished he could turn back the hands of time and make it not have happened." The government argued at trial that this statement was evidence of Shay Jr.'s guilty conscience.
2. Shay Jr. told reporters covering the bombing that he had been questioned about whether his father was capable of constructing a remote control device. Because the police claimed that they did not question Shay Jr. about the bomb's remote control detonator until after Shay Jr. made this statement, the government argued that the statement demonstrated that Shay Jr. had special knowledge about the bomb that only a co-conspirator would possess.
3. Shay Jr. gave an interview to a television reporter in which he made several statements concerning the bombing. Although he claimed in the interview that he was only guilty of knowing who had built the bomb after-the-fact, he admitted that Trenkler had told him before the bombing that he was planning a "surprise" for Shay Jr., which turned out to be the bomb. Shay Jr. also acknowledged during the interview that he had purchased a toggle switch and an "AA" battery holder that Trenkler had used in building the bomb.
4. Shay Jr. allegedly told a fellow cellmate, According to the cellmate, Shay Jr. also told him that he and Trenkler had built the bomb together and attached it to the undercarriage of his father's car.
The government supported Shay Jr.'s incriminating statements about the bombing with other evidence that: (a) Trenkler and Shay Jr. were friends who were in sporadic contact from 1988 through the fall of 1991; (b) Trenkler had the skill to construct the bomb; (c) gray duct tape consistent with that in the bomb was discovered in a search of Trenkler's parents' residence; (d) ten days prior to the explosion, someone purchased a toggle switch and "AA" battery holder of the same type used in the bomb from a Radio Shack store located directly across the street from where Trenkler was working; (e) Radio Shack's records listed the purchaser's name as "SAHY," and his identification number corresponding to the last four digits of his telephone number as "3780," which was similar to the last four digits of Shay Sr.'s home telephone number, "7380"; (f) Shay Jr. was strongly motivated to kill his father because they had a difficult "love-hate" relationship, and Shay Jr. believed that he would collect a substantial inheritance if his father were killed; and (g) Shay Jr. demonstrated consciousness of guilt by fleeing the jurisdiction after he was released on bail following his arrest on an unrelated matter.
Shay Jr. responded to the government's case by arguing that his statements about the bombing were unreliable, that the rest of the evidence failed to establish his guilt, and that other evidence suggested that Shay Sr. may have built the bomb. His attack on the statements comprised three parts. First, in an effort to demonstrate that he made the statements in order to fulfill a compulsive need for attention even though they were false, the defense elicited testimony from several witnesses that Shay Jr. regularly told the same grandiose stories, often changing significant details each time he told them; repeatedly sought out the media to talk about the bombing even though it was not in his interest to do so; made comments concerning the police investigation which were not confirmed by the police; and expressed abnormal interest in the media attention he received as a result of his statements.
Second, the defense attempted to show that Shay Jr.'s many statements about the bombing were conflicting and demonstrably wrong about important details that would have been known by a coconspirator. In other words, as defense counsel stated in her summation, To illustrate this point, the defense pointed to Shay Jr.'s repeated and incorrect statements that the bomb contained C-4 explosive (or plastique) and batteries purchased from Radio Shack.
Finally, the defense attempted to call Dr. Robert Phillips, a psychiatrist, who was prepared to testify that Shay Jr. suffered from a recognized mental disorder known as "pseudologia fantastica." 1 According to Dr. Phillips, this condition caused Shay Jr. to spin out webs of lies which are ordinarily self-aggrandizing and serve to place him in the center of attention. Put otherwise, coping for Mr. Shay, given his personality structure, entails seeking attention, tailoring his words to the audience, creating fantasies in which he is the central figure, and through which he attempts to enlist his audience.... Mr. Shay's stories are an attempt to draw others into his fantasy world in order to meet the interpersonal needs which were not met during his childhood.
The district court prevented the defense from offering this testimony, concluding that the evidence should be excluded pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 702 primarily because the jury was capable of determining the reliability of Shay Jr.'s statements without the testimony. 2
In preventing Dr. Phillips from testifying, the district court relied on its discretionary authority pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 702 to exclude expert testimony that will not "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Shay Jr. contends that the decision was based upon an erroneous interpretation of Rule 702. 3 The government argues that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence and alternatively asserts that the court was obligated to exclude the evidence as a matter of law because it concerned a credibility question that was the jury's exclusive province to resolve. We first consider the government's argument for categorical exclusion.
In arguing that expert testimony bearing directly on credibility questions is never admissible, the government relies on selected quotations from decisions in other circuits. See, e.g., Bachman v. Leapley, 953 F.2d 440, 441 (8th Cir.1992) (); United States v. Benson, 941 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir.1991) (), modified, 957 F.2d 301 (7th Cir.1992); United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir.1973) (), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959, 94 S.Ct. 1976, 40 L.Ed.2d 310 (1974). We think the government makes too much of these decisions. Rather than requiring the wholesale exclusion of expert testimony concerning credibility issues, these cases stand for the more limited proposition that an expert's opinion that another witness is lying or telling the truth is ordinarily inadmissible pursuant to Rule 702 because the opinion exceeds the scope of the expert's specialized knowledge and therefore merely informs the jury that it should reach a particular conclusion. See, e.g....
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