U.S. v. Sherman, 97-7073

Citation150 F.3d 306
Decision Date30 July 1998
Docket NumberNo. 97-7073,97-7073
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellant v. Robert J. SHERMAN
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)

Theodore B. Smith, III (Argued), Office of United States Attorney, Harrisburg, PA, for Appellant.

Benjamin S. Waxman (Argued), Robbins, Tunkey, Ross, Amsel, Raben & Waxman, Miami, FL, for Appellee

Before: ALITO, LEWIS * & McKEE, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

McKEE, Circuit Judge.

The government appeals the order of the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissing a fivecount indictment against Robert Sherman in which he was charged with committing perjury before a federal grand jury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1621. The district court held that the prosecution improperly charged Sherman under that general perjury statute rather than the more specific false declarations statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1623, thereby denying him the ability to assert the recantation defense available under 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d). For the reasons that follow, we will reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Statement of Facts

On October 23, 1996, Robert J. Sherman was indicted on five counts of perjury under 18 U.S.C. § 1621. The indictment stemmed from Sherman's testimony in the medical malpractice trial of Samuel and Gail Gassert v. Latif Awad, M.D. and Geisinger Medical Center. Shermana longtime obstetrician/gynecologist--had testified as the plaintiffs' medical expert in that trial. When cross examined about his qualifications as an expert, Sherman had testified that he was licensed to practice medicine in the District of Columbia, Virginia and Massachusetts and that none of his licenses had ever been revoked, suspended or restricted. App. at 63. He further testified that he had never been subject to any disciplinary proceedings by any hospital or medical society. App. at 62. He did, however, acknowledge that he had once been named in a medical malpractice case fifteen years earlier, involving a problem with a "D & C", 1 but he described it as "routine." App. at 63. When Sherman provided that testimony, he knew that all of his licenses had been revoked, and defense counsel ultimately elicited this admission from Sherman. Because that testimony is at the heart of this appeal, we will quote the relevant exchange at length:

Q: At the present time you are licensed to practice medicine in Virginia.

A: Yes.

Q: Over the course of your practice, which has been about how many years now?

A: Thirty years.

Q: Okay, over the course of your practice, how many states have you ever been licensed to practice in?

A: I was licensed in Massachusetts, Virginia, Maryland, and D.C.

Q: And you've continued to keep your license current in Virginia.

A: That's all.

Q: Do you remember at the time of your retirement in 1985, do you remember what states you had licenses in?

A: I don't have that handy at the moment.

Q: Well, were you licensed to practice medicine in Virginia in 1985?

A: Yes. yes.

Q: How about Massachusetts?

A: I moved away from Massachusetts so I didn't bother with that.

....

Q: Did you ever have your privileges at any of those hospitals either revoked, suspended or restricted?

A: No.

....

Q: Did you ever have any of your hospital privileges in Boston or in the Boston area revoked, suspended or restricted?

A: No.

Q: Have you ever been subject to any disciplinary proceedings by any--

(Objection and objection overruled)

Q: Dr. Sherman, have you ever been subject to any disciplinary proceedings by a hospital or medical society?

A: No.

Q: Have you ever been named as a defendant in a medical malpractice suit?

(Objection and objection overruled)

A: I had a malpractice case about 15 years ago myself, yes.

Q: Could you tell us what that was about?

A: It was settled somehow or other, but there was a routine case.

Q: Was that an OB/GYN case?

A: Yes.

Q: And it was routine?

A: Well, there was a D & C problem.

Q: You mentioned that over the course of your practice you were licensed in four states that you told us about. Have any of those licenses ever been revoked, suspended or restricted in any fashion?

A: No, I let them--I let them go because I had no intention of going back to active OB.

Q: So you let your license in Massachusetts lapse?

A: Yes.

Q: And you let your license in Maryland lapse?

A: Yes.

Q: And you let your license in the District of Columbia lapse?

A: Yes.

....

Q: Go back to your licensures, Doctor. Isn't it true that you had your license to practice medicine in the District of Columbia revoked in 1977?

A: Yes, it was. Yes, but--

Q: Isn't it true that you had your license to practice medicine in Massachusetts revoked in 1983?

(Objection and objection overruled).

A: Yes.

Q: Isn't it true that you had your license to practice medicine in Virginia revoked in 1979?

A: But it was reinstated.

Q: The question to you, Doctor, is isn't' it true that your license to practice medicine in Virginia was revoked in 1979?

A: Yes.

Q: And it was not until 197--1993 that your license was reinstated in Virginia.

A: Yes.

Q: And wasn't you license in Virginia reinstated on a probationary status?

A: Yes.

....

Q: And according to the order of reinstatement you were not to engage in the practice of medicine until such time as you successfully passed the special purpose examination.

A: Yes.

Q: Did you pass that examination?

A: I have to take it on March 17th.

Q: Do you have plans to take it?

A: Yes.

Q: But you have not yet complied with that particular requirement.

A: Not yet.

Q: I see. If you have not complied with a particular term or condition of reinstatement, has your license in Virginia in fact been reinstated?

A: Has it been reinstated?

Q: Has it been actually reinstated?

A: It has been reinstated subject to that, yes.

Q: Could you go into the state of Virginia today and treat patients?

A: I don't treat any patients at the--

Q: If you wanted to, could you, with your restricted license, go into Virginia today and treat patients?

A: No.

Q: After your license was revoked in Massachusetts in March of 1983, you requested in 1992 reinstatement, did you not?

A: Yes.

Q: That was denied, wasn't it?

A: Yes.

Q: Didn't you have a license to practice in Maine?

A: Yes.

Q: And you made a license renewal to Maine in 1983 which was denied, didn't you?

A: At that time. It is under advisement for renewal at this time.

....

Q: Doctor you told us that 15 years ago you were subject--you were a defendant in a routine medical malpractice suit, weren't you?

A: Yes.

Q: You know where I'm going, don't you, Doctor?

A: Yes.

Q: Do you remember a patient by the name of Rita McDowell?

A: Yes.

Q: Rita McDowell came into your clinic for an abortion, didn't she?

A: Yes.

Q: She was 16 years of age.

A: Yes.

Q: You performed an incomplete abortion on her.

A: I did not.

Q: Doctor, as a result of the procedure that you performed on Rita McDowell, she died didn't she?

A: Absolutely not.

Q: Rita McDowell did not die?

A: She died at D.C. General Hospital as a result of a CVP line which perforated the lungs, and she died of cardiac arrest on that score.

Q: Doctor, the reason that your license was revoked in D.C. in 1977 was because of the Rita McDowell case, wasn't it?

A: Yes.

Q: And the reason that your license was revoked in D.C. was because you, as a practice, were performing incomplete septic abortions on your patients.

A: That is your opinion but not mine.

App. at 58-59, 60-67, 69-70.

Sherman was subsequently indicted for perjury under 18 U.S.C. § 1621. Count I of the indictment charged him with testifying that none of his licenses to practice medicine had ever been revoked, suspended or restricted. See app. at 8-9. Count II charged him with testifying that he had allowed his license to practice medicine in Massachusetts to lapse, when in fact it had been revoked. See app. at 10. Count III charged him with testifying that he had only allowed his license to practice medicine in the District of Columbia to lapse. It had also been revoked. See app. at 11. Count IV charged him with testifying that he had never been subject to disciplinary proceedings by a medical society, when in fact he had been subjected to such proceedings in the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the Commonwealth of Virginia. See app. at 12. Count V charged him with testifying that 15 years prior he had been named in a routine medical malpractice case involving a D & C, which was ultimately settled, "when in fact ... the Board of Medicine of the District of Columbia had found that the defendant performed an incomplete abortion on a 16-year old girl in order to increase his fees by making later surgical procedures necessary, resulting in the patient's death ... [and] the revocation of defendant's license to practice medicine ... and ... criminal prosecution." App. at 13-14.

Sherman moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the government had denied him the due process of law by depriving him of the defense of recantation that is available under 18 U.S.C. § 1623, but not under 18 U.S.C. § 1621. See 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d). The district court agreed and dismissed the indictment. The court ruled that the government had unfairly denied Sherman a defense to the criminal charges, and this appeal followed. Our standard of review is plenary. King v. Ahrens, 16 F.3d 265, 270 (8th Cir.1994). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our standard of review is plenary.

II. Discussion
A. The Distinctions Between the Two Statutes

The sole issue before us is whether the district court erred in dismissing the five-count indictment against Sherman. The court held that the government lacked the discretion to charge Sherman under the general perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1621, rather than the false swearing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1623, as the latter statute more specifically applied to his conduct, and not prosecuting under that statute improperly deprived Sherman...

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