U.S. v. Shiel, 79-5140
| Decision Date | 14 December 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 79-5140,79-5140 |
| Citation | 611 F.2d 526 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. John T. SHIEL, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Sebastian K. D. Graber, Stetler & Townsend, Alexandria, Va., on brief, for appellant.
Frances M. Green, Sp. Asst. U. S. Atty., Alexandria, Va. (Justin W. Williams, U. S. Atty., Alexandria, Va., on brief), for appellee.
Before WINTER, RUSSELL and MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judges.
Appellant was a participant in a September 1, 1978 demonstration at the Pentagon opposing nuclear arms. The demonstrators gathered in the middle of "Concourse 10", an area similar to a public shopping mall. The Concourse is approximately forty feet wide and open to the public during daytime hours. It contains a bank, a post office and retail stores.
Without interference the demonstrators chanted and displayed placards, E. g., "Every bomb a theft from those who hunger." Shortly after noon, appellant and eight others collapsed upon the floor of the Concourse to symbolize the effect of a neutron bomb detonation. By doing so, they obstructed passage. A crowd of onlookers and passersby assembled as the nine "victims" lay prostrate in the Concourse. The captain of a contingent of federal protective service officers which had observed the demonstration silently from nearby announced over a bullhorn that the persons lying on the floor must get up because they were blocking pedestrian traffic.
Upon orders from the captain one officer approached each demonstrator and stated that arrests would be made in two minutes unless the demonstrator removed himself from the floor. Upon appellant's refusal to get up, he was arrested and issued a citation for violating a General Services Administration regulation, 43 Fed.Reg. 29,001, 29,002 (1978) (). 1 That regulation provides:
Persons in and on property shall at all times comply with official signs of a prohibitory, regulatory, or directory nature and with the direction of Federal protective officers and other authorized individuals.
Appellant was found guilty after his trial before a United States Magistrate, who imposed a fifty dollar fine, suspended the same and placed appellant on unsupervised probation for one year. The appeal is from the district court's affirmance of the Magistrate's judgment of conviction. We affirm.
Appellant does not earnestly contend that the regulation for violation of which he stands convicted is unconstitutional as applied to his actual course of conduct. He concedes that his behavior in blocking the Concourse might properly be prohibited and suggests that prosecution would have been proper under 41 C.F.R. § 101-20.311(b) (1978), which prohibits the "blocking of entrances, driveways, walks, loading platforms or fire hydrants." However, appellant argues that the regulation mandating compliance with an officer's order is deficient on its face as overbroad and vague under established First Amendment principles. On that predicate, appellant argues that the prosecution should have been dismissed.
We, however, are not called upon to decide whether the regulation fails to pass muster under the First Amendment in other imaginable sets of circumstances not actually presented by this case. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610-15, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) (); Cf. United States v. Glenn, 562 F.2d 324, 325 (4th Cir. 1977). To the extent appellant's conduct, prior to his simulated death in the Concourse, enjoyed First Amendment protection as "symbolic speech", that protection dissipated when appellant went beyond expression, and refused to obey a reasonable and legitimate order to cease blocking the passage of others. Appellant's unjustified refusal was not protected by the First Amendment, 2 and he lacks standing to raise First Amendment facial invalidity contentions not concerned with invocation of the regulation with respect to his own behavior. None of the exceptional circumstances traditionally invoked to justify relaxed standing requirements in First Amendment adjudications and described in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, Supra, 413 U.S. at 611-13, 93 S.Ct. 2908, especially the interference with "pure speech", pertain here. Compare Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 362-63 (4th Cir. 1979) (En banc ).
Moreover, if we were called upon to decide the question urged upon us by appellant, the conclusion is...
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State v. Hookstra, A-00-791.
...forbidding failure to obey directives of federal protective officers was not unconstitutionally overbroad); United States v. Shiel, 611 F.2d 526 (4th Cir.1979) (holding that regulation requiring persons on government property to comply with posted signs and orders of federal officers, when ......
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State v. Hookstra
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Townsend v. Carmel
...merit because the Plaintiffs in this case were constitutionally exercising their first amendment rights. Notwithstanding U. S. v. Sheil, 611 F.2d 526 (4th Cir. 1979), it is abundantly clear that the regulation in question is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. While Defendants correctly......
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