U.S. v. Silva, No. 05-13568 Non-Argument Calendar.

CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)
Writing for the CourtPer Curiam
Citation443 F.3d 795
Docket NumberNo. 05-13568 Non-Argument Calendar.
Decision Date22 March 2006
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jonathan SILVA, Defendant-Appellant.
443 F.3d 795
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Jonathan SILVA, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 05-13568 Non-Argument Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
March 22, 2006.

Page 796

Kendal D. Silas and Stephanie Kearns, Fed. Pub. Defenders, Fed. Pub. Program, Inc., Atlanta, GA, for Silva.

J. Gabriel Banks, Amy Levin Weil, U.S. Atty., Atlanta, GA, for U.S.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before ANDERSON, CARNES and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:


Jonathan Silva appeals the 24-month sentence imposed after revocation of his probation. Silva's probation was originally imposed after he admitted to violating the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042, for committing aggravated sexual abuse, 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a)(1), on national park grounds. At that time, Silva was seventeen years old. Almost two years later, Silva's probation officer filed an order to show cause why Silva's probation should not be revoked. After a hearing, the court modified Silva's probation to include taking a cognitive skills class and wearing an electronic monitor for 180 days. However, six months later, in March 2005, the court modified Silva's probation again after he failed to attend the class. Finally, in June 2005, the district court held a revocation hearing after the probation officer alleged that Silva did not wear the electronic monitoring device, used illegal drugs, failed to report for drug testing, and failed to submit a truthful monthly supervision report. Silva was nineteen at the time of the hearing. After Silva admitted to the violations at the hearing, the court sentenced him to 24 months' imprisonment, although Chapter 7 recommended a sentence within the three to nine month range.

I.

Silva contends that the district court improperly considered his age at the time of re-sentencing, rather than his age at the time he originally received probation, when it imposed a sentence which extended beyond his 21st birthday, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 5037. We review the interpretation of a statute, a question of law, de novo. United States v. Pistone, 177 F.3d 957, 958 (11th Cir.1999).

Title 18 of the United States Code, § 5037 delineates the appropriate terms of probation or official detention for juveniles adjudged delinquent. 18 U.S.C. § 5037(b),

Page 797

(c).1 The length of probation or detention depends on the age of the juvenile. For instance, a term of official detention for a juvenile delinquent "who is less than eighteen years old" may not extend beyond the lesser of "the date when the juvenile becomes twenty-one years old" or the relevant maximum term of imprisonment that would apply "if the juvenile had been tried and convicted as an adult." § 5037(c)(1). In the case of a juvenile "who is between eighteen and twenty-one years old," and if convicted as an adult would be convicted of a Class A, B or C felony, the term of detention in the pre-amended version of § 5037 may not extend beyond five years. § 5037(c)(2)(A).2

We have not previously addressed the issue of whether § 5037(c) refers to the defendant's age at the time of the original sentencing or at the time of the revocation hearing. This becomes important in cases such as this one, where the defendant was under eighteen at the time of the offense but over eighteen at the time of the revocation.

The rules of statutory construction guide us in deciding this issue. "The first rule in statutory construction is to

Page 798

determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute. If the statute's meaning is plain and unambiguous, there is no need for further inquiry." United States v. Fisher, 289 F.3d 1329, 1337-38 (11th Cir.2002) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Further, we will not "look at one word or term in isolation, but instead [will] look to the entire statutory context." United States v. DBB, Inc., 180 F.3d 1277, 1281 (11th Cir.1999). Finally, we should not interpret a statute in a manner inconsistent with the plain language of the statute, unless doing so would lead to an absurd result. United States v. Weaver, 275 F.3d 1320, 1331 (11th Cir. 2001).

Two Circuits have already addressed this issue. The Eighth Circuit relied upon the plain meaning of this statute and held that it applies to the defendant's age at the time of the revocation hearing and not at the time of the imposition of the original sentence. See United States v. K.R.A., 337 F.3d 970 (8th Cir. 2003).

The statute plainly states, using the present tense, that the relevant maximum term for official detention shall be based upon a juvenile "who is less than eighteen" or "who is between eighteen and twenty-one." [§ 5037(c) (emphasis added)] This same present tense language is used in determining the length of a term of probation. [§ 5037(b)] The statute does not refer to the age the juvenile was when she committed the original offense or when she was originally placed on probation.

Id....

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128 practice notes
  • Rosell v. VMSB LLC, 20-20857-Civ-WILLIAMS/TORRES
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Southern District of Florida
    • June 22, 2021
    ...the particular dispute. If the statute's meaning is plain and unambiguous, there is no need for further inquiry.” United States v. Silva, 443 F.3d 795, 797-98 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). That applies here because, when reading the regulatory text, the title could not be ......
  • McGuire v. Marshall, CASE NO. 2:19-CV-174-WKW
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Middle District of Alabama
    • January 7, 2021
    ...in a manner inconsistent with the plain language of the statute, unless doing so would lead to an absurd result." United States v. Silva , 443 F.3d 795, 798 (11th Cir. 2006). The speculative nature of Defendants’ argument is cause for hesitation because a literal interpretation of the statu......
  • In re Hill, No. 13–10702.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • April 22, 2013
    ...and unambiguous, there is no need for further inquiry.’ ” In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 823 (11th Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Silva, 443 F.3d 795, 797–98 (11th Cir.2006)). “Put differently, we ‘must presume that Congress said what it meant and meant what it said.’ ” Davis, 565 F.3d at ......
  • In re Davis, No. 08-16009.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • April 16, 2009
    ...the particular dispute. If the statute's meaning is plain and unambiguous, there is no need for further inquiry." United States v. Silva, 443 F.3d 795, 797-98 (11th Cir.2006) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Fisher, 289 F.3d 1329, 1337-38 (11th Cir.2002)). We "assume that......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
128 cases
  • Rosell v. VMSB LLC, 20-20857-Civ-WILLIAMS/TORRES
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Southern District of Florida
    • June 22, 2021
    ...the particular dispute. If the statute's meaning is plain and unambiguous, there is no need for further inquiry.” United States v. Silva, 443 F.3d 795, 797-98 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). That applies here because, when reading the regulatory text, the title could not be ......
  • McGuire v. Marshall, CASE NO. 2:19-CV-174-WKW
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Middle District of Alabama
    • January 7, 2021
    ...in a manner inconsistent with the plain language of the statute, unless doing so would lead to an absurd result." United States v. Silva , 443 F.3d 795, 798 (11th Cir. 2006). The speculative nature of Defendants’ argument is cause for hesitation because a literal interpretation of the statu......
  • In re Hill, No. 13–10702.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • April 22, 2013
    ...and unambiguous, there is no need for further inquiry.’ ” In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 823 (11th Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Silva, 443 F.3d 795, 797–98 (11th Cir.2006)). “Put differently, we ‘must presume that Congress said what it meant and meant what it said.’ ” Davis, 565 F.3d at ......
  • In re Davis, No. 08-16009.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • April 16, 2009
    ...the particular dispute. If the statute's meaning is plain and unambiguous, there is no need for further inquiry." United States v. Silva, 443 F.3d 795, 797-98 (11th Cir.2006) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Fisher, 289 F.3d 1329, 1337-38 (11th Cir.2002)). We "assume that......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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