U.S. v. Singletary

Decision Date27 July 2001
Docket NumberNo. 00-3850,00-3850
Citation268 F.3d 196
Parties(3rd Cir. 2001) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. JAMAAL ADEEM ATIF SINGLETARY, A/K/A JAMAL SINGLETARY A/K/A CURTIS SINGLETARY JAMAAL SINGLETARY, APPELLANT Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA District Court Judge: The Honorable Charles R. Weiner (D.C. Criminal No. 00-CR-00199)

Maureen Kearney Rowley, Chief Federal Defender, David L. McColgin, Assistant Federal Defender, Federal Court Division, Defender Association of Philadelphia, Suite 540 West - The Curtis Center Independence Square West Philadelphia, PA 19106-2414, Attorneys For Appellant

Michael L. Levy, United States Attorney, Robert A. Zauzmer, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief of Appeals, Lesley S. Bonney, Assistant United States Attorney, 615 Chestnut Street, Suite 1250 Philadelphia, PA 19106, Attorneys For Appellee

Before: Roth, Barry, and Fuentes, Circuit Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT

Fuentes, Circuit Judge.

Following a jury trial, defendant, Jamaal Singletary, was convicted on one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 922(g)(1). On appeal, Singletary contends that the felon-in-possession statute is unconstitutional because the conduct it proscribes -- the intrastate possession of a firearm -- does not have a substantial effect upon interstate commerce, and thus does not constitute a valid exercise of Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause. Specifically, Singletary contends that, although in United States v. Gateward, 84 F.3d 670 (3d Cir. 1996), we upheld the constitutionality of S 922(g)(1) as a proper exercise of Congress' regulatory power under the Commerce Clause, that holding must be reconsidered in the wake of the Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), and Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000). Because we conclude that those decisions do not undermine our prior construction of the felon-in-possession statute, we will reaffirm our holding in Gateward and affirm the judgment of the District Court.

I.

The relevant facts are not in dispute. During the evening of December 8, 1999, Police Officer Thomas Liciardello was watching a suspected stolen car in the area of Cobbs Creek Parkway and Larchwood Avenue in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. At about 7:30 p.m., while watching the car, Liciardello saw a blue pick-up truck drive across the sidewalk and into the park located there. He saw Singletary, the driver, get out of the truck, fire two shots into the air with a silver handgun, and then jump back into the truck and drive on through the park. Liciardello radioed information about the truck, and Officers John Spence and Maurice Haughton began chasing the truck as it left the park. During the chase, Spence saw a gun tossed out the passenger side window. The officers stopped the truck a short distance later, and Officer Liciardello located the gun on the street.

On April 18, 2000, a grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania indicted Singletary on one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 922(g)(1). Specifically, he was charged with having "knowingly possessed in and affecting foreign and interstate commerce, a.38 caliber Taurus International revolver... loaded with four live rounds and two spent rounds of ammunition." On July 5, 2000, the District Court denied a defense motion to dismiss the indictment, rejecting Singletary's argument that the statute is constitutionally infirm both facially and as applied because it does not require that the act of gun possession have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

At trial, the Government established through the undisputed expert testimony of Special Agent James J. Uvena of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms that the gun in question was manufactured in Brazil, imported into the United States through Atlanta, Georgia, and eventually sent to a firearms dealer in Texas in 1973. No further documentation on the gun was available, and thus, the Government presented no evidence regarding when the gun had come into Pennsylvania. Additionally, the Government presented no evidence concerning any effect the gun had on interstate commerce. As for the other elements of the crime, Singletary stipulated that he had a prior felony conviction, and the issue of possession, while hotly contested at trial, is not germane to the issues before us on appeal.

At the close of the Government's case, defense counsel submitted a proposed jury instruction that would have required the Government to prove "[t]hat the possession of the firearm substantially [a]ffected interstate commerce." An additional proposed instruction would have given the jury the following definition of the phrase "in or affecting commerce":

This means that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, the possession of the firearm in question, had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. In order to find that the possession of this weapon had the requisite impact on interstate commerce, you must find that the possession of the gun in question had a substantial relation to interstate commerce in and of itself.

The court denied the requested instructions and also barred defense counsel from arguing to the jury that the Government had failed to prove that the possession of the firearm had a substantial relation to interstate commerce. For its charge, the court instructed the jury that:

[t]o prove that the firearm was possessed in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, the Government must prove that at some time prior to defendant's possession of the firearm, the firearm had traveled in interstate or foreign commerce... that at any time prior to the date charged in the Indictment, the firearm crossed a state line.

The jury returned a guilty verdict. Defense counsel once again moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the court denied on November 6, 2000. The court subsequently sentenced Singletary to 27 months' imprisonment, three years' supervised release, a special assessment of $100, and a fine of $200.

II.

On appeal, Singletary contends that the Supreme Court's recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence renders 18 U.S.C. S 922(g)(1), the felon-in-possession statute, unconstitutional, and therefore, his conviction invalid. In the alternative, he argues for a reversal because of insufficient evidence on the interstate commerce element, or for a new trial because of the District Court's erroneous jury instructions on that same element.1

The District Court exercised jurisdiction over this case under 18 U.S.C. S 3231, and we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Because Singletary challenges the constitutionality of S 922(g)(1), we will exercise plenary review over the District Court's assertion of federal jurisdiction. See United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 469 (3d Cir. 1999) ("Our review of the statute's constitutionality is plenary, though we must respect Congress's ample discretion to determine the appropriate exercise of its Commerce Clause authority."), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1131 (2000); accord United States v. One Toshiba Color Television, 213 F.3d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) ("Our review over constitutional issues is plenary."). Moreover, "[b]ecause each of [Singletary's] challenges is based on the district court's construction of statutes and case law, we will exercise plenary review." United States v. Cross, 128 F.3d 145, 147 (3d Cir. 1997).

A.

Under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, Congress is empowered "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. Const., art. I, S 8, cl. 3. Pursuant to this authority, Congress enacted the felon-in-possession statute, which provides, in relevant part:

(g) It shall be unlawful for any person --

(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

18 U.S.C. S 922(g)(1). The statute can be read to create three crimes for convicted felons: (1) "to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce... any firearm or ammunition"; (2) "to... possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition"; and (3) "to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce." Plainly, (1) shipping or transporting and (3) receiving any firearm or ammunition "in interstate or foreign commerce" are both distinct crimes. Notably, however, Congress did not use the phrase "in interstate or foreign commerce" when it criminalized possession. Instead, Congress merely employed the phrase "in or affecting commerce."

At the time the Supreme Court established what remains the governing jurisprudence on federalization of gun possession, the felon-in-possession statute, then codified at 18 U.S.C. S 1202(a), was phrased differently. Specifically, the "predecessor statute to S 922(g)(1)[ ] made any felon `who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting commerce... any firearm' guilty of a federal offense." United States v. Gateward, 84 F.3d 670, 671 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting 18 U.S.C. S 1202(a) (repealed 1986)). In two key decisions, the Supreme Court addressed the interstate commerce aspect of this predecessor statute to S 922(g)(1).

First, in United States v. Bass, the Court construed 18 U.S.C. S 1202(a) against the Government's contention that the statute "banned all possessions and receipts of firearms by convicted felons, and that no connection with interstate...

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