U.S. v. Smith
| Decision Date | 31 July 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-1124.,No. 01-2427.,01-1124.,01-2427. |
| Citation | 344 F.3d 479 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Smith, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Nancy L. McGunn, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant.
Jennifer J. Peregord, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF:
Nancy L. McGunn, Penny R. Beardslee, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant.
Jennifer J. Peregord, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee.
Before: BATCHELDER, MOORE, and CLAY, Circuit Judges.
This is a consolidated appeal. In Case No. 01-1124, Defendant, James Smith, appeals from the district court's judgment entered on January 5, 2001, sentencing Defendant to twenty-one months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a restitution payment of $61,774.80 following Defendant's guilty plea conviction for making false statements to the Social Security Administration ("the SSA") in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. In Case No. 01-2427, Defendant appeals from the district court's order entered on October 4, 2001, granting the government's motion to enter a document into the record. For the reasons set forth below, we VACATE IN PART Defendant's sentence in Case No. 01-1124, we REVERSE the district court's order in Case No. 01-2427, and we REMAND both cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The government filed a criminal complaint on February 14, 2000, alleging that Defendant fraudulently collected disability benefits, totaling $61,744.80, from the SSA using the name and social security number of Michael C. Johnson from November of 1995 to January of 2000 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641. On the same day the complaint was filed, the district court issued a warrant for Defendant's arrest. Defendant turned himself into the United States Marshal Service on February 24, 2000. Thereafter, on March 15, 2000, the district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice.
The government filed an information on August 16, 2000, charging Defendant with one count of making false statements to the SSA in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Specifically, the information charged Defendant with knowingly and wilfully making the following false statements: (1) that his name was Michael C. Johnson, (2) that his social security number was identical to Michael C. Johnson's social security number, and (3) that he had never used a different name or social security number. On the same day the information was filed, Defendant filed a waiver of indictment.
At his arraignment held on September 11, 2000, Defendant entered a guilty plea to the information pursuant to a Rule 11 plea agreement. The plea agreement provides in relevant part:
A.... The defendant stipulates that all the allegations set forth in the information are true and constitute a violation of the statute.
B. The maximum term of imprisonment shall not exceed twenty-one (21) months.
C. The maximum term of supervised release shall not exceed three (3) years. Violation of any condition of supervised release may result in the defendant being imprisoned for the entire term of supervised release or being prosecuted for contempt of court under 18 U.S.C. § 401(3).
D. The maximum fine shall not exceed the statutory maximum.
E. The court is required to impose a $100 special assessment. The defendant will pay the assessment before sentence is imposed and will provide a receipt at sentencing.
F. The court can order the defendant to pay restitution for all losses resulting from his relevant offense conduct.
G. The defendant, by entering into this plea agreement, knowingly and voluntarily gives up any right he may have to appeal any sentence which is within the parameters of this agreement as delineated above.
. . . .
J. This agreement incorporates the complete understanding between the parties, and no other promises have been made by the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Michigan to the defendant or to the attorney for the defendant.
(J.A. at 14-15.) Before accepting Defendant's guilty plea, the district court explained the provisions of the plea agreement to Defendant. The district court then asked Defendant whether he understood the plea agreement, and Defendant replied "Yes, sir." (J.A. at 98.)
The United States Probation Office issued a Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") on December 18, 2000. The PSR determined that Defendant caused the SSA loss in the amount of $61,744.80, and recommended that Defendant pay restitution in that amount. The PSR also determined that Defendant had a total offense level of 11 and a criminal history category of IV. The PSR therefore recommended a sentencing range of 18 to 24 months of imprisonment.
Defendant filed a sentencing memorandum on December 27, 2000, objecting to, inter alia, the PSR's determination of the amount of loss. Defendant argued that had he used his own name and social security number, he could have legally collected $28,064.00 in social security income benefits from the SSA due to his diagnosed mental illness. Defendant argued that the $28,064.00 in social security income benefits he could have legally collected should be offset against the $61,744.80 in disability benefits he fraudulently collected. Defendant therefore argued that the SSA sustained loss in the amount of $33,710.00, and that he should pay restitution in that amount.
At the sentencing hearing held on January 3, 2001, the government argued that the amount of loss and restitution should equal the amount of disability benefits Defendant fraudulently collected, $61,774.80. The district court agreed and stated that it will order Defendant to pay restitution in the amount of "roughly $61,000." (J.A. at 124.) The district court further stated that it will order the "matter ... be resolved with the Social Security Administration as to whether or not . . . [the alleged $28,064.00 in social security income benefits Defendant could have legally collected] is a legitimate offset." (J.A. at 125-26.) Defense counsel stated that Defendant would agree to the district court's order if the order specified that the government has the burden of proving Defendant is not entitled to an offset. The district court stated that it was "not going to get involved in a quarrel as to who has the burden of proof." (J.A. at 126.)
The district court entered judgment against Defendant on January 5, 2001, sentencing Defendant to twenty-one months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a restitution payment of $61,774.80. In the judgment, the district court noted:
Defendant Smith contends that he was legally entitled to receive social security benefits in the amount of $28,064.00 and that this should be off-set against his illegal receipt of $61,774,80. If the Social Security Administration on inquiry of the Office of the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan agrees with this contention, then this amount of restitution will be reduced by that amount.
(J.A. at 53.) Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal on January 9, 2001, appealing the district court's judgment (Case No. 01-1124).
By letter dated September 5, 2001, the SSA notified the government that it had a policy of not paying social security income benefits retroactively to an individual who, like Defendant, fraudulently collected disability benefits. On September 13, 2001, the government filed a motion to admit the SSA's September 5, 2001-letter into the record pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(e)(2). In its motion, the government claimed that it was unaware of the district court's notation in the judgment directing the SSA to resolve the offset dispute until Case No. 01-1124 was on appeal. Defendant filed a response to the government's motion on September 28, 2001. In his response, Defendant objected to the admission of the letter into the record and requested a hearing on the matter. By order entered on October 4, 2001, the district court granted the government's motion without conducting a hearing on the matter. Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal on October 11, 2001 appealing the district court's order (Case No. 01-2427).
This Court reviews the question of whether a defendant waived his right to appeal his sentence in a valid plea agreement de novo. United States v. Stubbs, 279 F.3d 402, 411 (6th Cir.2002).
It is well settled that a defendant in a criminal case may waive his right to appeal his sentence in a valid plea agreement. See United States v. Fleming, 239 F.3d 761, 763-64 (6th Cir.2001); Stubbs, 279 F.3d at 410. For a plea agreement to be constitutionally valid, a defendant must have entered into the agreement knowingly and voluntarily. See Fleming, 239 F.3d at 764. "When a [d]efendant waives his right to appeal his sentence in a valid plea agreement, this Court is bound by that agreement and will not review the sentence except in limited circumstances." Stubbs, 279 F.3d at 410.
In the plea agreement, Defendant agreed to "pay restitution for all losses resulting from his relevant offense conduct," and to "knowingly and voluntarily give[] up any right he may have to appeal any sentence which is within the parameters of this agreement[.]" (J.A. at 15.) The government argues that the above-quoted language indicates that Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his sentence in any respect. Defendant, on the other hand, argues that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to appeal the manner in which the district court determined the amount of restitution.
The plea agreement is ambiguous as to the amount and manner of determining restitution. The plea...
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