U.S. v. Smith

• Decision Date: 12 January 2009
• Docket Number: No. 08-86-02-GFVT.,08-86-02-GFVT.
• Citation: 593 F.Supp.2d 948
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Richard SMITH, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky

593 F.Supp.2d 948

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Richard SMITH, Defendant.

Criminal No. 08-86-02-GFVT.

United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Southern Division, London.

January 12, 2009.

Gregory A. Ousley, U.S. Attorney's Office, London, KY, for Plaintiff.

Douglas Glenn Benge, Jensen, Cessna, Benge & Webster, London, KY, for Defendant.

AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

VAN TATENHOVE, District Judge.

Richard Smith was indicted for conspiracy to distribute, and possession with intent to distribute, methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. [R. 1.] On January 8, 2009, he pled guilty to the charge brought pursuant to section 846. [R. 61.] This resulted in Smith being subject to the mandatory detention provision of section 3143(a)(2). This requires that defendants who plead or are found guilty of certain crimes be mandatorily detained while awaiting imposition of sentence. This is the case unless the defendant is unlikely to flee or pose a danger and one of two other factors are present-either there is a substantial likelihood that an acquittal or new trial will be granted; or the United States recommends that no sentence of imprisonment be imposed. Here, these exceptions do not apply. Smith, therefore, was subject to mandatory detention. Despite this mandate, Smith moved for continued release pending sentencing for "exceptional reasons" under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c). For the reasons set forth below, Smith will be detained pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2).

I.

The statute at issue here, 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c), governs "appeal from a release or detention order" and allows a defendant to be released in certain circumstances for "exceptional reasons." The question presented, simply put, is this: does this statute grant district judges the authority to engage in the "exceptional reasons" analysis? While the question is simply stated, it has been met with conflicting answers.

Six circuits hold in published opinions that district courts have authority under section 3145(c) to consider whether "exceptional reasons" exist for granting release. However, a number of district courts in other circuits have interpreted the statute as a grant of jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a release or detention order only to courts of appellate jurisdiction. Although the Sixth Circuit has not decided the issue, it has followed its sister circuits in an unpublished decision, and determined that district judges are "not precluded from making a determination of exceptional circumstances in support of release." United States v. Cook, 42 Fed.Appx. 803, 804 (6th Cir.2002). Because the Sixth Circuit's holding in Cook is non-binding,¹ the district courts within this circuit remain divided.²

A.

The circuits finding in the law authority for a district court to consider "exceptional reasons" under section 3145(c) take a pragmatic approach. In United States v. Carr, the Fifth Circuit relies on no canons of statutory construction in its brief analysis of section 3145(c) and holds that a district court has authority under the statute to grant presentence release for "exceptional reasons." 947 F.2d 1239, 1240 (5th Cir.1991). The Carr court holds that Congress intends for section 3143(a)(2) to be read in conjunction with section 3145(c) because the "exceptional reasons" language of section 3145(c) was added to the statute at the same time as the mandatory detention provisions of sections 3143(a)(2) and (b)(2), and states that it can "see no reason why Congress would have limited this means of relief to reviewing courts." Id. It further reasons that because section 3143 uses the term "judicial officer" to refer to the person that may direct release and initially order detention, the term "judicial officer" in section 3145(c) applies to both lower courts and courts of appeal. Id. The Seventh Circuit's analysis in United States v. Herrera-Soto is similarly cursory in its holding that section 3145(c) applies to district courts. 961 F.2d 645, 647 (7th Cir.1992).

Published opinions from the Second, Tenth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits contain no independent statutory analysis, and hold, based on stare decisis, that section 3145(c) authorizes district courts to consider exceptional reasons. United States v. DiSomma, 951 F.2d 494, 496 (2d Cir.1991) (following Carr); United States v. Jones, 979 F.2d 804, 806 (10th Cir.1992) (following Carr, Herrera-Soto, DiSomma); United States v. Mostrom, 11 F.3d 93, 95 (8th Cir.1993) (following Carr); United States v. Garcia, 340 F.3d 1013, 1014 n. 1 (9th Cir.2003). District courts within these circuits follow precedent, but not without comment on the inadequacy of the majority view's reasoning. For example, a district court in Vermont followed the Second Circuit's decision in DiSomma, but none-theless commented that "[t]his circle of decisions, however well-intentioned, reflects a certain circularity of reasoning...." United States v. Bloomer, 791 F.Supp. 100, 102 n. 1 (D.Vt.1992).

Recently, more substantive articulations of this statutory construction have emerged. United States v. Price, No. 5:06CR41-11-V, 2008 WL 215811 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 24, 2008); United States v. Miller, 568 F.Supp.2d 764 (E.D.Ky.2008). The district courts in both Price and Miller examine the statutory language of section 3145(c) and determine that its language is ambiguous. Price, 2008 WL 215811 at *4-*5; Miller, 568 F.Supp.2d at 772. Specifically, they find that the term "judicial officer" in section 3145 is "reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning" because the term is used throughout the Bail Reform Act to refer to "judges at all levels of the federal judicial system, ranging from magistrate judges to appellate judges depending upon the posture of the case." Price, 2008 WL 215811 at *6, citing to United States v. El-Edwy, 272 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir.2001); Miller, 568 F.Supp.2d at 772.

Because the Price and Miller courts find the language of section 3145(c) ambiguous, they examine its legislative history and conclude that Congress did not intend for section 3145(c) to be limited to appellate courts. Price, 2008 WL 215811 at *6; Miller, 568 F.Supp.2d at 772. In particular, the Price and Miller courts determine that Congress intends for the "exceptional reasons" analysis to apply to district courts because the mandatory detention provision of section 3143(a)(2) was added to the Bail Reform Act at the same time the "exceptional reasons" clause was added to section 3145(c). Id. Further, the courts reason that Congress did not intend to limit the "exceptional reasons" analysis to appellate courts because a letter from the Department of Justice sent to the Senator who introduced the legislation did not expressly mention limiting a district court's ability to consider "exceptional reasons." Price, 2008 WL 215811 at *7, citing to United States v. DiSomma, 951 F.2d 494, 498 (2d Cir.1991); Miller, 568 F.Supp.2d at 773.

In addition to the legislative history, the Price court argues that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 9, which deals with release before and after a judgment of conviction, supports the conclusion that section 3145(c) applies to district courts. Price, 2008 WL 215811 at *8. The court concludes that because Rule 9(a) implies that a district court and appellate court may hear a motion for release before a judgment of conviction, and because sentencing takes place before a judgment of conviction is entered, then district courts necessarily have jurisdiction to hear motions under section 3145(c) before sentencing. Id. The court further concludes that Rule 9(b)'s use of the word "review" within the rules of appellate procedure signifies that "appeal" and "review" are synonymous, and therefore, the distinction between the titles of parts (a), (b), and (c) of section 3145 do not limit part (c) to appellate jurisdiction. Id.

Finally, both the Price and Miller courts note that district courts may authorize bail pending appeal under section 3143(c) and hold that district courts are "better equipped to find facts necessary to making a bail determination," and therefore, district courts may conduct the "exceptional reasons" analysis under section 3145(c). Price, 2008 WL 215811 at *8; Miller, 568 F.Supp.2d at 773.

B.

In those circuits that have not yet definitively construed section 3145(c), a diverse group of district courts have reached the opposite conclusion. This view was first set out by Judge Diamond of the Western District of Pennsylvania in United States v. Salome, 870 F.Supp. 648, 651-53 (W.D.Pa.1994). There, the court holds that the plain language of the statute, the statute's overall structure, and the procedures of Fed. R.App. P. 9(b) make clear that the authority to release a defendant for "exceptional reasons" under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) is only given to appellate courts. Id. The court emphasizes that the statute's title: "[a]ppeal from a release or detention order," and its first sentence: "[a]n appeal from a release or detention order ... is governed by ... section 1291 of title 28 [authorizing appeal only from final decisions of the district court] and section 3731 [authorizing appeal of criminal cases by the United States with the court of appeals] of this title," make logical sense only in the context of appellate jurisdiction. Id. at 652.

The Salome court further reasons that the overall structure of section 3145 demonstrates that part (c) applies only to appellate courts as parts (a) and (b) of the statute provide review from a magistrate judge or "a person other than a judge of a court having original jurisdiction over the offense and other than a Federal appellate court." 18 U.S.C. §§ 3145(a) and (b). Further, the court concludes that had Congress intended for district courts to decide whether "exceptional reasons" exist for release from mandatory detention, it would have included section 3145(c) within section 3143. I...