U.S. v. Smith
| Citation | 452 F.3d 323 |
| Decision Date | 30 June 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-4575.,No. 04-4574.,04-4574.,04-4575. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, and Molita Bryant; Wesley Palmer, Parties in Interest, v. Thomas E. SMITH, Jr., a/k/a Anthony Young, Defendant-Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, and Molita Bryant; Wesley Palmer, Parties in Interest, v. Tyrone Smallwood, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit) |
ARGUED: Frank Salvato, Alexandria, Virginia; Meghan Suzanne Skelton, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellants. Brian David Miller, General Services Administration, Office of the Inspector General, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Lana Marie Manitta, Martin & Arif, Springfield, Virginia, for Appellant Tyrone Smallwood. Frank W. Dunham, Jr., Federal Public Defender, Ivan D. Davis, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant Thomas E. Smith, Jr. Paul J McNulty, United States Attorney, Erik R. Barnett, Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Before WILKINSON and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and Glen E. CONRAD, United States District Judge for the Western District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge WILKINSON wrote the opinion, in which Judge WILLIAMS and Judge CONRAD joined.
Defendants Thomas E. Smith, Jr. and Tyrone Smallwood appeal their convictions and sentences arising from their participation in a large crack cocaine conspiracy and the murder of Conrad Shelton. Defendants primarily contend that the district court assumed the role of a prosecutor by rehabilitating government witnesses and frequently interrupting defense counsel's cross-examination. They further argue that venue was lacking in the Eastern District of Virginia. We hold there was no error in either respect. District courts deserve latitude in overseeing the presentation of evidence during a criminal proceeding, and the essential guarantee of a fair trial was not infringed. We further hold that venue on all counts was proper in the Eastern District because several acts in furtherance of the underlying drug conspiracy were perpetrated there. With respect to all other issues raised, we find no error, and thus affirm the judgment of the district court.
This case arises from the prosecution of members of a large drug manufacturing and distribution ring that operated in Virginia, Maryland, and Washington, D.C., during the 1990s. Defendants Thomas Smith and Tyrone Smallwood were key participants in this criminal organization, which was spearheaded by Walter Fleming, who has since pleaded guilty. Evidence adduced at trial revealed an extensive conspiracy dedicated to selling crack cocaine, and we shall undertake only a summary of those events relevant to the issues presented here.
Smith and Smallwood worked as partners in Fleming's distribution scheme. The two maintained several residences, including a Washington, D.C., apartment that Smith had rented under an alias. Defendants utilized this apartment to store drugs and convert powder cocaine into crack. Smith also used his alias to lease a house in Hyattsville, Maryland. On November 4, 1996, authorities searched this home, found both defendants present, and discovered Smallwood attempting to flush drugs down a toilet. As part of the raid, officers seized drugs, drug paraphernalia, firearms, body armor, cash, and vehicles, including Smith's Toyota Land Cruiser, which defendants had used to facilitate drug transactions. Other evidence introduced at trial showed that Smallwood had sold large amounts of crack cocaine on numerous occasions, including two separate sales of one-eighth of a kilogram of crack for $2800, one of which was conducted near a community swimming pool. When confronted by the FBI in 2001, Smith stated: "I am definitely guilty of a drug conspiracy and dealing drugs in the past."
Smallwood also had a role as an enforcer in Fleming's drug network, frequently accompanying Fleming on missions to confront individuals whom Fleming suspected of spreading rumors and stealing crack. On one mission, Fleming, with Smallwood present, shot a member of his own crew, later discarding his weapon in the Anacostia River. On another, Smallwood joined Fleming to interrogate an individual who had spread a story that Fleming was cooperating with authorities. Fleming later arranged to have this man killed.
Much of the evidence presented at trial concerned the murder of Conrad Shelton, an addict who did odd jobs for Smith and Smallwood in exchange for crack cocaine. Shelton's handyman duties included washing cars for defendants and their associates. Anthony Brown, who pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting Shelton's murder, testified that Shelton was not paid in crack until he finished the washing because Shelton would otherwise rush through the job in order to get high.
In early 1996, Smallwood discovered that one of his apartments had been robbed, and drugs and money taken. Smallwood suspected that Shelton — with his knowledge of defendants' residences and drug operation — had played a role in the theft. On February 11, 1996, Shelton received several phone calls, and told his girlfriend, Barbara Wyatt, that he was going to Smallwood's apartment. According to Wyatt, Shelton was nervous and agitated because he had been involved in stealing crack from Smallwood. Shelton was seen with more crack than usual that day.
Once Shelton arrived at Smallwood's apartment, Smallwood accused Shelton of organizing the burglary, and threatened to kill him. Smallwood, Smith, Anthony Brown, and Shelton then got in a car so that Shelton could help the defendants locate the person who had stolen Smallwood's drugs and cash. They eventually parked the car at the mouth of an alley in Washington, D.C., and while Brown acted as a lookout, Smith shot Shelton in the head. Both defendants thereafter fired multiple rounds into Shelton's body, twelve shots in all. Two of Shelton's head wounds contained soot and stipple, suggesting shots fired at point-blank range. Ballistic examinations further revealed that the bullets and cartridges at the scene of the murder matched guns that defendants habitually carried and that they were seen with that evening. Shelton's murder went unsolved for some time. Years later, when confronted by the FBI, Smith admitted that he often beat Shelton when narcotics or money were missing, and that he "could straighten out the story and clarify what happened when [Shelton] was killed."
On December 23, 2003, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia indicted Smith for conspiracy to distribute more than fifty grams of cocaine base (crack cocaine), see 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000) (Count One), and both defendants for murder while engaged in a drug trafficking crime, see id. § 848(e)(1)(A) (Count Two), and the use of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime, causing the death of Conrad Shelton, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), (j) (2000) (Count Three). Defendant Smallwood was charged only with Counts Two and Three because he had pleaded guilty to his role in the drug conspiracy in the District of Columbia in 1996.
A jury trial was conducted from February 9 to February 24, 2004, at the conclusion of which the jury found defendants guilty on all counts. The district court sentenced Smith to concurrent life sentences for the drug conspiracy and murder, and to a 120-month consecutive sentence for the use of a firearm. Smallwood was likewise sentenced to life in prison for Shelton's murder, plus an additional 120 months for the firearm offense. From these convictions and sentences, defendants bring this appeal.
Defendants' primary contention is that they were denied a fair trial because the district judge improperly intervened with prosecution-friendly questions and interruptions. We believe, however, that the district court acted appropriately in ensuring that matters were clearly presented to the jury, and that a multi-week trial did not bog down.
We begin with the standard of review. Defendants neglected to raise at trial any objections to judicial intervention, and so we review their allegations here for plain error. See United States v. Godwin, 272 F.3d 659, 672 (4th Cir.2001). Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, "[t]he court may interrogate witnesses," and "[o]bjections to ... interrogation by [the court] may be made at the time or at the next opportunity when the jury is not present." Fed.R.Evid. 614(b), (c). Defendants in this case failed to do either. A defendant is, of course, not required to object to each and every question or comment that a district court makes, as such interjection would inevitably prove disruptive at trial. But where, as here, defendants failed to bring even a single alleged error to the district court's attention during trial, we cannot conclude that they preserved this issue for appeal. See Godwin, 272 F.3d at 672.
Defendants nevertheless contend that harmless error review is required because they filed both a motion in limine and a post-verdict motion on judicial intervention. This argument must fail, for the former was premature and the latter dilatory. It is true that motions in limine may in some circumstances suffice to preserve an error for appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Ellis, 121 F.3d 908, 918 (4th Cir.1997). But in the context of improper judicial intervention, pretrial motions will not typically constitute a proper objection because the exact nature of any judicial overreaching cannot be known until the trial is underway. See United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1321, 1325 (4th Cir. 1996) (...
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