U.S. v. Sneath, 77-1232
| Decision Date | 08 June 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 77-1232,77-1232 |
| Citation | 557 F.2d 149 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. David Clarin SNEATH, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Patrick R. Doyle, Las Vegas, Nev., for appellant.
Robert G. Renner, U. S. Atty. and Thorwald H. Anderson, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Minneapolis, Minn., for appellee.
Before HEANEY, ROSS and WEBSTER, Circuit Judges.
David Clarin Sneath appeals from a sentence of eighteen months' imprisonment imposed after his guilty plea to a charge of interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312. (D.Minn., Judge Larson). Sneath's claims on appeal relate to the district court's reliance, in sentencing him, on allegations in his presentence report that he lied to the FBI during their investigation. He contends (1) that he denied the allegations of untruthfulness and the court failed to afford him an opportunity to rebut and explore the circumstances of the information; and (2) that even if true, lying to the FBI is an improper sentencing consideration.
According to the presentence report, Sneath admitted that statements he made to the FBI during his initial interview with them were untrue. The report was disclosed to and reviewed by Sneath's counsel prior to sentencing. At the sentencing hearing, the court alluded to Sneath's untruthfulness as follows:
THE COURT: I agree with Mr. Kelly, (defense counsel) there aren't any previous felony convictions as far as I know. There have been many other probably more minor problems.
One problem here, of course, was that by lying to the FBI agents you made the investigation very difficult. The FBI had to apparently go back and forth and back and forth to try to find the facts.
Subsequent to this colloquy, the court asked Sneath whether he believed that he "fully cooperated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation," and he responded affirmatively. Neither Sneath nor his attorney, however, otherwise challenged the allegations of untruthfulness, although both addressed the court prior to sentencing. 1
It is doubtful that Sneath can be said to have denied the allegations of untruthfulness at his sentencing hearing. No affirmative denial was asserted, and his response to the court's inquiry as to his cooperation with the FBI, viewed in context, seems directed more to whether he was currently being truthful with the FBI than whether he had ever lied to them. If the allegations were not denied, Sneath cannot now assert that he was deprived of an opportunity to rebut them since he was made aware of them through the court's reference to them and disclosure of the presentence report, was afforded an opportunity to address the court, and was not precluded from presenting anything to the district court. See United States v. Weinschenk, 414 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1969).
Even viewing Sneath's response to the court's inquiry as a denial of the allegations of untruthfulness, the district court did not err in failing to further inquire into the veracity of the allegations. The allegations seem collateral in nature, and from a reading of the sentencing transcript, it does not appear that they were a major factor in the sentence imposed. Accordingly, the court was not required to initiate a trial-type inquiry into the basis for the allegations, but only to afford Sneath an opportunity to present his side of the story. See United States v. Needles, 472 F.2d 652, 658 (2d Cir. 1973). This the court did.
Sneath further contends that even if true, the allegations that he lied to the FBI may not properly be considered as a sentencing factor. This contention is without merit. A sentencing judge is entitled to consider a wide...
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