U.S. v. Snyder, 90-1191

• Decision Date: 25 April 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-1191,90-1191
• Parties: 32 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1006 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. D.W. SNYDER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 1090

930 F.2d 1090

32 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1006

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. D.W. SNYDER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 90-1191.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 25, 1991.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc

Denied June 21, 1991.

Robert Glass, Glass & Reed, New Orleans, La. and Thomas E. Royals, Royals, Hartung & Davis, Jackson, Miss., for defendant-appellant.

James B. Tucker, James Kent McDaniel, Asst. U.S. Attys., and George Phillips, U.S. Atty., Jackson, Miss., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.

Before RUBIN, POLITZ, and DUHE, Circuit Judges.

DUHE, Circuit Judge.

D.W. Snyder appeals his convictions for extortion, filing false tax returns, bribery, and conspiracy. Snyder argues that federal jurisdiction was not proper and that the district judge committed reversible error in his instructions to the jury and in his admission of hearsay evidence. Finding that federal jurisdiction is proper and that the district court did not err, we affirm.

D.W. Snyder was the subject of two separate federal indictments involving charges that Snyder abused his position as a member of the Mississippi Public Service Commission. ¹ At the time of his indictment, Snyder had served seven terms on the Commission.

The first indictment accused Snyder of three counts of extortion under color of right under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1951(a), and four counts of filing false tax returns under 26 U.S.C. Sec. 7206(1). The second indictment accused him of one count of conspiracy to commit bribery under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371 and two counts of bribery under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 666. Snyder was one of three defendants named in the second indictment. The other two defendants were Thurston Little and Travis Ward. After the court granted each defendant a separate trial, it consolidated Snyder's two indictments for trial.

The evidence showed that Snyder had always run his campaigns informally, often spending his own funds for campaign expenses and replacing them later when he received contributions. During one campaign, Snyder received money from two independent telephone companies and a trucking firm regulated by the Commission. Snyder contended that this money consisted of voluntary campaign contributions. The government argued that the money was the result of extortion by the commissioner under color of right.

The evidence at trial also showed that Snyder and two coconspirators participated in a complicated bribery scheme. As part of the scheme, Snyder agreed to arrange for the Commission's approval of a company's rate increase if the company would agree to business transactions favorable to Snyder and his coconspirators. The trial testimony also suggested that Snyder accepted some funds directly in exchange for influencing the Commission's official actions. Finally, the evidence showed that Snyder failed to report as income the money he received through extortion and bribery.

Snyder was convicted on all ten counts. The court imposed concurrent prison sentences on all counts, resulting in a total prison term of eight years. It also imposed on Snyder fines of $100,000, special assessments of $500, and costs of $33,142.38.

Snyder now contends that the district judge erred in instructing the jury that Mississippi law prohibited Snyder from receiving campaign contributions from entities regulated by the Commission. He also claims that the court erroneously admitted a hearsay statement by a coconspirator on the bribery counts.

Snyder admits that 18 U.S.C. Sec. 666 extends federal jurisdiction to cases involving bribery by officials of state agencies that receive federal funds. He argues, however, that the statute is inapplicable in this case because the alleged offenses had no impact on the federal funds received by the Commission.

Jurisdiction

Snyder was convicted of two counts of bribery under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 666, which prohibits theft and bribery by officials of state and local agencies that receive federal funds. ² Snyder argues that section 666 should be construed narrowly to provide subject matter jurisdiction only in cases in which the official's alleged conduct directly affects the federal funds received by the agency.

This question of statutory interpretation is freely reviewable by this Court on appeal. See United States v. Westmoreland, 841 F.2d 572, 576 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 820, 109 S.Ct. 62, 102 L.Ed.2d 39 (1988). Snyder urges a variety of arguments on this issue. We find it unnecessary, however, to discuss these arguments in detail because we have previously considered and rejected them. See id. at 574-78.

Snyder's attempts to distinguish Westmoreland are unpersuasive. As we noted in that case, "Congress has cast a broad net to encompass local officials who may administer federal funds, regardless of whether they actually do." Id. at 577. Snyder is inextricably caught in the net.

Jury Instructions

Snyder also contends that the court erred in instructing the jury on the charges of extortion under the Hobbs Act. We review jury instructions to determine "whether the court's charge, as a whole, is a correct statement of the law and whether it clearly instructs jurors as to the principles of law applicable to the factual issues confronting them." United States v. August, 835 F.2d 76, 77 (5th Cir.1987); see United States v. Graves, 669 F.2d 964, 970-71 (5th Cir.1982).

Snyder does not argue that the district court's charge was an incorrect statement of federal law. The judge correctly instructed the jury that to establish an offense under the Hobbs Act, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt three essential elements: (1) that Snyder induced a person to part with property; (2) that Snyder acted knowingly and willfully by means of extortion; and (3) that the extortionate transaction delayed, interrupted, or adversely affected interstate commerce. The court further explained that extortion under color of official right means the wrongful taking by a public officer of money or property not due to the officer or the office.

The judge also correctly noted that a jury must consider any applicable state law. He adequately paraphrased the Mississippi statute that prohibits any member of the Public Service Commission from accepting any "gift, pass, money or any other benefits whatsoever, either directly or indirectly" from anyone employed or connected with any public utility regulated by the Commission. ³

But Snyder contends that the judge then went hopelessly astray in interpreting the state statute. The judge advised the jury "that as a matter of law a public service commissioner is prohibited from accepting campaign contributions from public utilities and common carriers and that, accordingly, such contributions are not money or property such a public officer is entitled to receive."

Snyder argues that this interpretation of the statute effectively withdrew from the jury the right to decide whether the money received by Snyder consisted of legitimate campaign contributions or illegally extorted funds. Snyder claims this interpretation deprived him of his only defense to extortion and filing false tax returns--that he had not wrongfully taken money but had legally received nontaxable campaign contributions.

We review de novo questions of statutory construction. See Farmers-Merchants Bank & Trust Co. v. CIT Group/Equip. Fin., Inc., 888 F.2d 1524, 1526 n. 3 (5th Cir.1989). Unfortunately, we have no Mississippi case law and little legislative history to guide us in interpreting this state statute. At the vortex of the dispute is the statutory mandate that members of the Public Service Commission must not accept "any gift, pass, money or any other benefits whatsoever, either directly or indirectly" from anyone employed by a public utility regulated by the Commission. Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 77-1-11 (1972).

Snyder exhorts us to embark upon a complicated historic and linguistic analysis of the statute. He proffers a profusion of polemics involving (1) the history of the statute, (2) comparison of the statute to other Mississippi statutes, (3) custom and practice under the statute, (4) the ejusdem generis doctrine of statutory construction, (5) the need to construe the statute strictly against the state, and (6) first amendment concerns implicated by construing the statute too broadly.

We believe that this assiduous analysis is unnecessary. "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience." O.W. Holmes, The Common Law 1 (1881). After studying the Mississippi Supreme Court's common-sense approach to statutory interpretation, we conclude that the plain meaning of the statute provides a sufficient basis for our decision. See, e.g., Knight v. State, 574 So.2d 662 (Miss.1990); Frazier v. State, 504 So.2d 675, 724 (Miss.1987); Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. L. & T. Developers, Inc., 437 So.2d 7, 11 (Miss.1983).

In a recent opinion, the Mississippi Supreme Court confronted the issue of whether the game of bingo constitutes a lottery, which is prohibited by statute in Mississippi. See Knight, 574 So.2d at 662. The court explained that "disposition of this case is not reached by purporting to know what the framers intended nor by utilizing Pythagorean logic." Id. Instead, the court relied on the experience of the judges and on the popular meanings of the terms "bingo" and "lottery" as shown in dictionaries. Id.

The court noted that both games involve the elements of chance, consideration, and prize. But this similarity, the court recognized, does not necessarily mean that bingo is a lottery, for under that approach, the stock market could also be termed a lottery. The court reasoned that the term "lottery" is not a "generic umbrella" that can encompass any enterprise that involves these three elements. Instead, the term "gambling" would be the appropriate generic umbrella. The court therefore...