U.S. v. Snyder, CR. No. 95-10200-EFH.
| Decision Date | 14 January 1997 |
| Docket Number | CR. No. 95-10200-EFH. |
| Citation | 954 F.Supp. 19 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Eric SNYDER. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Richard M. Welsh, North Grafton, MA, John J. Bonistalli, Law Offices of John J. Bonistalli, and Bernard Grossberg, Boston, MA, for Eric Snyder.
James Lang, United States Attorney's Office, Boston, MA, for the U.S.
MEMORANDUM AND SENTENCING ORDER
This matter is before the Court for disposition.
On June 28, 1995, a Federal Grand Jury returned a one-count Indictment, charging the defendant, Eric Snyder, with being a Felon in Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition. Defendant was arrested by the Boston Police Department on January 10, 1995 and remained in state custody until his arraignment in federal court on July 6, 1995. He has been detained since the date of his arrest.
Count one charges that on or about January 10, 1995, at Boston, in the District of Massachusetts, Eric Snyder, having previously been convicted in a court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, did knowingly possess, in and affecting commerce, a firearm and ammunition, to wit: a Colt .32 caliber semiautomatic pistol and .32 caliber ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
On July 26, 1996, Defendant Snyder was found guilty after a jury trial which began on July 22, 1996 before this Court.
The firearm was seized in a briefcase found in the trunk of defendant's girlfriend's motor vehicle after he was arrested by the Boston police on January 10, 1995 while driving this motor vehicle.
Defendant was charged in the state District Court for carrying a firearm.1 He was not charged in state court with armed robbery or any other offense arising out of this incident.2 Although the case had been investigated by the Boston police and initially prosecuted in state District Court, a federal indictment was returned on June 28, 1995. The state charge was later dismissed and the case was "adopted" for federal prosecution because of the enhanced sentencing provisions of the federal law.
Because defendant's criminal record warranted that he be classified as an Armed Career Criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4, the Federal Guidelines pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2) and § 2K2.1(b)(5) require the Court to impose a term of imprisonment of 262 to 327 months based upon a total offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of VI. The United States Attorney has recommended a term of 262 months.
Based upon my experience in the practice of criminal law,3 it is my judgment that, had this case been pursued in state court as initially contemplated, defendant would have received a term of imprisonment of between one and two and one-half years, not the 21 years, 10 months to 27 years, 3 months required to be imposed in federal court for the same offense.
The gross disparity in the sentences to be imposed for the same offense determined entirely by the forum in which the offense is prosecuted causes this judge grave concern. And this concern is exacerbated when, as is the case here, this prosecution was of local origin for the "local" offense of carrying a firearm. This case is an example of the United States District Court being used by local law enforcement as its sentencing court for "local" crimes committed by certain selected individuals.
The decision to prosecute this state case as a federal case lies in the unfettered and unreviewable discretion of the United States Attorney to select certain state defendants from among vast numbers charged with that same offense under state law for disparate sentencing treatment.4
And in the exercise of this absolute discretion in selecting which individual state defendant will suffer the disparate sentencing treatment, the United States Attorney, in effect, imposes the sentence, as the ostensible "sentencing" judge is a mere passive instrument in carrying out the United States Attorney's selective discretion. For the Judicial Branch has been stripped of its traditional inherent power as an impartial magistrate to impose the sentence, as under federal sentencing guidelines that power, in effect, has been transferred to the Executive Branch under its authority to select the charge and the defendant. In brief, disparate sentencing treatment is imposed on a selected defendant by the exercise of absolute prosecutorial discretion by an interested party to the case without any independent judicial supervision or intervention.
This case, thus, involves a sole prosecutor having the absolute power to determine whether a certain defendant will serve a 21-year plus term of imprisonment rather than a one-year plus term of imprisonment for the same offense. This raises fundamental issues of fairness in sentencing under the due process clause and de facto selective prosecution under the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.
For the Federal Sentencing Guidelines established to eradicate disparity in sentencing in the federal courts are being used to create disparity between those defendants charged in state court and those charged in federal court for the same crime.
At the outset, this Court does not find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed an armed robbery using the firearm upon which his conviction is grounded. The defendant was not charged in state court with armed robbery. Nor is there any mention in the police report filed at the time of his arrest of an armed robbery. Nor does this Court find the testimony of the government's witness Hawk credible concerning this uncharged allegation. As a result, the Court rules that the defendant's offense level shall be set at 33, criminal history category VI. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4.(b)(3)(B).
In Koon v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996), the Supreme Court ruled that district courts have discretion at sentencing to consider all factors that are not categorically proscribed by the Sentencing Commission. ___ U.S. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 2051. When deciding if a mitigating circumstance is adequately considered by the Sentencing Commission, a district court can only look to the Sentencing Guidelines, the policy statements, and the official commentary of the Sentencing Commission. Id. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 2050. If a factor is unmentioned in the Sentencing Guidelines, a district court is required to consider both the structure and theory of the applicable guidelines and the Sentencing Guidelines taken as a whole and then decide if the factor(s) take the case out of the applicable guideline's heartland. Id. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 2045.
The Government, in its Response to the Court's Memorandum and Order of November 25, 1996, cites and quotes from United States v. Deitz, 991 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1993), for its position that disparity between state and federal sentences is a factor the...
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U.S. v. Snyder, 97-1233
...sentencing guidelines and the sentence Snyder likely would have received had state authorities prosecuted him. See United States v. Snyder, 954 F.Supp. 19, 22 (D.Mass.1997) (memorandum explicating reasons for sentence). We thus confront a question of novel impression in this circuit: Is fed......
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U.S. v. Snyder
...Judge Harrington chose to depart downward, explaining his decision in a published memorandum. See United States v. Snyder, 954 F. Supp. 19, 22 (D. Mass. 1997) (hereinafter "Snyder I"). In his view, a downward departure was justified because had Snyder been prosecuted and convicted under sta......
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U.S. v. Snyder, 00-1051
...too harsh, Judge Harrington chose to depart downward, explaining his decision in a published memorandum. See United States v. Snyder, 954 F. Supp. 19, 22 (D. Mass. 1997) (hereinafter "Snyder I"). In his view, a downward departure was justified because had Snyder been prosecuted and convicte......
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