U.S. v. Solano, Nos. 79-1596

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: Before WALLACE, KENNEDY and TANG; TANG
• Citation: 605 F.2d 1141
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William Joseph SOLANO, Jr., Bobby Vernon England, Winston Bryant McConney, Raymond Delbert Witt, Alan David Passaro, Sharon Barger, Ralph Hubert Barger, Jr., John Palomar, Donald Duane Smith, Bert S. Stefanson, James Dewey Witt, Defendants-Appellants. to 79-1599 and 79-1603 to 79-1609.
• Docket Number: Nos. 79-1596
• Decision Date: 05 October 1979

Page 1141

605 F.2d 1141 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
William Joseph SOLANO, Jr., Bobby Vernon England, Winston
Bryant McConney, Raymond Delbert Witt, Alan David Passaro,
Sharon Barger, Ralph Hubert Barger, Jr., John Palomar,
Donald Duane Smith, Bert S. Stefanson, James Dewey Witt,
Defendants-Appellants. Nos. 79-1596 to 79-1599 and 79-1603 to 79-1609. United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit. Oct. 5, 1979.
As Amended Oct. 19, 1979.

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Gilbert Eisenberg, Filippelli & Eisenberg, Kent A. Russell, San Francisco, Cal., Richard E. Hove, Sullivan, Nakahara, Du Bois and Hove, Oakland, Cal., for defendants-appellants.

Sanford Svetcov, San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.

Before WALLACE, KENNEDY and TANG, Circuit Judges.

TANG, Circuit Judge.

These consolidated appeals are brought by eleven defendants who have been jointly indicted. The appellants have been charged with various violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) provisions of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d). In addition, certain appellants face federal drug and firearms charges.

Each appellant alleges that the RICO prosecution should be barred on the ground of double jeopardy, and now appeals the district court's denial of his or her motion to dismiss. Appeals from denials of motions to dismiss based on double jeopardy are permissible prior to trial. Abney v. United States,431 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977). These appeals have been expedited, and were consolidated for oral argument and consideration.

Before addressing the arguments made by each appellant, we discuss several general legal issues that are common to many of the appeals before us.

I

First, Abney allows pre-trial appeals from denials of double jeopardy claims alone. The Supreme Court was careful to note in this regard that:

Our conclusion that a defendant may seek immediate appellate review of a district court's rejection of his double jeopardy claim is based on the special considerations permeating claims of that nature which justify a departure from the normal rule of finality. Quite obviously, such considerations do not extend beyond the claim of former jeopardy . . . .

Abney, 431 U.S. at 663, 97 S.Ct. at 2042.

Several of the appellants present arguments that are based on the Due Process Clause, and other appellants ask this court to exercise its inherent supervisory power over district court proceedings. Insofar as such arguments do not directly invoke the Double Jeopardy Clause, they are not properly the subject of an Abney appeal and we decline to consider them at this stage of the proceedings. Similarly, a number of the appellants claim that by bringing this RICO prosecution the Government is violating various plea arrangements concerning prior offenses or acts. These appellants ask this court to enforce these agreements by barring the Government from using these offenses or acts at trial.

If the Government has agreed not to pursue certain criminal prosecutions in exchange

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for a guilty plea to other offenses, these plea arrangements must be respected. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). However, because claims relating to allegedly violated plea bargains are not strictly based upon the Double Jeopardy Clause, we will not consider such arguments in a pre-trial Abney appeal. We note that our holding here should not be construed as reflecting a decision on the merits of any of these claims; rather, we simply conclude that such claims are not properly before us now.

Second, various appellants allege that because they have been prosecuted in state court for acts that form part of the foundation of the federal RICO prosecution, they are being subjected to double jeopardy. These claims ignore the doctrine of dual sovereignty, which allows successive state and federal prosecutions for the same act. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 79 S.Ct. 666, 3 L.Ed.2d 729 (1959); United States v. Cordova, 537 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir.), Cert. denied, 429 U.S. 960, 97 S.Ct. 385, 50 L.Ed.2d 327 (1976).

Third, several appellants claim that they are being subjected to double jeopardy because they have already suffered federal prosecutions for acts that are now alleged as predicate offenses for purposes of the RICO prosecution. This court has held that a defendant can be convicted and separately punished both for the predicate acts which form the basis of a RICO charge, and for a substantive violation of RICO, without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 571 (9th Cir. 1979).

Finally, some appellants argue that the Government has violated a Department of Justice policy known as the Petite policy, which reflects a decision by the Justice Department not to prosecute crimes in federal court when there has been a state prosecution for substantially the same act. Such arguments are not properly the subject of an Abney appeal. Even if the issue were before us, this court has held that a violation of the Petite policy does not compel the dismissal of a federal prosecution. United States v. Snell,592 F.2d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir.), Cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 99 S.Ct. 2889, 61 L.Ed.2d 315 (1979).

With these considerations in mind, we turn to the individual appeals.

II

A. United States v. Passaro, No. 79-1603

We first discuss Passaro's claims because they best highlight the general considerations we find important in determining the validity of a double jeopardy claim brought prior to trial.

Passaro was charged in 1978 with violating federal drug laws, and was convicted in March 1979 of manufacturing drugs and conspiracy to manufacture drugs in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 846. He is charged in the present RICO prosecution both with a substantive violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), and with conspiracy to violate RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).

The gravamen of Passaro's claim is that the drug conspiracy for which he was convicted in March 1979 falls within, or is completely subsumed under, the larger more unified conspiracy alleged in the present indictment. He bases this claim on the fact that the present indictment for conspiracy to violate RICO relies upon overt acts that either formed the basis of the March 1979 conviction, or that were known to the Government when it prosecuted Passaro on the federal drug charges. Although admitting that it is unclear at this point what evidence will be used by the Government in the present prosecution, he asserts that the same evidence will be offered in the RICO prosecution that was offered in the prior drug case. He consequently asks this court either to bar the RICO prosecution or remand his appeal for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether in fact the two prosecutions are for the same conspiracy.

Our discussion of Passaro's claim must begin with an analysis of the standard to be used to determine whether a given prosecution violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Supreme Court...